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SYMPOSIUM ON RIOTS AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION

T

HERE are many voices which should be heard when a riot
threatens a large city. Several groups have a special interest, for
each is faced with some portent of disaster. Such groups include
the militants, the military, insurance companies, the courts, the
police, and ghetto residents themselves.
Attorneys, including law students, are no different. The type
and quality of services they provide genuinely contribute to the
stability of a riot-threatened community. Conversely, when certain
citizens of a community expect, but do not receive, adequate legal
representation, their situation is made even more intolerable and
their added disconsolation may hasten civil disobedience.
This Symposium provides a forum for certain spokesmen who
are deeply concerned with the responsibilities that lawyers should
assume when a riot flares. In the Symposium, the reader will, hopefully, discover that most of the authors are making a sincere, nonpolitical, and urgent appeal to members of the legal profession,
first, to understand some of the underlying and often legally reinforced provocations extant in the ghetto community, second, to
elucidate these grievances for the better understanding of all citizens, and finally, to make every effort to eliminate the causes of
civil disorder before it becomes a reality.
The issue begins with a report of the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association's Conference, entitled "Winter Rights - Summer Riots," held in conjunction with the ABA annual convention
on August 4, 1968. The edited remarks of eight distinguished Conference participants have been selected for publication.
In her introduction to the Conference report, Mrs. Lauritis
briefly describes the selected articles. As she points out, however,
the reader may find that the speeches and articles are not as important for their formal content as they are for disclosing the tension
which she describes as having pervaded the discussions. Those who
attended the opening of the Conference were all concerned professional people, bent on discovering proposals for better harnessing
the efforts of the organized bar to combat the causes of civil dis-
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order; apparently, however, the conferees were unable to prevent
the ensuing discussion of politically sensitive issues from becoming
polemical.
Using the shorter, often rhetorical, Conference papers as a
backdrop for the remainder of the issue, we have tried as much
as possible to select articles which either attempt to resolve or more
fully elaborate upon the issues raised by the Conference speakers.
For example, in his address to the Conference, Mr. Sterling
Tucker examines the negative attitudes which many Black citizens
have toward the law. He suggests that these attitudes might be
natural responses to some prevalent White attitudes toward the
ghetto community. This same proposition is fully documented by
former NAACP figurehead Leroy Clark and his wife in their article
entitled Denial of Rights to Black Citizens. The Clarks explain that
discriminatory attitudes are often manifested in the commission of
illegalities against Black citizens, setting in motion a series of reactions which may culminate in violence.
There are several other useful cross references from the articles
of Conference participants to those of other contributors. Conference
speaker Burt Griffin predicts that further urban violence will be
strategically directed against the police by militant groups; Riots and
the Police is the subject of Dr. Gresham Syke's article. Mr. Nathaniel
Jones briefly told the Institute of the discoveries made by the Kerner
Commission; the National Advisory Commission's report is reviewed
in detail later in the issue. Professor Phillip Ginsberg conducted a
Conference panel on the contributions which law students can make
in eliminating the causes of riots; in his responsive article, Professor
Alan Merson commends the participation of many students in the
Model Cities Program in Denver; also in the issue a white student
shares the dilemma which he experienced when attempting to win
the personal trust of a group of poor people and inspire them to a
confidence in the legal system which he represented. Finally, the need
for adequate legal services for everyone, a concern which was expressed throughout the Conference, is articulated by Mr. Junius Allison and Mr. Maynard J. Toll in their article entitled Advocates for
the Poor.
There is one exception to the format of using Conference papers
to introduce the longer articles in the issue. The Conference section
entitled Proper Handling of Mass Arrests stands by itself. Each of

the four authors who contributed to this section had the opportunity
to rework the remarks which they made to the Conference, and we
feel that their presentations do not require further elaboration.
A final comment about the composition of the issue should
be made. In advertising the Symposium, it was mentioned that we
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would include an article concerning the problems of providing a
system of reinsurance in order to adequately indemnify the losses
occurring to private property during a riot, but unfortunately this
article had not been received when the issue was sent to press.
Of course, the students who have produced this issue do not
pretend that it exposes all of the legally relevant issues that arise
in a riot situation, but we do hope that the Symposium includes
something which will interest and, perhaps, trouble any person who
reads it.
CharlesM. McGee
Symposium Editor

Two POUNDS OF FLESH
By ENE-MALLE LAURITIS*

The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, an organization concerned since the early 1900's with providing effective
legal advice and representation for the poor, sponsored the Conference "Winter Rights-Summer Riots" reported in this symposium issue. Mrs. Lauritis, editor of the NLADA publication,
Legal Aid Briefcase, critically evaluates what happened at the Conference and suggests that the problems that confronted Conference speakers are reflected in the actions and attitudes of lawyers
throughout the country.

T

HE Conference was convened on August 4, 1968, by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in conjunction with
the American Bar Association's annual convention. The topics to be
considered were built around the most burning issues of the time:
riots, their handling, and their prevention.
Printed herein are the edited remarks of eight Conference
participants. Professor Philip Ginsberg of the University of Chicago
begins the discussion with an examination of the function law
schools and students have regarding riots and slums. Mr. Sterling
Tucker from the National Urban League follows with an interpretation of the black viewpoint of law and order. The riot experiences of two cities, Detroit and Chicago, are then related from
opposing perspectives: Judge Vincent Brennan, Recorder's Court,
Detroit, and Benjamin Mackoff, Administrative Director of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, represent the courts; the
perspective of defense counsel is articulated by legal aid attorneys
Mr. Alphonso Harper and Mr. Frank Jones from Detroit and
Chicago, respectively.
Mr. Nathaniel Jones who served as counsel for the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders gives his impression of
the Kerner Report, which was produced by the Commission. Finally,
Mr. Burt Griffin, from the Office of Economic Opportunity, predicts
a new form of disruption in the ghetto.
The significance of "Winter Rights - Summer Riots," however, lies not so much in the formal contents of the papers presented
as in the overall situation that ultimately developed, a situation indicative of what is going on in our country today. The panel members
were eager to participate in what was presumably to be a dialogue
*Editor,

LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE.
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between black and white. The people who attended' were all men
of good will, concerned about what is taking place in our society.
Yet, what happened?
No dialogue took place.
There were black spokesmen. "Look," they said. "There is a
grave problem. The problem is created by white people. Since they
created it, they must do omething to alleviate it. In the name of
our common humanity, in the name of justice, you must begin to
do something now!"
And there were white spokesmen. Their response was less
clear cut. Some chose to close their eyes. "There is no problem,"
they said. The phrase "God's in his heaven and all's right with the
world" exemplified their position. Others, though they recognized
the existence of a problem, felt that they were unable to do anything about it. Their denial of involvement took two different tacks:
Some saw it as not their problem and of no immediate concern to
them as to whose problem it might be; others saw it as not their
problem but were willing to put the onus of responsibility on another
group (the police, for example).
The problem is amorphous. Its essentials, however, are relatively simple to enumerate: Blacks view themselves as pariahs
of the white community. They feel that the weight of this ostracism
pervades all institutions in America - the schools, the job markets,
the police stations, the availability of decent housing, the welfare
agencies, the law schools, the churches, the credit agencies, the
bar association, the shops, and the courts. Many black people believe
that everywhere they go, since they are black, they are automatically
suspect, they are automatically second-rate. In school, if a person
is black, he is automatically ignorant. On the job market, if one
is black, he is automatically incompetent, unreliable, and untrustworthy. If people are looking for a place to live, their blackness
automatically disqualifies them from anything decent. Their list
of grievances goes on and on -all the way to the courts where
equal justice for all is the watchword but where equal justice does
not always prevail.
Mr. Alphonso Harper says that in Detroit 99 percent of the
arrestees during the riots of 1967 were black. He adds that he
knows of no one in a position to do something about it - not
the sheriff's office, not the judges, not the bar associations, not
1 Several panelists commented on the sparse attendance at this session. Of thousands of
lawyers attending the ABA Annual Meeting, a sorry few made the minimal effort to
attend the panel. One would like to think that these thousands of lawyers were so well
acquainted with the problems of the poor that any further enlightenment would prove
superfluous. Yet, despite the profession's recent activist role in matters that affect the
poor, the lack of concern demonstrated on the part of the vast majority of attorneys in
Philadelphia is all too indicative of where we now stand - at the very beginning.
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the public- who proclaimed that the detention facilities these
blacks had to endure were and are intolerable. Judge Vincent Brennan
counters that Mr. Harper must remember that it was impossible
to bus in white people to be arrested. A witty remark, no doubt,
but it misses the entire thrust of Mr. Harper's statement. The issue
is not that more blacks than whites were arrested but that, because
the arrestees were overwhelmingly black in number, few people
cared whether their condition was tolerable or intolerable. The
corollary to Mr. Harper's point is that, had the arrestees been white,
a great outcry would have arisen concerning the inhuman conditions they had to endure in the criminal court building and in the
buses.
If Detroit misses the boat, what can be said about Chicago?
It is hard to believe that Mr. Jones and Mr. Mackoff were talking
about the same city, the same conditions, the same people.
Yesterday, I saw some signs being peddled. One of them
read: "I love humanity. It's people I can't stand." It's a terse way
of saying that, although we subscribe to noble principles, when the
time comes to apply them to a concrete individual case, the principles
are ignored. Equal justice under law is such a noble principle. Yet
when we examine what actually occurs in our courts, we see that
principle violated time and again.
The problem is one of poor; the problem is one of black. If you
are black, you are poor - unless you can prove that you are more
competent than a white man when you are in school or when you are
looking for a job and, sadly, twice as innocent as a white man when
you are facing a court justice. How else can we interpret the impression given by judges who seem to be more worried about police
morale than about the trampling of individual rights and liberties?
If I were raped and the jury brought in a not-guilty verdict for the
defendant, it would be bad for my morale to have the defendant
freed. It would also be bad for the morale of the district attorney
who prosecuted the case and the police investigators who tracked
down the defendant. But is this any reason to detain the defendant?
I see no difference between this hypothetical situation and the one
in Detroit where outrageously high bail was set, expressly to protect
the morale of the police.
Mr. Whitney Young, Executive Director of the National Urban
League, had a conversation with a white man about attitudes. The
white man said he used to be sympathetic to the black cause, but
with all the hullaballoo the blacks were creating nowdays, he wasn't
so sure anymore. When Mr. Young asked him what he had done
about the problem when he was still sympathetic, all the man was
able to say was, "Well, I must admit I was never involved."
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Mr. Young's response was: "Well, nothing from nothing leaves
nothing."
The point is that, unless we act upon our attitudes, upon our
convictions, we might as well not have them at all. If I were to
proclaim that I was all for the cause of the black man and then I
headed for the suburbs the moment a black man moved next door
to me, what good would proclamation be?
As lawyers, our major concern is equal justice, and we must
strive to act on that concern now. Mr. Young's comment was a call
for all of us to become activists - the law schools, the bar associations, the NLADA, the individual lawyer, and the individual
citizen.
President Richard M. Nixon discredits the conclusion of the
Kerner Commission Report - that the American society is a racist
society - because, he feels that "this talk ... doesn't help in terms
of breaking down the prejudices." 2 He seems to miss the elementary
proposition that, unless one recognizes the existence of a problem,
one cannot begin action to solve it. It would be my guess that those
of us who play ostrich and ignore the indications that we do indeed
harbor a racist society in these United States will be of even less assistance in breaking down the prejudices.
Because we lawyers are involved with all aspects of life, we
soon begin to assume that we know more about medicine than the
physician, more about budgeting then the CPA. Let us not then
make an exception of racism. If we as lawyers would be counted
as people concerned with and involved in the mainstream of American life, racism is precisely what we must know about and act upon.
The time to begin is now. The place to begin is with ourselves, individually and collectively.
This is the message that "Winter Rights - Summer Riots"
brings. The time is now. The person is you.

2

Chicago Daily News, Nov. 7, 1968 at 1.

STUDENT RESPONSE TO THE URBAN CRISIS
By PHILLIP H. GINSBERG*
Professor Ginsbergsuggests some novel approaches for students
to legal participationin the problems created by urban riots. Recognizing the simple fact that one of the best ways to remedy the destruction caused by riots is to prevent them from occurring, he
proposes a concept of preventive legal service in the ghettos,
staffed by law students, assisted by law school faculties and volunteer practitioners, with emphasis on empirical data collection and
community participation. At the conclusion of Professor Ginsberg's formal remarks, a panel composed of Judge Alvin Rubin,
U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, Professor Dallin
Oaks, University of Chicago Law School, John Britton, Howard
Law School, Richard Doyle, Assistant General Counsel, Office of
Economic Opportunity, and Professor Ginsberg discussed some of
the issues raised in the formal presentation. The author's summary
of the panel discussion follows the text of the major article.

T

HE topic of proper legal response to the problems posed by
civil disorders has been widely discussed. Most of us have
some familiarity with the Kerner Report,' specifically Chapter 13,
as well as the ABA's publication, Bar Leadership and Civil Disorders,' dealing with this topic. Although the question of the involvement of law students may not have received as much attention,
it would seem that the contributions which law students can make
may be readily set forth. Consequently, while devoting some portion
of my remarks to the general area of civil disorders, I would like
to address myself primarily to the more basic question of what law
students can do in response to the legal crises affecting all of our
institutions, and what effect students can have not only on the
seasonal disturbances, "but on the 'riots,' if my peculiar definition
of the term be interpreted as the wholesale disregard of due process,
which occurs in the lives of ghetto residents. The term includes not
merely the riot of destruction, but the 'riots' which produce the
frustration and alienation in our cities." 3
One of the few beneficial consequences of the April 1968
disturbances in Chicago was that law students who were members
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Director, Edwin F.
Mandel Clinic, a branch of the Legal Aid Bureau, United Charities of Chicago.

I THE

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,

TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)

REPORT OF THE NA-

[hereinafter cited Kerner

Report].
2 ABA SECTION ON CRIMINAL LAW, BAR LEADERSHIP AND CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).

a Although written more than a year before the Chicago Democratic Convention disturbances, the author's use of the word "riot" is not unlike that used in D. WALKER,
RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE VIOLENT CONFRONTATION OF DEMONSTRATORS AND
POLICE IN THE PARKS AND STREETS OF CHICAGO DURING THE WEEK OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1968 1,5 (1968).
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of the University of Chicago's Legal Aid Association obtained an
invaluable insight into the mechanical functioning of the judiciary
and enforcement agencies during a time of crisis. The spectacle of
approximately three thousand arrestees deprived of most of the
essentials of due process constituted an important ingredient in
one's law school education.
During the height of the riot, students were present in each
of the courtrooms where so-called bond hearings were held and
they assisted in the preparation for the hearings. Where possible,
students interviewed defendants and relayed information obtained
to the defendants' families (a process that otherwise would not
have been undertaken).
After the mass arrests and mass hearings, law students interviewed defendants in the Cook County Jail and the House of Correction in order to prepare motions for bond reductions. In the
absence of court personnel, students also served as unofficial employees of the state in the Criminal Court Building and tried to
facilitate the bonding procedure. By means of this exposure the
students were able to ascertain the extreme conditions prevalent
in the detention centers, and the inordinate delays to which defendants and those attempting to assist them were subjected in
attempting to post bond.
In addition to these functions, law students also had a hand
in seeking to force the judiciary and other governmental agencies
to rectify the abuses of due process. Approximately 15 of the law
students, who attended the abbreviated bond hearings and observed
the conditions in jail, prepared affidavits which were attached as
exhibits to a petition seeking mandamus against the Chief Judge of
the Circuit Court of Cook County and other responsible officials. 4
From these experiences, it is clear that there are many roles
for a law student to play in times of disorder. Ideally, in communities like Chicago, in the event of future disturbances, the role
of the law student will not be as significant as it was in April assuming the organized bar fulfills its responsibilities -however,
the law student can still perform significant tasks. Briefly, these include the following:
1. Drafting model statutes, ordinances, and plans to deal with
emergency situations. For example, law students in Chicago
have helped to coordinate plans in the event of a further
riot;
2. Acting as observers at various levels including the precinct
station, the courtroom and the centers of detention;
4See Ginsberg, Volunteer Lawyers Retrieve Due Process in Chicago, 26
BRIEFCASE 207 (1968).
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3. Acting as liaison between the volunteer lawyers and the
various social agencies;
4. Assisting in the researching and drafting of suits seeking
relief in cases where defendants were denied basic rights.
As I indicated at the outset, my definition of the term "riot"
has more than seasonal significance. It also embodies the concept
of constant turmoil for the ghetto dweller. Equally, the opportunities for law student involvement are present not only at times
of dramatic conflagration, but on a day-to-day basis when the
courts and other institutions are engaged in "business as usual."
The law student in the poverty or legal aid program who seeks
effective involvement in our urban problems will concern himself
with those institutions whose policies and practices represent the
other side of the coin in the issue of "law and order." He will
insist that those who seek to enforce the law must also respect it. 5
For example, it might be fruitful to compare the standards
and attitudes of justice which one finds in Traffic Court with
that found in the Misdemeanor Courts. Without unduly prejudging the inquiry it might not be surprising to determine that
in Traffic Court, where a broad spectrum of the citizenry encounters "justice," the posture of the law is distinguishable from
that in the Misdemeanor Courts, where thousands of ghetto residents have their sole or most meaningful contact with justice.
Based on such a comparison, suggestions might be forthcoming
on measures which would improve the quality of justice in the
lower criminal courts.
Another institution where the law student in the poverty law
program could document the phenomenon of the daily riot is that
of housing. Current statistics reveal that approximately 15 million
urban Americans live in substandard housing.6 The relative lack
of progress in this area is demonstrated by the complaints expressed
almost 30 years ago by Richard Wright's fictional character, Bigger
Thomas, in Native Son:
He knew that empty flats were scarce in the black belt .

.

. when-

ever his mother wanted to move she had to put in requests long
months in advance ....
He remembered that his mother had once
made him tramp the streets for two whole months looking for a
place to live . . . . He had heard it said that black people even
though they could not get good jobs paid twice as much rent as
whites for the same kind of flats ....
He knew that black people
could not go outside the black belt to rent a flat . .. they had to
live on their own side of the line ....
No white real estate man
5

See Oaks, Law and Order-A Two-Way Street, 3 DIALOGUE 59 '(1968).
ONote, Tenant Unions: Collective Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 YALE
L.J. 1368 (1968).

1969

STUDENT RESPONSE TO URBAN CRISIS
would rent a flat to a black man other than in the section where
it had been decided that black people might live.7

In addition to representation aimed at code enforcement, law
school poverty law programs should consider representing tenant
unions in collective bargaining, as well as the possibility of assisting
community groups in obtaining public and private funds for new
housing.
Another institution where the incidence of frustration and
alienation cumulatively equals the intensity of the seasonal outburst
is the ghetto school. The nature of the problem is well documented
in studies such as the Havighurst Report" and Death at an Early
Age.' A former Chicago school principal, Barbara Sizemore,
ironically points out that the neighborhood school so fervently defended in certain sections of our cities is irrelevant in the ghetto
where the doors are locked, the telephone is not answered, the
education is inferior and, not surprisingly, the drop-out rate is high.'"
An education expert, Dr. Arthur Pearl of the University of Washington, has commented that if the Marquis De Sade could have
administered a ghetto school, he would never have taken to beating
women." Meaningful participation by the law student might include
representing an aggrieved student before the appropriate agency or
conducting classroom discussion and mock trials on the relevance
and meaning of the law to the teenager.
What I am recommending is not merely a law school response
to the most violent indication of the turmoil in our cities, but to the
institutions which control the lives of ghetto residents. By influencing
such factors as equality of ghetto justice, education, and housing,
it may be that the efforts of law school poverty programs can help
to facilitate a process so desperately needed to reverse the separatist
pattern articulated in the Kerner Report and its supplemental
studies,' 2 and in the recent Douglas Report.'3
In order to make such a vital contribution to our society, I am
urging not only a broader concept of legal aid services in law reform,
but a new approach in the method of delivery of these services. If
the concept of remedial law is now insufficient, so too is the attitude
with which such services have often been administered.
R. WRIGHT, NATIVE SON 210-11 (1940).
8 R. HAVIGHURST, THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF CHICAGO: A SURVEY FOR THE BOARD OF
7

EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO (1964).

9 J. KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE (1967).
10 Address by Barbara Sizemore before the Chicago Law Forum, Apr. 18, 1968.
11 Address by Dr. Arthur Pearl before Chicago Area Lay Movement, Mar. 20, 1967.
12 Kerner Report, supra note 1.
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Clearly the spirit of black pride and the philosophy of selfhelp dictate the manner inwhich reform as well as remedial representation by primarily white lawyers and students must be offered.
An illustration of the sensitivity and perception required by the
poverty lawyer is given us by the leader of the Black Consortium, a
political action group in Chicago, who recently stated that at one
time the white volunteer condescendingly remarked to the ghetto
community, "Here is what I am going to do for you." When the
black resident rejected this attitude, the next phase was, "What can
I do for you?" This, too, was unacceptable. Today, to establish his
good faith, the community practitioner must speak in terms of "Tell
14
me what you want me to do.'
Having outlined the nature of the challenge and suggested the
method for the response, I should also enumerate the availability
of resources. Initially the law school poverty program enjoys the
expertise of its faculty (for example, encourage your professor
of commercial transactions to refine your defense of unconscionability). Similarly we should enlist the experience and influence of
the local bar.
Second, since questions of law are inherent in every aspect of
ghetto life, all the resources of the university should be utilized. For
example, a program sponsored by law and business school students
could facilitate the development of indigenous businessmen; cooperation with the medical school could lead to a community health
project dealing with such problems as lead poisoning and drug abuse;
and a joint effort with the school of social work could deal with the
imperfections of the various welfare agencies.
Finally, as is true with all attorneys, our value as practitioners
will be measured by the results we achieve for our clients. This fact,
in turn, is governed by the relationship the program enjoys with the
community. There are several steps we can take to enhance this relationship and attract the type of clients and cases which lend themselves to improving ghetto institutions.
First, carefully scrutinize the remedial case load for common
adverse parties and hidden issues. Law schools which are not located
in or close to inner city areas should consider the creation of store
front offices which would assure a more truly representative case load.
Second, we should acquaint ourselves with community personalities and discuss our programs with them. In communities
where there are no effective indigenous organizations we must be
14 Interview

with Calvin Lockridge, Leader of the Black Consortium of Chicago, in Chicago, Illinois, June 18, 1968.
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flexible and innovative. The assistance of churchmen and sympathetic community workers and politicians should be solicited.
Third, the professional personnel who staff our volunteer
programs can be an effective link to the community. Since it is likely
that there are as yet an insufficient number of black attorneys to
staff and direct our programs, strong consideration should be given
to employing and training indigenous legal assistants and other
paraprofessionals.
Finally, we should invite the community's participation in the
determination of policy and priorities. The formation of a representative community advisory board might prove an important
factor in establishing community rapport. For example, the board
might advise that in the remedial area resources should be allocated
to criminal or domestic representation, or that a reform program
should concentrate on such issues as consumer credit or police
practices.
In conclusion, in our brief discussion of riots and the institutions
which provoke them, we have proposed techniques and approaches
that to some may appear radical. Indeed, to stress representation of
the client qua community ahead of the significance of legal aid
involvement as a part of one's law school education may be regarded
as heresy. In my opinion, we cannot regard our law school legal aid
program as primarily a component of the curriculum; rather the
emphasis must be placed on the value of the services rendered to the
community. The urgency of the urban situation precludes the more
traditional approach. To rely once again on a contemporary authority, W. H. Ferry, of the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, in an article entitled "Will Black Colonies Be the Final
Solution to the Failure of Integration?" states:
[B]lacktown now will never accept the token of integration for
the reality. Its dreams of princes and dominions are no longer
related to Whitetown. Blacktown is tired and fed up with waiting.
It will not immigrate into Whitetown with its passport stamped
"conditional on good behavior as determined by white authorities."
What it will do instead is unclear . . . its options are limited.

What's certain is that it cannot any longer be expected to deceive

itself with illusions of integration.
Blacktown is destined to exist
15
separately from Whitetown.

Although one may reject Ferry's grim conclusions, his appraisal
of the ghetto attitude may well be accurate. We, in our profession,
both lawyers and law students, cannot expect to resolve the racial
dilemma; however, we must confront it.
15 Ferry, Will Black Colonies be the Final Solution to the Failure of Integration?,

KATALLAGETE:
Spring 1968, at 16.
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PANEL DISCUSSION

The discussion focused on two broad questions generated by
the April civil disorders: (1) Should the law schools be formally
involved in providing service to the indigent community and if so,
to what extent? (2) Has the organized bar, in protecting the rights
of mass arrest and ghetto resident defendants, honored its commitment to equal justice?
The law schools' responsibility was initially examined in the
context of whether they should formally prepare law students to
take part in the legal aftermath of civil disturbances and suspend
classes for that purpose. It was agreed that the curriculum should
prepare the volunteer law student to provide effective assistance
in such an emergency. For example, a course in criminal procedure
should deal with the various factors the court must consider in the
setting of bond, thereby enabling a law student to assist counsel
by soliciting from the defendant information that would facilitate
his release on bond. However, despite agreement that the experience
which students may obtain, as well as their contribution to the
legal process, may outweigh the loss of academic hours, it was
felt that formal participation by the law schools to the extent that
students be excused from classes is inappropriate. To the contrary,
it was observed that if a law school assumed any significant responsibility for providing for the representation of defendants, it
would not only testify to the failure of the local organized bar, but
would perpetuate that failure.
On a similar note, with respect to the scope of the students'
formal court room participation, it was noted that if local rules
permit students to represent defendants under normal circumstances,
they could also appear in times of disorder; however, absent such a
rule the role of the student in the wake of a riot would be confined to interviewing the defendant and otherwise assisting counsel.
From an examination of the position of the law school with
respect to student practice during riots, the discussion moved to
the question of academic credit for participation in a legal aid
clinical program.
Although it was acknowledged that the law school curriculum
could profitably include more instruction as to the practical application of the law, there was considerable agreement that it would
be inappropriate to grant credit solely for providing clinical legal
assistance. While participants in legal aid programs obtain significant educational benefits, this should be regarded as a by-product
of a legal education. In addition to the fear that awarding credit
might attract students whose commitment and participation would
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be minimal, it was observed that the formal role of the law school
was not to perform community services.
However, while rejecting credit for purely clinical activity,
many asserted that it would be consistent with the "mission" of
the law school to include the clinical experience as a component
of a formal course. For example, courses are now being taught at
Harvard, New York University, George Washington and others
which combine an intellectual approach to urban problems with a
placement in representative governmental agencies and community
organizations.
Similarly, while not involving itself directly in a legal services
program, the law school could compliment a "poverty law clinic"
by offering courses directly related to such urban problems as
housing, employment, and welfare. The relationship between the
clinic and the curriculum would be further enhanced by enabling
the student, as part of the formal course requirements, to represent
or counsel a client faced with a legal problem dealt with in the
course. For example, as part of a course dealing with employment
or labor, law students could represent complainants before the state
Fair Employment Practices Commission of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. Similarly, courses in property,
criminal law, and administrative law could include clinical components wherein the student would represent clients in housing court
or before commissions dealing with charges of discrimination in
the sale or rental of property, clients charged with a crime or
alleging police misconduct, and clients challenging the administrative
decision of the state or federal welfare agencies. Finally, courses
dealing with corporate law and business planning could contain
a clinical component permitting students to counsel developing
minority businessmen. Experimentation in these areas is being conducted at the University of Chicago and other law schools.
Examination of the manner in which the organized bar protected the rights of defendants arrested during the April riots was
prompted by a concern that in some areas the law schools and law
students were called upon to fill a void created by the inactivity
or indifference of the legal profession. It was felt that in those
areas where the concern was justified, the bar, in assigning significant responsibilities to students, was offering students educational
opportunities in theory but in fact was exploiting them.
While recognizing that the ghetto problems illustrated by the
April riots should be of vital concern to the legal profession, members of the audience expressed scepticism that traditional practitioners, because of the exigencies and pressures of their practice,
would involve themselves in mass arrests or the institutional im-
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balances of the ghetto. Such a reluctance on the part of the profession, to whatever extent it may exist, was regarded as additional
reason for student participation and curriculum involvement in the
problems of the poor. Presumably, in addition to the educational
experience and the opportunity for service, the end result of such
activity would be a new generation of lawyers with a broader
self-image.

BLACK-WHITE CONFRONTATION:
THE LAW AND THE LAWYER
By

STERLING TUCKER*

A guest speaker to the Conference from the National Urban
League, Mr. Tucker demonstrates how the emotional use of the
term "law and order" is often nothing more than a call for society
to return to the status quo which perpetuates the concept of separate
and unequal communities for blacks and whites. He warns that a
continuation of this attitude will provoke further rebellion, making
all previous rioting seem ininor in comparison.

T

HE problems of our cities are grave indeed - more grave than
most people realize. Even those whom we entrust to deal with the
problems of cities don't really understand them. Thus, they deal only
in symptoms, or they deal only with reactions to the crises which
our society faces.
As I think of these problems, I recall a session with the Republican Club of the House of Representatives in the early days when
the Poor People's Campaign was in its planning stages, when Dr.
Martin Luther King was still alive. I said then that the Congress
is obligated to provide a new kind of leadership. The kinds of
sounds coming from Congress with reference to the Poor People's
Campaign were very negative and were not promising. It seemed to
me that the Congress ought to be making an effort to show the
nation that it supported the Poor People's Campaign and that it
supported the leadership of persons like Dr. Martin Luther King.
During the discussion period that followed, however, many Congressmen said, "We can't offer support. The mail we get from home
tells us not to reward people who are aggressive, not to reward the
militants, and foremost, not to reward those who riot."
I responded by saying, first of all, that rioters don't want to
be rewarded. The first stage of a revolution is to create chaos, and
the concern of revolutionists is to tear down the signs of their oppression; their concern is to destroy that which enslaves them.
What happens after that is another stage, and today they don't
necessarily consider a later stage their business. Furthermore, one
must understand that writing is a middle-class habit. The people who
write to their representatives in Congress are mainly middleclass people - principally middle-class whites.
I reminded them of a story of two Indians who were watching
*Director of Field Services, National Urban League, Inc.; Vice-Chairman, D.C. City
Council.
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an atomic explosion for the first time. As the smoke billowed to
the sky, one Indian remarked, "I wish I had said that." We must
understand that the smoke rising to fill the skies in our cities is a
form of communication. We must begin to understand that this
new form of communication, finding expression through what we
regard as negative actions, is as clear an indication of a people's
voice as are the letters and the telegrams that find their way to the
desks of Congressmen.
If we are going to deal with the urban problems we face
today, we must first recognize the real problems of black ghettos in
America. It is inaccurate to characterize riots as produced by a certain
group of people who can be dealt with or controlled. We must recognize these people as a dimension of the power structure.
An old man, a worker, in a large city said not long ago that
he felt kind of foolish sitting around a conference table talking about
ways to produce change. He had been trying to get money for
summer jobs for young people, and he needed about a quarter of
a million dollars, but he was unable to find any means to have this
amount squeezed from the city budget. Then a 17-year-old
threw a brick through a window, threatened to set something on
fire, and discovered the power of a match. By throwing the brick
through the window, the teenager was able to get about three times
as much money for summer programs as the old man was able to
get through all his conferencing and negotiating.
We have to understand that in the hands of this 17-year-old
is a great deal of power. This is power by default, because society
has failed to accept its responsibility, because society has failed to
exercise its power in a responsible way and, instead, has exercised
it in the limited and frightening ways that many shortsighted persons see as the only proper action to be taken.
The problem is indeed chaotic. Back in my college days, a
fellow student, who was on the debate team and who is not a great
lawyer, began all of his arguments with the same line: "The world
is full of chaos and perpetual unrest." After several debates, he was
asked why, no matter what the argument, he always began with
the same line. He answered: "when I rise to speak, I want to say
the most profound truth I know, and that most profound truth is
that the world, indeed, is always full of chaos and perpetual unrest."
As we look at our nation, we know how true this is today. To
better understand some of the dimensions of urban problems it is
well to think about a few of the delusions we harbor, some of the
solutions proposed for curing and controlling the urban unrest we
face, and perhaps to offer an independent suggestion or two for
consideration. A problem that concerns everyone these days is crime
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in the streets. Yet there are those who try to minimize this problem
by arguing that the majority of ghetto crimes are committed by
blacks against blacks. They attempt to pacify white America by
saying, "Don't be alarmed, because the problem doesn't really
affect you. These people are merely killing off each other; they are
robbing only each other and knocking each other in the head. The
solution is to contain these crimes in the black communities, for
it is not your problem, and you don't have to be concerned about it."
This approach, of course, simply distorts the problem. First,
it causes people who might otherwise be concerned about the elimination of crime to go back to sleep. It convinces them that the
authorities will take care of it, that the police will keep them safely
protected if they just stay in their own communities. Thus, they
come to see crime not as an issue of concern for the entire community
or for the entire nation but simply as a problem of concern to a part
of society. They hide from themselves the fact that the crime rate
is a warning to society as a whole. Second, the argument distorts
the white community's view of black communities, for it perpetuates the illusion that all black people are alike.
Third, the argument is intended to enlist the support of
blacks in the law and order campaigns, to obtain a blanket black
endorsement for whatever tactics police employ in their work in the
black ghettos. If Negroes want to have their city cleaned up and
if they really want to join the side of law and order, they are urged
to support all police practices in a common effort to clean up the city.
People wonder why there is reluctance on the part of black
people to give such a blanket endorsement to police activities. What
they don't know is that children in black communities see
racketeering and extortion. They see prostitution pushed into their
communities. They see numbers rackets and narcotics. They see
all of this, and they also see something more: They see policemen
winking at these illegal activities. They see a selective enforcement of the law. Is it any wonder that they do not have full confidence in a structure that doesn't appear to work in their interest?
They know that law-enforcement officials, like much of the rest
of the general community, are quick to support the notion that all
black people are alike; that policemen, like others, often fail to understand that all people are individuals, that black people, too, are innocent until proven guilty.
The argument that most crimes are committed by blacks against
blacks must be set aside. It doesn't serve the best interests of the
black community and it doesn't serve the best interests of the white
community. The argument of itself, and the planning that is built
around it, do not deal with the substantive and critical issues.
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What is the real problem? I have been referring to black communities and white communities and I wish this distinction were
unnecessary; but the fact is that we are two separate societies. In
any city, if there is a substantial black population, there will be a
black community. No matter what the laws, there will always be
some who use them to maintain black communities.
Citizen acceptance of dual societies is evident in a story related
by Carl Rowan, a black syndicated columnist who recently served
as the director of the United States Information Agency following
a term as Ambassador to Finland. He had come to Washington as
the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
Mr. Rowan bought a house in a white community in Washington,
despite objections from many neighbors. One Saturday afternoon in
spring, wearing his old clothes, he was out mowing his lawn. A
chauffeur-driven limousine came by and stopped. A lady sitting in
the back of the automobile motioned to Mr. Rowan and said, "Boy,
will you come here?" Rowan tells that he shuffled over to the
automobile and the lady added, "Boy, how much do you get for
mowing lawns?"
Mr. Rowan scratched his head and said, "Well, Ma'am,
I don't have a set price. As a matter of fact, I don't charge the lady
in this house anything - she lets me sleep with her." The limousine
drove off.
This incident is an indication of the kind of civilization we
have allowed to develop. Carl Rowan is a statesman, but is seen as
having no business in a white neighborhood except as a yard boy.
Residential segregation is no accident in America. We worked hard
to achieve separate societies, and we are working even harder to
maintain them. The plain facts are that no black man in America
has been fully assimilated into the mainstream of American life.
The average person, coming to these shores from Europe or
other parts of the world, can, in the first or second generation, be
assimilated once he learns the language, the culture, the traditions,
and acquires a skill. He can then move with almost complete
freedom into and across the American scene. Not so the black man.
He's been here not a generation or two, but fourteen. He knows
the language; he knows the folkways and the mores; and many
black men have marketable skills. But still blacks are barred. Thus,
the issue today is not one of better jobs or better housing or better
education. The problem is one of black and white. Until we deal
with this black-white issue, the black man will be handicapped no
matter how much education and training he has. Until we deal
with the black-white issue, there will continue to be separate black
and white communities in America. And as long as there are black
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and white communities in America, the problems of America are
going to remain.
There is another glib solution offered to solve the problems
of the cities and it, too, is disturbing - the emotion-packed appeal
to what is called "law and order." This phrase has become to many
a white racist a battle cry, one which will continue to ring hard
until it is coupled with an equally vigorous call for justice and
equality. Sadly, those who call the loudest for law and order are
often the keepers of the keys to the cities. They are the city administrators, members of Congress, people sitting in the courts
and in the police departments, people running the schools, people
controlling housing, and people controlling the jobs. They are the
ones who make the laws, and they are the ones who are responsible
for executing them. They hold the keys to the black ghettos, they
control the black ghettos, and they make their profits in the black
ghettos. Their actions and their inactions suggest that there is a twin
battle plan- to seal off the ghettos even further from the rest of
society and to chain and enslave ghetto people.
Those who call most for "law and order" are those who are
in the best positions to do something about the injustices of our
society. They deal with the symptoms of the monster they've created.
Their plan of greater control of the ghettos, of seeing ghetto people
enslaved to a greater extent is doomed to failure. The explosions
that this plan will surely generate will so rock this nation in fear
and destruction that all society could become immobilized; whatever
moral and spiritual fiber is left in us will be so torn to shreds that
we may not be able to get ourselves together again.
I fear very greatly for our future. I see nothing on the immediate horizon which would suggest that anyone is about to come
to grips with the ugliness of the urban problem. The riots in our
cities are costly and they are agonizing. The response to them is
frightening. Until this response becomes more enlightened, we are
not going to be able to deal with the problem.
Social custom in America becomes social morality. To gain
acceptance, we need not necessarily do what is right so long as we
do what is customary. Yet it is our customs that are destroying
this country. The social code practiced by many Americans has
tended to smother America, and it has frustrated the men and
forces of democracy. The social code says that black is different
and inferior; that social code says that if you are black, you can
live better for less, and that, therefore, you don't deserve and don't
need as much. This social code is what has entrapped the black
child in the ghetto schools, and social code is what makes white
America sleep well at night, feeling that it is offering opportunity
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when, in fact, it is denying opportunity. Somehow we must get
white America to understand that its social code is all wrong.
This places a great responsibility on the legal fraternity, that
of helping to depolarize America and of altering its basic thinking
and behavioral patterns. If we are going to have law and order
coupled with justice, we must begin in the halls of justice. Those of
us who have been close to the courts of justice have seen a great
deal of injustice. It is not surprising that in large numbers, people
of the black ghettos feel that because they are poor and because
they are black, they are automatically wrong, automatically guilty
in the eyes of those responsible for administering justice.
I would hope that in the legal fraternity we don't become so
much a part of the system and so acceptive of those portions that
are unjust that we, in effect, also become the keepers of the status
quo rather than producers of the kind of massive change that is
essential. The Kerner Commission Report pointed out many areas
that the legal profession itself can deal with, and it must come to
grips with them.
Urban League Director, Whitney Young relates a discussion
he had with a participant of a conference he attended.
"Mr. Young, I used to be one of those who was sympathetic
toward the cause of the Negro. I used to have great sympathy for
him, but now I'm confused, and I don't know how I feel anymore."
Mr. Young replied, "I want you to tell me now -and
I'm
going to take out my pencil and I want you to say it slowly - What
did you do about the problem when you were sympathetic? I want
you to list the things you did."
The man said, "Well, I must admit that I was never involved."
Mr. Young answered, "Well, nothing from nothing leaves
nothing. You didn't do anything when you were sympathetic, you're
not doing anything now, so you're right where you started."
This interchange points to the real problem: Most people think
it someone else's job to deal with the crises of our inner cities,
whereas in reality there is a role for everyone, and lawyers in particular have a large responsibility.
What do we have to do?
As I have stated in a book, Beoynd the Burning,' the ghettos
are going to be homes for the people who live there for some time
to come. No matter what we do, we cannot eliminate the ghettos
tomorrow. But there are some things we can do now which will
help us move in that direction. Ghettos today, for most of the
people who live there, are like occupied territory. The people who
I S.
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police them, the people who teach in them, the people who own the
businesses, the people who run the ghettos and make the decisions
-very
few of them live in the ghetto. This makes the ghetto an
occupied territory, and people don't like to live in occupied territory
unless they derive some benefit therefrom. This has been true of all
of civilization and in all parts of the world. No one likes slavery,
especially in America in the middle of the 20th century. What we've
got to do is to get some real power of decision and responsibility to
the people who live in our inner cities. We've got to give them a
piece of the action, a stake in the future right where they are. This
is what the National Urban League's New Thrust program is designed to do in the 90 cities with which we are dealing.
We must find ways to put ghetto people into the system.
In the schools, for example, there are teacher aides, but many professionals are still calling for them to be college-trained people. But
a ghetto mother can be an excellent teacher aide. My wife, for
instance, used to teach kindergarten. She had a morning class and
one in the afternoon. In the winter, she spent about three-quarters
of the day putting on children's galoshes and taking off their coats.
Some mother in the ghetto community could be doing this type of
job and thus be brought into the system.
Again, some of our playgrounds are staffed with uniformed
policemen. Why not take some ghetto residents who don't have
jobs and make them playground attendants and hall guards. Why
not bring them into the system, make them part of it?
We must do more than equalize opportunity. Equalizing life
opportunities will only prevent the gap between whites and blacks
from growing wider. If we are going to close the gap, we must be
concerned not about equalizing opportunity but about equalizing
results. It's not enough to put the same share of the tax dollar into
the ghetto schools as we put into the schools in the suburbs. If
we are going to equalize the results, we must put more of our
tax dollars into the ghetto school. A child who comes to school in
the ghetto on that first day is looking for a great educational experience - a great adventure - in the same way that any nonghetto
child does. When he gets to that school with its inferior conditions
and its inferior facilities, his excitement and his motivation are soon
gone. The child begins to believe that he is "nobody," and it's hard
to convince him otherwise. That is one of the problems, complicating
and aggravating all the others.
Every lawyer, each in his own community, must help to shape
a new tomorrow, must help to shape a new direction and new planning which will solve the problems of our schools and the problems
of our cities. Lawyers, as an important part of the leadership struc-
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ture, must take the lead. The job just cannot be accomplished by
black community leaders going to the ghetto to say "cool it." That
doesn't get results. The results will come from "main street" where
lawyers and other professional people work, and where the decisions
are made.
Some progress is being made. In the Urban League's New
Thrust program, we hope to have the help of a legal committee
from the bar associations to work on problems of credit and other
sharp practices that plague ghetto communities. We hope lawyers
will share with us their experiences with these problems, their resources, and their knowledge.
There is a tough job ahead, but alternatives are available. It
we love our country and if we believe in democracy, then we must
believe democracy can work for all people. Indeed, we must make
it work for all people. Someone asked once, "And when will peace
come to Athens?" The response was that peace would come to Athens
when the uninjured are as indignant as the injured.
There will be many discouragements along the way, as there
were on a day when the weather was awfully bad. It was snowing
and sleeting and raining. A train came to a steep hill, and the townspeople stopped it and told the engineer he might not be able to
make it to the top. The train might come sliding back into the town
and some of the townspeople might be killed, they reasoned. The
engineer said, "I carry goods and supplies. On the other side of the
hill, there has been a great disaster, and they need what I have. I
must go, but I will go carefully." Seeing his determination, the
people let him pass. The train started up the hill, but it couldn't
get up any momentum. The train began to slip, but at the bottom
of the hill, the engineer gained control again and finally dragged
the train up over the top. When he got to the top, he mopped his
brow and said to the brakeman, "I can't understand why we had so
much trouble getting up this hill. Even though the weather's bad,
we should have been able to get up more momentum. I was afraid
for awhile that we wouldn't make it." The brakeman said, "I too
was afraid we weren't going to make it. As a matter of fact, I was
so afraid that I had the brakes on all the way."
We face the same problem today. People believe that there is no
solution, and some believe it so completely that they are not only
unwilling to do anything themselves, but they keep others from
trying as well. The time is much shorter than many of us would
like to believe. The revolution has not yet come. What we have
thus far witnessed has been a mild rebellion, a regurgitation of

1969

BLACK-WHITE CONFRONTATION

25

what has been forced into ghetto communities. The change that
has come as a result of this rebellion has only been marginal.
We still face a great challenge. The hill is high. There are
dangers enroute; but let's try to make the trip.

PROPER HANDLING OF MASS ARRESTS:

THE EXPERIENCE OF Two CITIES
Urban riots incite pandemonium. Consequently, recollections
and evaluations of specific events often vary widely. The four contributing authors, having struggled with the tremendous administrative chaos generated in the courts of Detroit and Chicago by the
riots of 1967 and 1968 respectively, offer their observations.
Frank Jones of the Legal Aid Bureau of Chicago occupies a
strategic position with respect to racially overtoned disturbances.
He is a black man and he is a lawyer. His comments are those of
a concerned member of the bar who is displeased with legal procedures, and of a concerned member of the Negro race who is displeased with the treatment afforded his people in a time of stress.
He draws on specific instances to illustrate the frustration which
emanated from the handling of mass arrests. His major concern is
that normal release procedures seemed to halt until several days after
the outbreak of the riots, and he believes that much of the delay
resulted from a purposive effort of judicial administrators to stall
until racial tensions had subsided.
In response to Mr. Jones' charges, Benjamin Mackoff, Administrative Directorof the Circuit Court of Cook County, uses statistics
and personal observations to assert that few, if any, arrestees were
deprived of their fundamental constitutionalrights during this time.
Mr. Mackoff gives a step-by-step account of the procedures used by
the courts throughout the duration of the riots. He maintains that
the crushing caseload was solely responsible for any delay in proceedings, and that this delay was in no way unreasonableunder the
circumstances. Additionally, he incorporates into his article a lengthy

order of John S. Boyle, Chief judge of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, which enumerates in detail the release procedures to be
followed in the event future disorder erupts.
The scene now shifts from Chicago, 1968, to Detroit, 1967.
Alfonso S. Harper,a senior trial lawyer from the City of Detroit,
gives his impressions of neglect and mismanagement of arrestees
during the Detroit riots. References to specific instances by Mr.
Harper suggest that the fault lies in several sectors of legal administration: Inordinately prohibitive bail premiums were set by the
judges; fundamental rights of arrestees were often ignored or
waived by defense counsel; police arrested many without probable
cause; and in many instances justice was colored by racial prejudice.
He urges all citizens, and lawyers in particular, to work diligently
to alleviate aggravationswhich can escalate into full-blown civil disorders.
In reply, judge Vincent Brennan, Chief Judge of Recorder's
Court in Detroit at the time of the riots, examines several factors
which he believes contributed to the chaos. His major concern is
that the breakdown in the sheriff's department aggravated much
of the confusion. Too, rumors of serious magnitude permeated
the atmosphere, and many judges, attorneys, and police exhibited
extreme fatigue as the long days and nights of rioting continued.
Hopeful that such situations will not be repeated, he calls for
increased police-community relations, efforts in both the Black and
26
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White communities, and solicits suggestions for proceduralimprovements in the Detroit judicial system.
Although the articles presented in this section deal with riots
in only two American cities, it is felt that the attitudes, criticisms,
and suggestions they contain are representative.

CHICAGO:

1968

By FRANK JONES*

T

HERE are those who say that there was in the city of Chicago
between April 13 and April 15, 1968, a total breakdown in the
system for the administration of criminal justice. There are those
who say that there was a cleverly calculated plan of conspiracy to
make it appear that the system had broken down, that the system
was used (in setting bail, for example) to keep masses of people guilty and innocent alike - incarcerated. Still others say that there
was no breakdown at all, that the courts functioned very well, and
that everything went quite smoothly.
It doesn't really matter which one of these alternatives is subscribed to; the fact is that the effect on the lives and the families
of the hundreds of arrestees was identical: Justice, fairness, and, in
some instances, judicial integrity seemed to have taken a holiday.
When I was asked to speak about the Chicago experience, not
only from the vantage point of a black lawyer, but also as a black
person who grew up in the neighborhood that was destroyed, my
first thought was that to come to this conference was a waste of
time- mine and yours. Did people really want to hear the truth,
especially if that truth underscored the apathy and the sluffing off
and hostilities? It then
of responsibilities and hypocrisies -yes,
occurred to me that even if only one person here began to recognize
the significance of the recommendations for the administration of
criminal justice as outlined by the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders' and began to push for a committee to oversee
the implementation of these recommendations in every major city
in this country, then my speech here would have been well worthwhile.
It is known that the discretionary enforcement power of police
officers, jail officers, and court officials increases during periods of
riots or civil disorders and that the adversary procedures for the
protection of the rights of the accused give way to the discretion
of the administrators. Abuses are compounded, arbitrariness and
*Director of Special Projects of the Legal Aid Bureau of Chicago, Illinois.
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unfairness increase, and an already distrustful, suspicious, and anxious mass of poor people become even more convinced that the
system is designed to emasculate them. This did and continues to
happen in the ghettos of Chicago -and,
I suspect, in every city
throughout this country.
Let me review my own experience during the April riot in
Chicago. On Friday, April 5, after the death of Dr. Martin Luther
King, I left my office as administrative lawyer for the Legal Aid
Bureau in the downtown section and headed for one of our West
Side offices in the Lawndale district, which was in the heart of the
riot area. High school students from two West Side high schools,
Crane and Farragut, were roaming or parading through the City's
downtown area when I left the office. There were policemen present,
who, I might add, acted in a responsible, professional mannerMayor Daley's statement to the contrary notwithstanding.
By the time I reached West Madison Street, parts of it were
burning, and looting had begun to occur. For fear of personal injury
to themselves and at the suggestion of the director of the Urban
Progress Center, the personnel at the Lawndale office had left. We
had reports that burning and looting were taking place near the
Midwest office, another legal aid office on the West Side.
When I arrived at the Midwest office, the lawyers were still
working. One of the lawyers had gone to the Fillmore District
Police Station, at the request of a parent of a juvenile who had been
detained. Youth officers had asked the parent to come to the station
a normal procedure. Our lawyer was able to get what is called
a station adjustment -a
procedure by which a juvenile is released
to the custody of his parents. At that point, normal procedures were
still in effect. The system had not yet collapsed.
As the night wore on and as more and more arrests were made,
the distinction between the treatment of juveniles and adults became
much more blurred. Detention hearings for juveniles were dispensed
with. The Audy Home, a juvenile detention home, became filled
and juveniles were being detained in quarters with adults. The
argument was advanced that this was happening because the juveniles
had, in fact, lied about their ages. This argument was erroneous.
I personally handled four cases involving 15-year-old boys who were
arrested for curfew violations. They were incarcerated in County
Jail, even though the officials knew their ages. I was told simply
that there was no place else for them to go (incidentally, they stayed
in jail for three days because the officials in the County Jail couldn't
locate them and didn't know they were there).
On Saturday, April 6, arraignments and bail hearings were held
at Central Police Headquartaers. Only attorneys from agencies such
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as the Legal Aid Bureau, the ACLU, and the Public Defender's
Office were present. Volunteer lawyers from the Black bar association, that is, the Cook County Bar Association, were being stopped
at the door by policemen (who, incidentally, were guarding all
entrances to the building) and were being asked what their business
was. In several instances the lawyers were not allowed to go up
to the courtrooms.
The agency lawyers, with the exception of the Public Defender,
were relegated to the task of trying, as best they could, to get
information from the accused to their relatives about where they
were being taken. This was unfortunate, because the lawyers were
being given incorrect information by court officials, either inadvertently or purposely - I can't say which. Thus, those persons who
were detained in jail were unable to make bail because their relatives
were unable to locate them.
By Monday morning, April 8, there was a line of people two
blocks long outside the Criminal Courts Building. They had been
there since very early in the morning. They were trying to put up
bail, or at least to locate their relatives, and they stayed there all
day long. Many of them told me that when they finally talked to
an official, they were told to come back the next day, Tuesday.
The issuance of misinformation was not the only mishap that
occurred in the courtrooms on Saturday, April 6. Attorneys were
harrassed by the bailiffs, and at least one judge threatened them
with contempt of court when they objected to the courtroom chaos.
Even though bail was being set at a production-line rate and no
meaningful hearings were being held, there appeared to be some
modicum of reason for a short period of time in the amount of
bail being set-from $1,000 to $5,000 for an offense that constituted a felony-unlike the bail set during previous riots, which
ran from $10,000 to $25,000.
Thus, initially, the bail was reasonable. Then, across the board,
from Saturday until Easter Sunday, a week later, no bail was set
below $10,000. Clearly, this high bail was being used for detention
purposes.
Bail was set regardless of individual circumstances. No meaningful hearings were held. A case in point: On Easter Sunday, I
represented a man whose bail had been set a week before at $5,000.
Undisputed testimony brought out that this man had been on the
same job for 13 years, had lived in this community for 20 years, had
a wife who had been blind for several years, had eight children,
and had no police record of any kind. The facts of the case (not
relevant in a bail hearing, since the amount of bail set is simply
for the purpose of insuring that the accused appears in court) are
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that on April 6 this man had taken his wife to church at about
7:30 p.m., and had returned home to prepare and eat dinner with
his children. He then left his home at 8:30 p.m. to walk the three
blocks to the church to pick up his wife. About a block from his
home, he encountered teenagers running down the street. Policemen
accosted him, arrested him, and charged him with looting. I asked
that the judge release this man on his own recognizance. The judge
graciously reduced bail to $2,500 and informed me that if I wasn't
satisfied with that, he would raise it back to $5,000. This example
illustrates the incredible insensitivity shown by the judges toward
the problems of the people arrested. Many more such cases can be
documented in the files of the Cook County Bar Association.
On Monday, April 8, the scene shifted to the Criminal Courts
Building, Cook County Jail, and the House of Correction. First,
it was impossible to locate any prisoners. Even if they could have
been located, a hearing for reduction of bail could not have been
held. The vestibules of the jails were crammed with people, the
corridors of the Criminal Courts Building were crammed, and people
who were trying to locate their relatives and friends were standing
outside in lines. Emergency detention camps had been set up at the
Navy Pier, which was the old University of Illinois campus. In the
bullpens behind the courtrooms, 180 people were locked up, but the
County Jail officials didn't know they were there.
On that Monday, parents of a juvenile asked me to locate him
and try to effectuate his release. He had been charged with looting.
On the prior Saturday night, his mother had received a phone call
from a legal aid lawyer who was at the central police station where
they were holding the "bail hearings." He had informed her that
her son had been arrested and was being taken to the County Jail.
Since he was a juvenile, a youth officer would have called her
under normal circumstances, and the hearing would have been
held in the Audy Home or Family Court.
I went to the County Jail, checked the register, and talked
with the officials who also checked the register. There was no
record of the boy. I went to the House of Correction and checked
the register. I went to the Audy Home and checked the register.
I went to the central police station lockup and checked the register.
I went to the District Police Station where he had been taken immediately after he was arrested. There was a record there, but it
revealed only that he had, in fact, been arrested. Because the boy's
mother was fearful that something on the order of the Algier's
Motel incident 2 had happened to her son and was understandably
2See

J.

HERSEY, THE ALGIERS MOTEL INCIDENT (1968)

incindiary incident.

for a factual account of that
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anxious, I doublechecked all of these places again. I was unable to
find her son.
On Wednesday, the boy's mother called me and said, "My son
has got to be in the County Jail. I just got a letter from them." I
went over, armed with this letter; they did, in fact, find that he
was there.
These kinds of experiences were multiplied twenty, thirty, and
fortyfold by the lawyers of the Cook County Bar Association who
later gathered together and related their experiences. There were
lawyers who were not allowed into courtrooms. There were lawyers
who couldn't find their clients. There were lawyers who had gone
to the jails again and again, but the jail officials were not able to
determine where their clients were - or even if, in fact, their clients
were being held at all.
On Wednesday morning, April 10, a woman came to me and
said her sister was being held in the House of Correction on a $5,000
bail, and she wanted me to try to get her out. The sister had only
one kidney and lived with her mother who was afflicted with a
very serious heart ailment. I went to the chief judge of the Criminal
Division, and he informed me that two judges were sitting for bail
hearings. I went to the courtroom. The clerks, the bailiffs, and the
assistant state's attorney were having a kind of rotating conversation
about fishing and golf. The judges were in the backroom, also
having a conversation. I went into the judge's chambers, told the
judge what the problems were, and asked to have an immediate
hearing for this particular person. One of the judges informed me
that hearings couldn't be held and bring-back orders couldn't be
signed because there weren't any files. Nobody knew where the
files were, or even if any files were in existance. I contacted the
chief clerk who said in effect that he didn't know where the files
were either.
I was finally able to convince the judge that he had the power
to order a clerk to prepare what is called a corrected minimus, which,
when presented to the bail official, is in fact a reduction of bail.
He signed such an order on the basis of my explanation concerning
the circumstances of the detained woman. That done, the judge
went back to his conversation!
Although the chief judge had indicated that hearings would
begin on Wednesday with 400 people being presented, none were
held. Thus, for three days, while people were being arrested in
droves, no hearings were held.
On Wednesday night, I attended a meeting of the Cook County
Bar Association. We found that each of us had encountered comparable experiences, and we resolved to send a telegram to the chief
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judge demanding a conference with him for the purpose of ironing
out some kind of procedure in order to eliminate these abuses. We
were also anxious to effectuate the release of some of these detained
people because they had jobs and because they had families who
were concerned about them; moreover, they were, for the most part,
innocent and without criminal records. The judge told us to tell
our problems to his administrative assistants and left the room.
Because we felt that the administrative assistants were at least
partially responsible for some of the chaos, we filed a petition for
habeas corpus instead. This was denied.
Again, volunteer lawyers were told by the judges that hearings
would be held for 400 prisoners on Thursday. In fact, only 20
hearings were held by one judge, in one courtroom, and even that
judge packed up and left at 2:30 p.m.
On Friday, still no hearings were held, and on Saturday, 30
hearings were held with the judge leaving at 3:30 p.m. Meanwhile,
hundreds of people were languishing in the County Jail in unsanitary and unsafe conditions.
Significantly, throughout the week, the only lawyers that showed
up in the Criminal Courts Building were from the Legal Aid Bureau,
the ACLU, Northwestern University Law School, and the Cook
County Bar Association. Conspicuously absent were lawyers from
the Chicago Bar Association. The Cook County Bar Association
lawyers were there because they were informed each day that
hearings would be held. Did the lawyers from the Chicago Bar
Association know that there wouldn't be any hearings? In fact,
several of my friends who are members of the Chicago Bar Association and who work in large law firms in Chicago told me that they
had tried to volunteer their services to the courts earlier in the
week. Court officials had told them, in effect, "We will call you
when we need you."
The argument will undoubtedly be tendered that hundreds of
people were released on recognizance bonds throughout the week.
While this is true, the hundreds that were released were people
arrested for curfew violations- teenagers for the most part. They
were released through the efforts of the Civil Legal Aid who had
prepared sheets of recognizance bonds and presented them to one of
the judges. However, no hearings were held in these cases.
Again, on Saturday, only one judge sat for hearings, and he
left at 2:30 p.m. Members of the Cook County Bar Association and
the volunteers from the legal services programs went to the Assistant
State's Attorney in charge of the riot procedures and asked him why
there hadn't been more hearings. His answer was that nobody had
ordered these people over from the jail, and he couldn't.
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Another curious fact now emerged. The Public Defender had
indicated that he had filed appearances in every case in which rioters
were involved. Since hearings could not be held for the reduction of
bail, because nobody had ordered the people over from the jail, we
asked the Assistant State's Attorney at 4:00 p.m. on Saturday night:
"Why don't you let us go into the jail, take the names of the people
tier by tier, and give the names to you? Then you can get an order
entered to have them brought over for hearing on Sunday." To
my amazement, he agreed.
At 8:00 p.m., the chief judge was called. Four judges were sent
over for Easter Sunday; four courtrooms were in operation; 400
bail hearings were then held - hearings that should have been held
on Monday the week before. Even then, out of 400 hearings, there
were not more than five people who were released on recognizance
bonds. That is an incredibly low percentage when one considers the
fact that most of the people who were arrested were, in fact, family
people who had lived in the community for long periods of time and
who had no prior arrest records.
There are a few observations I would like to make before I
close. If there wasn't a conspiracy, as some people have charged,
there was at least a great amount of conscious parallelism. Otherwise, how, after nothing had been done from one Friday to the
following Saturday, could an arrangement be made on Saturday
night at 8:00 p.m. for four judges, four courtrooms, and a bevy of
public defenders and state's attorneys to be present and available by
Sunday morning, and Easter at that? How could this sudden decision
come about?
There have been many discussions about what happened and
why it occurred. The Cook County Bar Association says: "Well,
it occurred because we were so persistent and worked so hard all
week long." The Legal Aid Bureau and the Cook County Legal
Service Program says: "Well, it occurred because we filed a writ
of mandamus to the supreme court." I don't subscribe to either of
these theories. I think the logjam broke because it was scheduled
to break at that time, because those who make the decisions with
respect to when and how hearings are to be held in Cook County
decided that there were not going to be any hearings during the
week of April 8 through 12, that people were going to be locked
up and were going to stay locked up until things cooled off. By
Easter Sunday, things had cooled off and hearings were begun.
Thus, I subscribe to the proposition that the Cook County courts
ran very smoothly during the riot period: They ran exactly according
to plan.
If people really care about solving the conditions that breed

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

riots and want to obtain some profound insight into the riots why they are occurring and how or if there is anything that can be
done about them - I would suggest reading Black Rage,' an excellent and recent book co-authored by professors at the University of
California at Los Angeles.
In addition, there is the study that has been released by the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,4 containing
some interesting and valuable statistics. Finally, the implications of
what happened in Chicago seem to me very dear. God help us if
we don't cure the actual ills that we endure.

CHICAGO:

1968 -A RESPONSE

By BENJAMIN S. MACKOFF*

T

HE recent outbreak of rioting in our cities and the mass arrests
which follow present new challenges to our legal system for
which we as lawyers receive little formal training. Even those of
us directly concerned with the administration of justice have not
had sufficient experience in contending with the added burdens
imposed on the courts by the arrest and detention of large numbers
of persons to qualify as experts. We in Cook County, however, are
constantly striving to develop procedures which will insure that
justice is fairly and effectively administered despite the increased
pressures; and, therefore, we welcome suggestions from others who
have our same objectives. I would have been especially pleased if
the previous speaker had thought to make such a contribution because
of his experience during the April riots in Chicago.
But, sometimes we lawyers are the victims of an advocatory
style of thinking which makes us so identify with those we represent
that we are led to attack the people they oppose rather than the
practices we condemn. This type of thinking and the statements
which it provokes only tend to polarize the various segments of the
community and prevent the kind of inquiry which we as lawyers
are dedicated to pursue. Therefore, rather than respond to such
statements, I submit for your attention a procedure for use in mass
arrest situations which was developed by our court in cooperation
with the organized bar of Cook County. This procedure is based
upon our experience during the April riots in Chicago which I shall
3

p. COBBF & W. GRIER, BLACK RAGE (1968).
4 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
*Administrative Director, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

riots and want to obtain some profound insight into the riots why they are occurring and how or if there is anything that can be
done about them - I would suggest reading Black Rage,' an excellent and recent book co-authored by professors at the University of
California at Los Angeles.
In addition, there is the study that has been released by the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,4 containing
some interesting and valuable statistics. Finally, the implications of
what happened in Chicago seem to me very dear. God help us if
we don't cure the actual ills that we endure.

CHICAGO:

1968 -A RESPONSE

By BENJAMIN S. MACKOFF*

T

HE recent outbreak of rioting in our cities and the mass arrests
which follow present new challenges to our legal system for
which we as lawyers receive little formal training. Even those of
us directly concerned with the administration of justice have not
had sufficient experience in contending with the added burdens
imposed on the courts by the arrest and detention of large numbers
of persons to qualify as experts. We in Cook County, however, are
constantly striving to develop procedures which will insure that
justice is fairly and effectively administered despite the increased
pressures; and, therefore, we welcome suggestions from others who
have our same objectives. I would have been especially pleased if
the previous speaker had thought to make such a contribution because
of his experience during the April riots in Chicago.
But, sometimes we lawyers are the victims of an advocatory
style of thinking which makes us so identify with those we represent
that we are led to attack the people they oppose rather than the
practices we condemn. This type of thinking and the statements
which it provokes only tend to polarize the various segments of the
community and prevent the kind of inquiry which we as lawyers
are dedicated to pursue. Therefore, rather than respond to such
statements, I submit for your attention a procedure for use in mass
arrest situations which was developed by our court in cooperation
with the organized bar of Cook County. This procedure is based
upon our experience during the April riots in Chicago which I shall
3

p. COBBF & W. GRIER, BLACK RAGE (1968).
4 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
*Administrative Director, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois.

1969

HANDLING OF MASS ARRESTS

describe from my own observations, having been present at all
stages of the court operation from beginning to end.
The Circuit Court of Cook County was not without an emergency
plan during the April riots, for it had already begun to prepare for
the confrontations expected to occur during the Democratic National
Convention in August. Yet, we certainly could not have forseen the
tragic slaying of Dr. Martin Luther King in Memphis, Tennessee,
and were not ready for the large number of persons suddenly thrust
upon our court system in the violent events which immediately
followed his death.
After local authorities received word of the assassination of
Dr. King on April 4, 1968, the Chicago Police Department was
placed on emergency call. While no disturbances were reported that
night, investigators from the Chicago Commission on Human Relations reported tension running high in the Negro community. By
the morning of the next day, several disorders were reported in
Chicago high schools.
At approximately 3:00 p.m., April 5, 1968, students from the
Crane and Farragut High Schools were joined by other students who
had walked out of the John Marshall High School. After a meeting
in a neighborhood park, the students began to parade east on
Madison Street toward the downtown area. After marching approximately 1 mile, the crowd, which by now had been joined by adults,
became of a violent mood and began throwing stones and smashing
windows on either side of the line of march. At approximately
4:00 p.m., the first sign of fire appeared along the parade route.
The fires could be seen all the way to the Chicago Loop, approximately 5 miles away. From that time on, the rioting spread to adjacent neighborhoods in the predominantly Negro area.
At the first outbreaks of disturbances, the court was informed
that there was a likelihood that the disturbances would flare up into
open rioting and that a great number of persons would be arrested.
Acting upon this information, the Chief Judge, by General Order,
made 20 courtrooms of the Circuit Court of Cook County available
for the processing of mass arrest cases' and assigned all judges and
magistrates of the court to emergency duty. 2 At that time we also
contacted the State's Attorney of Cook County, the Corporation
Counsel of the city of Chicago, and the Public Defender of Cook
County and advised them to assign assistants to the four courtrooms
that were being set up initially to hear mass arrest cases at the
'Special Orders Nos. 68-34, -35, -36, and -37 of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois (April 5, 1968).
2 Special Order No. 68-32 (Juvenile Division) and Special Order No. 68-33 (Municipal
District One) of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (April 5, 1968). By
these orders, 138 judges and 115 magistrates were made available to these divisions.
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Chicago Police Headquarters Building at 11th and State Streets in
Chicago. The Public Defender advised the court that he would be
able to staff the courtrooms 24 hours a day with assistants and
would send investigators to help them prepare their cases. The
Legal Aid Bureau also called that afternoon and volunteered the
services of their members,3 whereupon they were directed to the
Police Headquarters Building to assist the Public Defender. At approximately 4:00 p.m., the Presiding Judge of Municipal District
One of our court, which serves the city of Chicago, was notified
to initiate a plan of action to process the expected defendants in
accordance with general orders already in effect since June of 1966.'
These orders were supplemented by procedures which were to have
been implemented during the expected disorders of the Democratic
Convention.
Under the plan worked out by cooperating law enforcement
agencies, those who were arrested were first brought to the neighborhood police district station and processed by the Chicago Police
Department. Fingerprints and photographs were taken at that time.
An assistant state's attorney or corporation counsel was assigned
to the police station to advise the police officers on the charges to
be lodged against the defendants. In line with recommendations by
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders5 and the
American Bar Association Section of Criminal Law,6 police officers
were excused from appearing in court at this time. Instead, they
filed their charges at the police station in a verified complaint,
swearing to the truth of the charges before a deputy clerk of the
court.7 This allowed maximum police manpower to be kept at its
main function- maintaining order and protecting the community.
On Friday, April 5, 1968, the police began processing the first
prisoners at the Fillmore district station, which was in the area of
the conflagration. After being processed, the defendants were brought
to the Police Headquarters Building at 11th and State Streets and
housed at the Central Detention Facility. From there they were
brought into the courtroom for a hearing.
While processing on Friday evening began without undue delay,
it was disrupted when the Fillmore district station came under attack.
Of the 21 persons who appeared on Friday night to volunteer their legal services, only
five were lawyers admitted to practice in Illinois. The rest were Legal Aid Bureau
assistants or law students.
4 General Order No. 66-12 of the First Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois (June 20, 1966).
3

5 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 189 (1968).

6ABA

CRIMINAL LAW SECTION, BAR LEADERSHIP AND CIVIL DISORDERS,

(1968).

7

ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

38, § 111-3 (1967).

§ 2-B (7)
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Telephone and electrical lines were cut and shots were fired into
the police station. During this time there were approximately 200
prisoners inside the station who had been processed and who were
awaiting transportation to the Police Headquarters Building and
more were being brought to the station in police vans. Since it was
impossible to continue processing the prisoners at the Fillmore
district station, it was decided to bring them directly to the Central
Detention Facility. Because of the change in plans, a new processing
area had to be set up in the Police Headquarters Building, and this
delayed bail hearings for approximately 4 hours. From that time
on, all prisoners were brought immediately before a judge after
processing for the purpose of having bail set.
Since the police officers could not appear in court, arraignments
and preliminary hearings were set for approximately 10 days after
the bail hearings, when it was expected that the riot would have
run its course. Because these defendants could not receive an immediate trial, the court undertook to set bail in a reasonable amount
in all cases as soon as possible. On the first night bail was set
between $1,000 and $5,000 for misdemeanors and around $10,000
for felonies. Some individual recognizance bonds were set in appropriate cases.
Under the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, 8 a defendant
may be admitted to bail by presenting a cash deposit of 10 percent
of the amount of bail set with a minimum deposit of $25. Thus,
where bail is set at $1,000, the defendant has only to deposit $100
to gain his release, and where bail is set at $10,000, he must deposit
$1,000 to be released from custody. If the defendant fails to appear
for trial, his deposit is forfeited and he is liable for the rest of
his bond.
Other than on Friday night when processing was delayed, all
bail hearings were held within 4 to 6 hours after the defendant's
arrest. Before the defendants appeared for a bail hearing, persons
from the legal aid services interviewed them to determine which
relative or friend should be informed of their incarceration. When
the defendant's case was called and bail set, the legal aid volunteer
telephoned the person designated and informed him of the arrest
of the defendant, the charge placed against him, the amount of bail
set, and the amount of deposit required to release the defendant from
custody. He also indicated that the defendant was in the custody
of the Sheriff of Cook County and would be held either at the
County Jail or the House of Correction, both located at the Criminal
Courts complex at 26th Street and California Avenue in Chicago.
8

Id. ch.

38, § 110-7.
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Under Illinois law, where a person charged with a crime is
indigent, the court must appoint counsel to represent him at the
time of arraignment.' The Public Defender is appointed in all misdemeanor cases, but the court may appoint counsel other than the
Public Defender in felony cases where the defendant requests such
counsel. During the April riots, the court extended this statutory
right to counsel to include the bail hearings and the Public Defender was appointed unless the defendant indicated that he had
private counsel who would represent him. The court also determined
that, because of the emergency nature of the situation, there should
be no test of indigency and that lawyers would not be required to
sign their usual affidavit of non-solicitation.' 0 As a matter of fact,
no private counsel appeared to represent any of the defendants, and
no defendant requested counsel other than the Public Defender. At
the hearing the prosecutor was allowed to present whatever verified
information he had regarding the circumstances of the crime and
the defendant's prior criminal record. The Public Defender then
presented, through the defendant, those factors in the defendant's
background which tended to indicate that the defendant had a stable
position in the community and would appear for trial. After hearing
both sides, the judge set bail at an appropriate amount. An official
court reporter was present to provide a stenographic record of the
proceedings.
While the rioting appeared to subside late Friday night, it
broke out anew Saturday morning. On Saturday, April 6, 1968, the
Mayor of the city of Chicago by Executive Order" imposed certain
restrictions within the riot area'" and proclaimed a general curfew
for all persons under the age of 21 years. The curfew was to begin
at 7:00 p.m. that night and remain in effect until 6:00 a.m. the
following morning for each night until the emergency was declared
to be over.
On Friday the number of persons arrested totaled approximately 800. On Saturday, with the imposition of the curfew, the
number of persons arrested climbed dramatically to over 1,500.
Most of the persons arrested were charged with curfew violations,
a misdemeanor which carried a maximum fine of $500. Persons
accused only of violating the curfew were released on their own
individual recognizance bond after being detained until 6:00 a.m.
the next morning. This was done so that curfew violators would
9

Id. ch. 38, § 113-3.
1 Rule 0.9 of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (August 1, 1967).
" Executive Order, City of Chicago, Illinois (April 6, 1968).
12 The restrictions included a prohibition on the sale of inflammable liquids in portable
containers and gave police commanders the right to prohibit the sale of alcoholic
beverages in their districts.
0
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not be rearrested after their release and again brought before the
court.
Juvenile offenders were treated separately from adult defendants. Under Illinois law a person is considered a juvenile when he
is a male 16 years and under or a female 17 years and under."
Out of 1,207 juveniles arrested, there were 594 station adjustments,
where juveniles were released at the police station to their parents'
custody. Of the juveniles who were arrested and detained, all but
65 were released when their parents or some near relative appeared
at the detention center and assured their appearance in Juvenile
Court. To assure compliance with the statutory provisions concerning
juveniles, 4 those juveniles who were detained had their cases set
for trial in the juvenile detention facility within 2 days after their
arrest.
The House of Correction and the County Jail held all prisoners
who were arrested. While plans were made for the possibility of
emergency detention facilities in the event the rioting continued for
an extended period of time, such facilities were never used. There
was never any prisoner housed at Navy Pier.
As the number of persons arrested grew on Saturday, April 6,
1968, it was felt that additional courtrooms would have to be opened
to supplement the four judges at l1th and State Streets who were
sitting around the clock in 8-hour shifts. Therefore, on Saturday
evening two additional courtrooms were opened at the Criminal
Courts Building located at 26th Street and California Avenue. The
Chief Judge also continued all previously set criminal trials and
traffic cases for one week to allow police officers who were witnesses
to remain at their posts. By Sunday afternoon, however, the number
of persons arrested had diminished considerably from the previous
day, and we again directed all bail hearings to the four courtrooms
at lth and State Streets.
The number of defendants arrested dwindled on Monday and
Tuesday, and the four courtrooms designated for bail hearings were
reduced to two. After the Mayor declared the emergency to be over
on Wednesday, the 10th of April, the court resumed bail hearings
on new arrests in the usual and normal manner, but made special
courtrooms available to hear motions for the reduction of those bonds
already set. One judge was assigned to hear all such motions on
Thursday, April 11. Because of the increased number of motions
filed thereafter, there were two judges assigned on Friday, three on
Saturday, and, on Easter Sunday, 13 judges sat most of the day to
hear bond reductions.
13 ILL. REv. STAT.

ch. 37, §

141d. ch. 37, § 703.

702

(1967).
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After the emergency was declared over, many individuals and
groups of persons representing community organizations came before
the court to ask the release of persons they claimed were arrested.
These matters were referred to the Public Defender, who at that time
represented all defendants except those who had retained private
counsel since their bail hearings. Many of these groups alleged that
persons whom they knew to be arrested could not be found in the
jail and that they feared for their safety. These rumors were fed by
persons and organizations attempting to capitalize on the riot
situation. Upon investigation it was disclosed that of the approximately 1,700 persons who were detained, 400 gave false identities.
When relatives or friends sought them by their own name in order
to post bond for them, they could not be found. Similarly, some legal
groups- including the Cook County Bar Association, a predominantly Negro organization, who had not been appointed by the
court to represent the defendants - petitioned the court for reduction in bail for all defendants awaiting trial on charges arising
from the riots. Since a motion for reduction in bail could be presented only by the attorney actually representing the defendant, these
matters also were referred to the Public Defender. In order to
expedite the release of those defendants still incarcerated, the Public
Defender agreed to allow persons representing several volunteer
legal organizations to assist him and his staff by going into the Jail
to interview the defendants and present facts upon which to move
to reduce bail. By Monday, April 15, 1968, out of 3,781 persons
arrested during the rioting, only 267 remained in custody - most
on charges of arson, burglary, and other serious crimes.
Two thousand nine hundred and seventy-two cases have been
instituted against the 2,574 adults who were arrested. Defendants
were found guilty in 896 misdemeanor cases and not guilty in 261
cases. Charges were dismissed in 487 cases, and defendants failed to
appear in 611 cases. Seventeen cases were continued under court
supervision.
In addition, 738 defendants were named in 277 indictments
returned by the Grand Jury sitting in May and June of 1968. The
Grand Jury also returned "no bills" on 13 defendants in five cases.
Of the defendants indicted, 417 were found guilty, 57 were found
not guilty, prosecution was dropped against 20 (one of whom died),
102 failed to appear for trial, and the cases of the remaining 142
defendants were still pending on February 28, 1969, having been
continued on motion of the defendants or with their consent.15
15Honorable Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Attorney of Cook County, Report of Civil
Disturbances (dispositions to February 28, 1969, inclusive) (March 17, 1969).
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As indicated previously, the Circuit Court of Cook County was
not completely prepared for the large-scale rioting which broke out
on April 5, 1968; but, we did the best that we could under emergency
conditions with the facilities and procedures available. We were
scrupulous in seeing that all of the requirements of due process were
observed. We were anxious that there be a minimum of delay
between the time of the defendant's arrest and the time that he was
brought to court for a bail hearing. While we worked long hours
around the clock during the entire period of emergency to see to it
that the cases were processed expeditiously and without undue delay,
the court came in for a good deal of criticism from those who were
not present during the emergency. Persons who received their information thirdhand were quick to denounce "the complete breakdown
of judicial administration during the rioting" and to demand that
all persons arrested during the rioting should be released from detention. This prompted the creation of the Chicago Riot Study Committee, a committee of distinguished citizens from all walks of life,
who concluded:
The Committee is of the view that even in a mass arrest situation,
bonds ought to be set as nearly as may be in accordance with the
individual circumstances of the arrestee and with the basic purpose
of assuring his availability for his trial. If this is done, so that the
community could be assured that the bonds were set in the appropriate amounts in the first place, then the Committee would agree
that bond reduction hearings for those unable to make the proper
bonds that had been set should be postponed until the emergency
is over. Once the emergency is over, the Committee believes that
the courts should proceed as in fact they did during the April riots
that is, to view sympathetically the circumstances of those still
under detention and in all except serious, hard-core cases to release
arrestees on their own recognizance or upon the amount of a bond
which is within their resources.",
As a result of the publicity directed toward the conduct of the
court during the riots, the organized bar became more directly involved with the court's mass arrest program. The Chicago Bar Association created a committee of volunteer lawyers from the bar
at large to assist the court in emergency situations. Additionally, the
court, in cooperation with the Chicago Bar Association, developed
new guidelines for the processing of defendants in mass arrest
situations. These guidelines have been incorporated in General Order
No. 18 which was promulgated on August 21, 1968, by Chief Judge
John S. Boyle. 17 While certain provisions of this order are applicable
16 CHICAGO RIOT STUDY COMMITTEE:

REPORT OF THE CHICAGO RIOT COMMITTEE
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(August 1, 1968).
17 General Order No. 18 of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (August 21,
1968).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

only to Cook County, the general provisions are equally valid for
other jurisdictions. General Order No. 18 provides:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

GENERAL ORDER

No. 18

SUBJECT: PROCEEDINGS IN MASS ARRESTS

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
18.1

MASS ARREST
When 50 or more persons, induding juveniles, are arrested in one
incident within the territorial limits of any Municipal District of
the Circuit Court of Cook County for acts which constitute a breach
of the public peace, such action shall be considered a "mass arrest."

18.2

COURT FACILITIES
A. Municipal District One
(i) When less than 300 persons, including juveniles, are the
subject of a mass arrest within the corporate limits of the City
of Chicago, court facilities of Municipal District One shall be
made available at 1121 South State Street, Chicago, for the
purpose of accepting the filings of complaints and informations
and for the setting of bail.
(ii) When it reasonably appears that 300 or more persons, including juveniles, will be the subject of a mass arrest within the
corporate limits of the City of Chicago, court facilities of
Municipal District One shall be made available at 2600 South
California Avenue, Chicago, for the purpose of accepting the
filings of complaints and informations and for the setting of bail.
B. Municipal Districts Two through Six
(i) When less than 150 persons, including juveniles, are the
subject of a mass arrest within the territorial limits of any
Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County outside
the corporate limits of the City of Chicago, court facilities of
the Municipal District wherein the arrest occurred shall be made
available at a place designated by the Presiding Judge of that
District for the purpose of accepting the filings of complaints
and informations and for the setting of bail.
(ii) When it reasonably appears that 150 or more persons, including juveniles, will be the subject of a mass arrest within the
territorial limits of any Municipal District of the Circuit Court
of Cook County outside the corporate limits of the City of
Chicago, court facilities of the Municipal District wherein the
arrest occurred shall be made available at 2600 South California
Avenue, Chicago, for the purpose of accepting the filings ot
complaints and informations and for the setting of bail.
C. Juvenile Division
When juveniles are included in a mass arrest within the territorial limits of any Municipal District of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, court facilities of the Municipal District wherein
the arrest occurred shall be made available to the Juvenile Division at the appropriate location for the purpose of holding
detention hearings as provided in Article 3 of the Juvenile Court
Act of 1965 as amended.
DUTIES OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE
A. When a mass arrest occurs in any Municipal District, it shall be
the duty of the Presiding Judge of the District upon notification:
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(i) To designate the courtrooms to be used for accepting the
filings of complaints and informations for the setting of bail;
(ii) To assign judges and magistrates to adequately staff the
courtrooms provided;
(iii) To designate a place or places for the preparation or making
of bail bonds and for the taking of security deposits on bail; and
(iv) To notify the following persons and direct them to assign
sufficient deputies and assistants to adequately staff the court
facilities provided:
(a) The Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
(b) The Sheriff of Cook County,
(c) The State's Attorney of Cook County,
(d) In Municipal District One, the Corporation Counsel
of the City of Chicago; In Municipal Districts Two through
Six, the appropriate Municipal prosecuting attorney,
(e) The Public Defender of Cook County,
(f) The Chairman of the Chicago Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers Committee, and
(g) In Municipal District One, the Supervisor of the Official Court Reporters of Municipal District One; In Municipal Districts Two through Six, the Official Court Reporter designated by the Presiding Judge of the District.
B. When juveniles are included in a mass arrest in any Municipal
District, it shall be the duty of the Presiding Judge of the District, in addition to the foregoing, upon notification:
(i) To designate the courtroom or courtrooms to be used for the
holding of detention hearings as provided in Article 3 of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1965 as amended; and
(ii) To notify the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Division who
will assign sufficient judges and magistrates and other personnel
to adequately staff the court facilities provided.
DUTIES OF JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES
A. Upon arriving at the designated court facility, the judge or
magistrate shall report to the Presiding Judge of the District
or his designate and receive his court assignment. He shall then
proceed to his assigned courtroom and commence hearing cases
until relieved or otherwise discharged from his assignment;
B. Each judge or magistrate shall designate a special area in his
courtroom for the seating of attorneys and shall specify an appropriate area to be used as a place for conferences between
attorneys and their clients;
C. It shall be the duty of each judge and magistrate to maintain
order and decorum in and about his courtroom and to enforce
the provisions against prohibited behavior.
PROHIBITED BEHAVIOR (See Rule 0.7 of the Circuit Court of
Cook County)
A. The solicitation of business relating to the furnishing of security
deposits for bail or the employment of any attorney is prohibited;
B. Loitering in or about the rooms or corridors of the courthouse
is prohibited. Unapproved group congregating or the causing
of a disturbance or nuisance in or near any courthouse or place
of holding court in mass arrest cases is prohibited. Picketing or
parading outside of a building housing a court hearing mass
arrest cases is prohibited when such picketing or parading obstructs or impedes the orderly administration of justice;
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The State's Attorney of Cook County may require any person
who violates this order to appear forthwith before any judge or
magistrate of this Court to answer to a charge of contempt;
D. The Sheriff of Cook County and his deputies, the Custodian of
the courthouse and any peace officer shall enforce this order
either by ejecting violators from the courthouse or by causing
them to appear before one of the judges or magistrates of this
Court for a hearing and for the imposition of such punishment
as the Court may deem proper.
PRE-HEARING INTERVIEWS
Persons designated by the Presiding Judge of the District shall be
allowed to interview the defendants to obtain sufficient information
to advise interested persons of the defendants' arrest and detention.
COURTROOM OBSERVERS
Persons designated by the Presiding Judge of the District shall be
admitted to all court facilities to observe the proceedings therein.
SUGGESTED PROCEDURES FOR THE SETTING OF BAIL
In mass arrest cases, the following procedures should be used whenever practicable:
A. The Court shall summon the defendant to the bar and place him
under oath;
B. The prosecuting attorney shall file a separate complaint or information, together with one copy, for each offense with which
the defendant is being charged;
C. The Court shall inform the defendant of the charge or charges
placed against him and shall furnish him a copy of the complaint
or information;
D. The Court shall advise the defendant of his right to counsel;
E.
If the defendant is without counsel, the Court shall appoint the
Public Defender of Cook County to defend him;
F. If the defendant requests counsel other than the Public Defender
of Cook County, the Court shall appoint a member of the Chicago
Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers Committee to represent the
defendant;
G. All attorneys appearing on behalf of a defendant shall file their
written appearance with the Court. Appointed counsel other than
the Public Defender of Cook County may file a special appearance
for the sole purpose of representing the defendant in the setting
of bail;
H. No Affidavit of Ethical Conduct, under Rule 0.9 of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, shall be required of any attorney appointed
by the Court;
I.
The defendant shall have a reasonable opportunity to confer
with his attorney before the bail hearing shall commence. If the
defendant or his attorney requests additional time, the Court
shall pass the case and summon the next defendant to the bar;
J.
When the hearing is resumed, the prosecuting attorney shall
advise the Court of the facts surrounding the defendant's arrest
and shall relate his past criminal acts and conduct, if known;
K. The defendant or his attorney shall have ample opportunity to
advise the Court of all mitigating circumstances and other facts
tending to show that the defendant will comply with the conditions of the bail bond;
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After a full hearing, the Court shall set bail in an amount:
'(i) Sufficient to assure compliance with the conditions set
forth in the bail bond;
(ii) Not oppressive;
(iii) Commensurate with the nature of the offense charged;
(iv) Considerate of the past criminal acts and conduct of the

defendant; and
(v) Considerate of the financial ability of the accused;
M. When the defendant is charged with an offense punishable
N.

0.
18.9

by fine only, the amount of bail set by the Court shall not exceed
double the amount of maximum penalty;
The use of recognizance bonds is encouraged in appropriate cases.
The Court may impose reasonable conditions and restrictions to
assure the defendant's appearance in Court;
After setting bail, the Court shall continue the cause to a date
certain returnable to the same branch of the Court.

POSTING OF BAIL
A. If the defendant is to be admitted to bail on his own recognizance
or if the defendant is able to give the required security deposit
on bail and the defendant indicates that he will comply with the
conditions set forth in the bail bond, he shall be brought without
undue delay to the nearest place for the preparation or making
of bail bonds and for the taking of security deposits on bail;
B. If the defendant is unable to give the required bail security
deposit, he shall be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of
Cook County until he gives bail as required or until his next
Court appearance;
C. Persons other than those specifically prohibited by statute from
furnishing bail security shall be granted access to a place designated for the preparation or making of bail bonds and for the
taking of security deposits on bail and shall be permitted to
deposit the required security deposit on bail on behalf of the
defendant.

18.10 SUGGESTED PROCEDURES FOR JUVENILE DETENTION
HEARINGS
In mass arrest cases, the following procedures should be used whenever practicable:
A. The Court shall summon the juvenile to the bar and place him
under oath;
B. The State's Attorney of Cook County shall file a petition, together
with one copy thereof, alleging that the juvenile is delinquent,
otherwise in need of supervision, neglected or dependent;
C. The Court shall inform the juvenile of the allegations contained
in the petition and shall furnish him a copy of the petition;
D. The Court shall advise the juvenile of his right to counsel;
E. If the juvenile is without counsel, the Court shall appoint the
Public Defender of Cook County to represent him;
F. If the juvenile requests counsel other than the Public Defender
of Cook County, the Court shall appoint a member of the Chicago
Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers Comnmittee to represent the
juvenile;
G. All attorneys appearing on behalf of a juvenile shall file their
written appearance with the Court. Appointed counsel other than
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the Public Defender of Cook County may file a detention hearing
appearance for the sole purpose of representing the juvenile in
a detention hearing as provided in Article 3 of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1965, as amended;
No Affidavit of Ethical Conduct under Rule 0.9 of the Circuit
Court of Cook County shall be required of any attorney appointed
by the Court;
The juvenile shall have a reasonable opportunity to confer with
his attorney before the detention hearing shall commence. If the
juvenile or his attorney requests additional time, the Court shall
pass the case and summon the next juvenile to the bar;
When the hearing is resumed, the State's Attorney of Cook
County shall advise the Court of the facts surrounding the juvenile being taken into custody as well as any other information
concerning the juvenile relevant to the issue of detention;
The juvenile or his attorney shall have ample opportunity to
advise the Court of any additional information concerning the
juvenile relevant to the issue of detention;
If the Court finds after a full hearing that it is a matter of
immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the juvenile
or of the person or property of another that the juvenile be
detained or that he is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the Court,
the Court shall order that the juvenile be detained at the Arthur
J. Audy Home for Children, 2240 West Roosevelt Road, Chicago,
or at any suitable place designated by the Presiding Judge ot
the Juvenile Division, until his next Court appearance;
If the Court finds after a full hearing that it is not a matter
of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the
juvenile or of the person or property of another that the juvenile
be detained or that he is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court shall order that the juvenile be released to the
custody of his parent, guardian, legal custodian or responsible
relative;
Where no parent, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative
appears to whose custody the juvenile may be released, the Court
may order that the juvenile be temporarily detained at the Arthur
J. Audy Home for Children, 2240 West Roosevelt Road, Chicago,
or at any suitable place designated by the Presiding Judge of the
Juvenile Division until such time as a parent, guardian, legal
custodian or responsible relative shall appear to assume custody
of the juvenile;
The Court shall set the adjudicatory hearing on the petition for
a date certain returnable to the same branch of the Court.

18.11 TELEPHONE FACILITIES

Telephones shall be made available to assigned counsel or their assistants to notify one interested person of the arrest of the defendant, the
charge or charges upon which he was arrested, the amount of bail set,
the amount of deposit required for posting bail, and where the defendant is being held.
18.12 INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS ARRESTED
The arresting agency shall make available as soon as practicable information concerning the identity of all persons arrested in the mass
arrest.
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INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS DETAINED
The Sheriff of Cook County shall make available as soon as practicable
information concerning the identity of all persons ordered by the Court

into his custody, the amount of bail set and the locations where they
are being detained.
18.14 REVIEW OF BAIL SET

As soon as practicable after the incident which gave rise to the mass
arrest has ended, the Sheriff of Cook County shall deliver to the
Presiding Judge of the District a list of all persons remaining in
custody. Thereupon, the Court on its own motion shall call each
defendant remaining in custody before the bar and shall conduct a
hearing to re-examine the bail previously set.
ENTER:
JOHN S. BOYLE, Chief Judge

Circuit Court of Cook County
General Order No. 18 was followed to good effect during the
disorders which accompanied the Democratic National Convention
in Chicago throughout the week of August 26, 1968. Six hundred
and thirty-seven defendants were processed in that period, most of
whom were charged with disorderly conduct and other minor crimes.

Most defendants were able to post bond immediately and gain their
release. At the end of the week there was only one defendant arrested
during the Convention disorders remaining in the County Jail, and
he was there only because he refused to post a $25 deposit or have
anyone post it for him.

The Circuit Court of Cook County received universal praise for
its expeditious handling of mass arrest cases during the August disorders. The Chicago Bar Association announced that "[rJeports
received from the Association's volunteer lawyers and observers
indicate that the Magistrates and Court personnel performed their
functions competently, courteously and with proper regard of the
Constitutional rights of the defendants."' 8 Even some of the most
vocal critics of the court's actions in April conceded that our court
set a new standard in the handling of mass arrest cases.

We now know that rioting can erupt at any time in any of our
cities. And, while there is some satisfaction in knowing that our
response in August was a correct one, we must still dedicate ourselves
to the sad task of preparing for future disorders that we hope will
never occur. In the unhappy event that we are again faced with a
mass arrest situation, we shall respond to those additional burdens
by relying on the provisions of General Order No. 18, being firmly
committed to that "establishment" which is ordained in the Preamble
of the Constitution of the United States: The establishment of justice.

18 Letter from John J. Sullivan, President, Chicago Bar Association, to Honorable John
S. Boyle, Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Sept. 12, 1968.

DETROIT: 1967
By ALFONSO R. HARPER*
ECALLING July 23, 1967, I would ask you to imagine, if you
will, hundreds and hundreds of men and women shoved
together in a concrete masonry building, standing shoulder to
shoulder without room to fall down even if they fainted, not to
mention sitting if they become weary, all in the middle of their
own waste for any number of hours - 14 to 28. Imagine rows and
rows of buses - dozens of them - around the police headquarters,
the criminal courts building, and the county jail, packed with as
many as 2,000 men who remained in these vehicles for as long as
48 hours with little opportunity to have sanitation relief except
through some improvised facility within the vehicle.
All of this happened in Detroit during the week following
July 23, 1967. Despite the fact that these events would appear
unusual and abnormal, I submit that the method for handling mass
arrests in Detroit in July of 1967, and the methods employed during
all of the past half-century for handling individual arrests or
arrests in small numbers, differed only in terms of magnitude rather
than in terms of attitude. There has never been any consideration to
speak of for prisoners in the city of Detroit, particularly when those
prisoners happen to be Negro. I know this because I have been one
of those prisoners; thus, my knowledge in this regard has not come
vicariously. Indeed, I have been one of the people grabbed up, shoved
into a scout car, taken to the police headquarters without even the
inquiry usually expected, and then later released upon discovery that
I was a practicing attorney.
What causes this situation? It emanates from a virtual lack of
consideration for people who happen to be Black, as, in this case,
the overwhelming majority of those arrested in July 1967 were.
Of course, a handful of White persons were arrested during the
disturbance - probably 75 or 100 out of approximately 7,000 persons arrested. Yet I have not heard one word from officialdom in
Detroit to the effect that the public would not stand for this kind
of practice again.
Like many other people, I could not predict the disturbance
of July 1967. I'm just not sophisticated enough to predict such a
radical change. But, I wasn't the only one who was caught off
*Attorney, Legal Aid and Defender Association, Detroit, Michigan.
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guard. The criminal courts of Detroit were also obviously unprepared to handle the situation.
The technical charge on which most of the several thousands
of arrested persons were brought before the courts was that of entering without breaking, which carries statutory punishment just below
that for the common law crime of burglary or the statutory crime
of breaking and entering. Yet, bail bonds were fixed at $10,000 to
$25,000, and a day or so later, bail bonds ran as high as $10,000
for alleged curfew violaters.
Oddly enough, of the more than 7,000 people who were
arrested, the number that were eventually convicted of a felony
was negligible. Many were convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, a
misdemeanor known, under our statute, as entry without permission
of the owner, carrying a 90-day maximum sentence. Within 4 or 5
days after the commencement of the disturbance, the courts seemed
to recover their reason, and, in many instances where they were
able, corrected their errors and released on personal recognizance
many of the people who had been held on high bond. By that time,
however, many had already posted bonds. I recall, particularly, one
case where a 48-year-old prisoner, who had no prior criminal record,
was charged with entering without breaking. The specific facts alleged were that he was discovered coming out of an already vandalized and open grocery store with merchandise valued, by police accounting, at $2.08. His bail was set at $10,000. His very elderly parents mortgaged their home to raise the $1,000 premium necessary
to pay that bond. A few days later, when the man was brought before
the court, the judge was asked to reduce the bond and, although he
obliged by changing the bond to one of personal recognizance, the
premium had already been paid and no recovery of this money was
possible. This man was later convicted of the misdemeanor of entry
without permission of the owner and sentenced to exactly those 4
or 5 days he served in jail, but his parents' thousand dollars was
already gone.
The entire administration of justice in this country is affected
to a greater or lesser extent by race. Even when Blacks sit on the
judiciary, they too, to a great extent, represent "the establishment."
Their strong desire to belong to the establishment sometimes keeps
them from being as merciful and equitably judicious with their
fellow Black citizens as they might otherwise be. We are not, therefore, speaking merely about a group of White judges who administer justice; we are talking about judges who administer justice or
something that is described in terms of justice.
The courts of Detroit have shown some signs of improvement
since the disturbance of 1967. A number of measures have been
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instituted in the Recorder's Court that should result in an improvement of justice. The Detroit Bar Association deserves some credit
for urging these improvements, but I would indict the group we
normally refer to as the Clinton Street Bar Association, consisting
of that small group of lawyers who practice exclusively in the
criminal courts. Much of what happened in June was the fault
of that Clinton Street Bar, whose members, virtually without exception, walked into the courts with their clients and waived their
right to a preliminary examination. Thus, even if the judge might
have been inclined to dismiss the charge for lack of proof or
probable cause, waiver of the hearing by the attorney meant that
the defendant would automatically be bound over for trial on the
felony.
The best representation that was obtained for defendants came
from volunteer members of the Detroit Bar Association, many
coming from "blue stocking" firms that practice principally in the
civil area. These volunteers were "bright-eyed" young chaps who
handled their cases generally with the same zeal with which they
would handle a negligence case in circuit court. In many instances,
they seemed a bit odd when compared to the Clinton Street Bar members who so often literally waltzed their clients through the courts
without protecting their rights. Thus, if I would indict the police,
and to some extent the bench, I certainly would do the same for that
small segment of the bar which mishandled their clients' cases.
In passing, it would be only fair to state, that at least one member of the Recorder's Court bench was untouched or little affected by
the apparent hysteria by which most of his fellow judges seemingly
were influenced to varying degrees.
Given the knowledge in advance that a civil disorder such as
that which occurred in Detroit was going to take place (and I had
no such knowledge), I could have predicted that a tremendous number of people would be arrested without the police or any citizen
observing the crimes supposedly committed by them. I would also
have been able to predict that a significant number of those people
would be beaten and abused- as they in fact were -because this
has been happening in Detroit for a long, long time, and it has
occurred in all of our major cities.
The permissive attitude of the public is one possible explanation
for this recurring abuse. We have always accepted the explanation
for police brutality - that the Negro arrestee had resisted arrest
or had in some way interfered with the police officer in the performance of his duty (in 99 percent of the established instances,
Negroes are the victims of the brutality and White police officers
are the perpetrators). It should be understood that this Negro, in
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almost every case, is the same one who, until after World War I1,
was too cowardly, according to official reports, to walk armed into
battle during wartime. For reasons that I cannot possibly understand,
the police officers are always able to convince the general public
and officialdom that this same Negro, from some unknown source,
has a terrific amount of courage and bravery in the face of the police
billyclub and will, in almost every instance, fight back and resist
arrest. I say he probably ought to, but the facts are that he does not.
I wish I could say something of value about what we really
can do in the event of mass arrests in the future. My attitude is very
pessimistic. We all hope that there will be no further occasion for
conducting mass arrests, certainly not on the magnitude experienced in July 1967; but, actually to avoid it calls for a change of
attitude on the part of almost everyone concerned. There must be
an absolute rejection of the nice little explanations when incidents
do occur.
Some might be so naive as to believe that justice is administered
irrespective of race, creed, or color. If so, I would point out the
following: A few years ago, some of us tried to discover how many
Whites, who had been actively involved in the hundreds of violent
deaths of Negroes in Wayne County (where Detroit is located),
had been convicted of first-degree murder. We could not determine
this from any documents; we could not gather all of the hundreds
of transcripts where trials were held to determine the respective
races of the parties involved. We did, however, ask several judges
and lawyers who had practiced in that county for 40 years or more.
In not a single instance were we able to uncover any information
indicating that any White person who had slain a Negro had ever
been convicted of first-degree murder in Wayne County, at least
not in this century. At the same time, any number of Negroes have
been found guilty of first-degree murder where Whites were the
victims. Indeed, the records also indicate that offenses committed
by Negroes against other Negroes invariably carry lower penalties
following conviction than similar convictions where a Negro is
the offender and a White person is the victim. Is this coincidental
- or is there a factor at work that many would rather ignore?
Let me give still another illustration: In many instances, it is
very difficult for Negroes to have their complaints of law violation
heard. Last year, I spent the major part of 10 working days trying
to assist a 14-year-old girl in obtaining a recommendation for a
warrant in a statutory rape case in which all the evidence had been
documented. I actually had to invoke the assistance of the mayor's
office and the chief prosecutor before I could obtain this recommendation. The case was so strong that, although the trial lasted
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five days, the jury stayed out less than an hour and brought back
a verdict of guilty as charged. Does an incident such as this indicate
an equality of justice?
Perhaps we should first examine ourselves. Those of us who
have considered ourselves virtually free from prejudice would bear
some self-examination. The emotional content, mixed with a bitter
bigotry, that makes one man move out of his home when a Negro
moves next door drives another man to participate in the lynching
of a Negro. The difference is only one of degree; it was this same
emotional content that glaringly showed itself in the conduct of
those engaged in so-called law enforcement and so-called administration of justice in the city of Detroit before and during the
1967 disturbance.
If any point of value can be made on the subject of mass
arrests, it must be that the rights of the individual must be protected. First and foremost, those who, by virtue of position or office,
are charged with the administration of our laws must be constrained
to the utmost to avoid the influence of racial prejudice. Then, perhaps, the question of "how to handle mass arrests" will become moot.

DETROIT: 1967-A RESPONSE
By JUDGE

VINCENT

J.

BRENNAN*

J AM not prepared at this time to accept my good friend Alfonso

Harper's statistics on the method and the selection of cases and
how they were handled in the Detroit riot of 1967, but I intend
to look into it, because he did point out certain interesting facts.
He said it was odd that, during the riots, some 99 percent of those
arrested were Negro. The reason for this phenomenon is very simple:
At that time, the incidents occurred in a predominantly Negro
neighborhood - the 12th Street area, similar to the North Clark
or Rush Street areas in Chicago. Twelfth Street is lined on both
sides by pawnshops, bars, nightclubs, cheap rooming houses, cheap
markets, and places where prices are high, services slight, and
quality virtually negligible. The street is inhabited by pimps, prostitutes, and dope peddlers. It is a street any city could do without.
The riot began on 12th Street and became uncontrollable within
hours. Since the area was from 97 to 99 percent Negro, the arrestees
were also 97 to 99 percent Negro.
We in the judiciary were trying to do our best during this
time, but we were harrassed from all sides. We had no plan or
*Former Chief Judge, Recorder's Court, Detroit, Michigan. Presently, Judge, Michigan
Court of Appeals.
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of a Negro. The difference is only one of degree; it was this same
emotional content that glaringly showed itself in the conduct of
those engaged in so-called law enforcement and so-called administration of justice in the city of Detroit before and during the
1967 disturbance.
If any point of value can be made on the subject of mass
arrests, it must be that the rights of the individual must be protected. First and foremost, those who, by virtue of position or office,
are charged with the administration of our laws must be constrained
to the utmost to avoid the influence of racial prejudice. Then, perhaps, the question of "how to handle mass arrests" will become moot.

DETROIT: 1967-A RESPONSE
By JUDGE

VINCENT

J.

BRENNAN*

J AM not prepared at this time to accept my good friend Alfonso

Harper's statistics on the method and the selection of cases and
how they were handled in the Detroit riot of 1967, but I intend
to look into it, because he did point out certain interesting facts.
He said it was odd that, during the riots, some 99 percent of those
arrested were Negro. The reason for this phenomenon is very simple:
At that time, the incidents occurred in a predominantly Negro
neighborhood - the 12th Street area, similar to the North Clark
or Rush Street areas in Chicago. Twelfth Street is lined on both
sides by pawnshops, bars, nightclubs, cheap rooming houses, cheap
markets, and places where prices are high, services slight, and
quality virtually negligible. The street is inhabited by pimps, prostitutes, and dope peddlers. It is a street any city could do without.
The riot began on 12th Street and became uncontrollable within
hours. Since the area was from 97 to 99 percent Negro, the arrestees
were also 97 to 99 percent Negro.
We in the judiciary were trying to do our best during this
time, but we were harrassed from all sides. We had no plan or
*Former Chief Judge, Recorder's Court, Detroit, Michigan. Presently, Judge, Michigan
Court of Appeals.
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contingency in the event of a mass arrest situation. Consequently,
there was a breakdown in our courts. We judges were hounded
by humanity amounting to 100 times our daily load. There were
7,000 arrests, of which approximately 4,000 went through the
courts and 3,000 were released at the precinct level. How could the
13 judges cope with all of the arraignments, examinations, trials,
and final dispositions? During those first few days, we confronted
defendants we knew nothing about. During normal periods, the
court is presented at the time of an arraignment with a previous
record sheet, if any, and a write-up that indicates the degree of
involvement and the offense with which the defendant is charged.
During the riots, however, we didn't have any of this information.
As soon as the riot had begun, we mobilized the court and
staff and issued orders to those protecting the security of the
Recorder's Court Building that they should allow any attorney to
enter the building upon presentation of his Bar Association membership card. When an attorney appeared before a judge and manifested his knowledge of the defendant, the defandant was released
on a personal recognizance bond if there was no other record. For
two or three days, however, until the identification bureau could
catch up with the number of the arrests, we had no way of knowing
who had appeared before us. We heard rumors that busloads of
people who had started the Newark, New Jersey, riot were coming
in from Newark. We heard rumors that people who had started
and fanned the Watts fire were flying in from Watts. The jails
were overcrowded, and the Sheriff's Department, which is responsible for the handling of prisoners, completely broke down. We
couldn't obtain any information whatsover from the sheriff.
We worked around the clock, 24 hours a day, for 3 weeks.
There was no judicial manpower shortage; we handled all of the
cases that were ready for us. The backup developed in the Warrant
Clerk's Office where warrants are typed and prepared for the
courts. During the first week, we handled nothing but arraignments;
during the second and third weeks, we handled preliminary
examinations.
The detention facilities were heavily overcrowded and unsanitary, but there was no place else to put the arrestees. The buses,
compared with the detention cells in the Recorder's Court Building,
were not nearly so bad. At least the arrestees were able to sit down,
they were located outside, restroom facilities were available near
the buses, and they were given something to eat and drink each day.
By Tuesday or Wednesday, the third and fourth days after
the riot had begun, arrestees were being shifted to other cities in
the state. We found it extremely difficult to locate prisoners,
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because, once again, the Sheriff's Department had broken down.
Many of those arrestees who had made bond could not be located.
Many had given false names.
On Wednesday, four days after the riot had begun, I signed
a personal bond order containing the names of 2,200 people. But,
we were continually plagued with staffing problems: We were
trying to staff the Warrant Clerk's Office and trying to staff a
section to investigate the backgrounds of arrestees. Neighborhood
Legal Services, a division of the Office of Economic Opportunity,
volunteered its help and performed admirably. The Public Defender's Office, though only recently organized with but a skeleton
force, did an outstanding job. The Detroit Bar Association represented, without charge, every arrestee charged with an offense in
Recorder's Court. At the time of arraignments, there was an attorney
present during all sessions of most courts.
When should those arrested be released - at the time of
arraignment, that night, or the next day? How can the judge know
anything about any of the vast numbers arrested during a riot,
whether any have a prior police record, whether any are fugitives,
or whether any are already on parole or probation for prior offenses? Is it unreasonable to delay the release of arrestees pending
the setting of reasonable bonds? When should bonds be set? Should
reasonable bonds even be considered during a riot conflagration?
Is there a morale problem for those entrusted with the safety of
the community - the police, the National Guard, and the Army if, after the arrest and delivery of an individual to the courts, the
policeman or guardsman return to the streets only to be confronted
with the same person whom he recently arrested? All you need is
one or two such incidents before the story spreads throughout the
police or National Guard forces. Under such circumstances, many
policemen would probably drop their badges and go home, saying,
"To hell with it."
These are some of the questions that must be answered by
the judiciary confronted with a riot-mass arrest situation. I don't
pretend to have all the answers, nor do I believe that Mr. Harper,
Mr. Jones, or Mr. Mackoff have the answers. Yet, these and similar
questions are crying for solution.
A number of studies analyzing the phenomenon of riots and
their causes have been made throughout the country. We certainly
need these studies, for this country is facing times of uncertainty.
Riots are polarizing the Black and White communities. Our policemen are ill-equipped to deal with this polarization. Most of them
are only high school graduates and receive salaries in the neighborhood of $6,000 per year; yet they are asked to be on-the-street
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psychologists, domestic relations experts, and Supreme Court Justices. We must raise the standards of police qualifications. I know
of many instances where the police have handled situations in a
manner that can only result in hatred and disrespect for the law
and criminal justice system. But, what can we expect from underpaid civil servants who are continually confronted with emotional
situations requiring instant decisions in which, should they fail to
react immediately, they may be mobbed on the street, they may
start a riot, or they may be shot? We must get to the root of the
problem. We must re-establish in the eyes of the Blacks a respect
for the courts and a respect for authority. We must establish in
the eyes of the Whites that same respect. We must establish better
police-community relations for both Blacks and Whites. How do
we as Whites do all this? How do we as Blacks do it?
If a riot were to occur in Detroit tomorrow, Recorder's Court
would undoubtedly react in the same manner as it did in July of
1967. However, we would hope to have available the detention
facilities that would be necessary in the event of a mass arrest;
we would hope to have on ready call forces of probation officers
and attorneys to obtain immediate information from those arrested
in order that a third party - employer, relative, or lawyer - might
step in and post bond or vouch for the defendant.
For those communities which have not experienced the calamity
of a riot, I would suggest that city officials compile a master set
of plans to provide for, among other things, extra clerical help,
additional detention centers, central communications, prisoner location systems, and a bureau of identification experts in the event a
riot does flare up. If these essential areas are provided for, the
communities will be fairly well prepared to handle the problems
that will surely ensue. But, let's face it: The problems will not be
completely solved. Regardless of any meticulous preparation, when
confronted by a mass arrest situation, the normal judicial system
breaks down, and the emergency methods which must follow do
not, unfortunately, meet the ideal level that our critics seek.
Mr. Harper has set forth isolated instances that occurred during
the 1967 Detroit riots in an attempt to paint the entire picture.
This, I believe, is unfair, since I feel that Recorder's Court and the
entire Detroit community did an admirable job at the time, considering the trying conditions with which they were faced. Many
volunteers provided assistance during the crisis, but our most outspoken critics were conspicuous by their absence. These critics have
sought to tear down and criticize the entire judicial process without
offering any suggestions or ideas for improving and perfecting
the ideal criminal justice system faced with a mass arrest situation.

GETTING AT THE CAUSES OF RIOTS

THROUGH LEGAL SERVICES
By

NATHANIEL

R. JONES*

Mr. Jones' brief article summarizes the most significant grievances and problems found by the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders to have been the underlying causes of the riots
which flared in a number of cities in 1967. The book review of the
Kerner Report contained elsewhere in this symposium issue outlines
in further detail these enumerated grievances. It is particularly
incumbent upon the organized Bar, says Mr. Jones, to become more
involved in alleviating the underlying causes of civil disorders by offering organized programs for free legal services, not only to
criminal indigents but also to those ghetto residents facing myriad
confrontations which arise with municipal officials and quasi-legal
agencies. He concludes with the observation that lawyers alone can
ensure the fair and equitable enforcement of existing laws.

ANY

discussion of alleviating the causes of civil disorders by
legal services requires, first, an identification of those causes.
An authoritative examination into this subject was conducted by the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders appointed in
July 1967 by President Johnson. The report of that Commission,
known as the Kernef Report, presents to the nation a disturbing
analysis of America's ills. It represents an intensive look into 20
representative cities that experienced civil disorders in 1967.' Since
it was my privilege to serve that Commission as assistant general
counsel, I took part in many phases of the Commission effort. The
report of the Commission encompassed many areas, and it said many
things regarding the causes of civil disorders.
In discussing the causes of riots in America, the Commission

declared that:
1. Virtually every major episode of urban violence in the Summer
of 1967 was foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved
grievances by ghetto residents against local authorities. So high
was the resulting tension that routine and random events, tolerated
or ignored under most circumstances ... became triggers of sudden
violence.
2. Coinciding with this high level of dissatisfaction, confidence
in the willingness and ability of local government to respond to
Negro grievances was low. Evidence presented to this commission in
hearings, field reports and research analysis of the 1967 riot cities
*Former Assistant General Counsel, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.
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ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
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REPORT),

at 77 (Gov't ed.

1968). Three other cities where disturbances occurred are not included in this figure
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established that a substantial number of Negroes were disturbed and
angry about local governments' failure to solve their problems.'

The following represent a catalogue of some, but by no means
all, of the grievances that the commission found significant in creating the climate for the disorders:
1. A distinct lack of communication existed between local
governments and the residents of the erupting ghettos.3 This factor
led many Negroes to have a feeling of isolation from the process
4
of government.
2. There was an inability of government to respond effectively
to the needs of ghetto residents, even when those needs were made
known to the government.'
3. Deep hostility existed between ghetto residents and the
police. A widespread belief in the communities was that police
heaped physical and verbal abuse upon ghetto residents without
being held accountable for their actions through working grievance
6
mechanisms by which residents could complain of mistreatment.
4. There was a feeling on the part of ghetto residents that
they were being exploited by retail merchants who serve the ghettos.
The commission found this to be a significant grievance in 11 of
20 cities.'
5. Garnishment practices were prevalent in various cities, allowing resident laborer's wages to be diverted to a creditor with
little or no advance notice.8
6. Local courts perpetuated class inequities by the manner in
which they dispensed "justice," resulting in a community loss of
confidence in the fairness of the courts.9
7. High rates of unemployment and underemployment were
found in the inner city ghettos, accentuated by the 500,000 hardcore unemployed."0
8. The schools generally failed to provide the type of educational experience which helped the ghetto children overcome the
effects of discrimination and deprivation."
9. The well-known deficiencies of the welfare system were
2
especially prevalent in the ghetto.'
2 Id.at 147.
3
4

Id. at 148.
Id.

5

Id. at 81.

6Id.
7Id. at 83.
8

Id. at 140.

9 Id. at 82.
10 Id.at 81.

11Id.
12 Id.

at 82.
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10. Housing grievances were common. 1 3 Poor people paid
disproportionately large amounts of their meager income for substandard housing,' 4 landlords violated building codes with impunity, and municipal authorities refused to compel correction
through enforcement of the codes.", Forty-seven percent of the units
occupied by non-whites in the disturbance areas were found to be
substandard. 6
The legal profession is in a unique position to render the type
of services that will bring on the necessary reforms. Lawyers are
the parties and the courts are the institutions that can give the
law relevance to people in the ghetto. Free legal counsel is now
being provided to some persons in ghettos who lack funds, but for
the most part, the recipients are persons who are involved in litigation. However, the Commission observed that more is needed
than the providing of counsel to persons involved in litigation. 7
If lines of communication are to be effectively opened between the
ghetto residents and administrators at all levels, it is important that
lawyers be available to offer meaningful advocacy in the variety of
ways which concern residents. This includes such activities as representing residents before police review boards, mayors, boards of
education, welfare departments, public housing authorities, city
councils, fair employment practice commissions, and other governmental bodies that have the responsibility to bring about changes
in ghetto life.
Bar associations should consider establishing funds to subsidize
proper agencies so that counsel can be provided for citizens who
wish to petition or present their concerns to governmental agencies.
The right of petition is an empty term to persons burdened with
problems but lacking funds.
Where it is evident that the apparatus for redress of grievances
is outdated, clogged, or nonexistent, the organized Bar must assist
in the creation of a new apparatus. I remind you that charity begins
at home. In this spirit, the organized Bar should attempt to get its
own house in order. Everything must be done - no effort must
be spared - to encourage the institutions in which lawyers have
influence to be responsive to the needs of people. For one thing,
reform in the structure and operation of local courts is urgently
needed. Unfortunately, there is a prevailing practice of mass disposition of cases by lower courts. This is often done by judges who
13 Id.

at 257-60.

Id. at 81.
15 Id. at 259.
'4

16 id. at 259. See also Id. 338 n.160, 77 & n.146, 78 & n.160, 80 & n.194, 348-58.
Id. at 152.
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do not seriously concern themselves with the fundamental problems
which cause the acts for which the persons were arrested. This procedure only adds to the incendiary mixture of our cities.
If lawyers, who certainly see the legal problems more frequently
and with much greater intimacy than any other segment of our
society, fail to raise their voices for reform, who else will? If
the unfair practice of judicially setting high bonds in cases involving
the poor and unpropertied while allowing the affluent and propertied to walk out of jail on personal bail 8 is not ended by the
organized Bar, who else will? If the Bar itself refuses to insist upon
lower courts creating truly professional probation departments to
counsel and assist people in the infancy of their problems, who
else will? If the Bar doesn't urge that courts cease their sloppy
procedures concerning statutory requirements of notice and due
process in garnishment and wage attachment cases, who else will
do it?
In short, the court system as a grievance mechanism must be
made to work for the poor as well as it does for the affluent if we
are to relieve frustration. Grievance mechanisms, the means by
which humble citizens can complain and seek redress of their grievances, will best work if our communities put money and lawyers
on the firing line. Professional representation of the impoverished
of our society can pay enormous dividends in terms of modifying
the feeling of alienation that too many ghetto residents have
developed.
Make no mistake about it, the only way that ghetto residents are
going to develop respect for the judicial process, to again experience belief in due process of law as a means of redress, and to
respond affirmatively to the cries for law and order we now hear
at every turn is for lawyers to take the lead in fashioning legal
remedies that are relevant to the problems of the poor and are
readily available for their use and protection and to ensure that
the laws that govern the lives of ghetto residents are administered
by fair, sensitive, and compassionate officials.

18 See generally Id. at 183, 185, 191-92.

PUBLIC MORALE AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE
By

BURT GRIFFIN*

Mr. Griffin maintains that riots have now run their historical
course and are being replaced by small battles against the police,
strategically planned by militant groups which express the ghetto's
grief in the attitudes and practices of law enforcement agencies.
He describes several incidents demonstrating official insensitivity
to the problems of black people and predicts that militant groups
will multiply unless appropriate action is taken by city ofticials.

N listening to the discussions that have preceded me, I find
myself agreeing with my black brothers and disagreeing with
both the tone and the substance of the remarks made by my white
brothers.
Much of the background for what I want to say has already
been laid. I think we are past the stage of worrying about riots and
mass arrests. The people who have rioted in our cities are largely
worn out. They have had their fling, they are a little older, the
communities are by and large burnt down, and there's not much
more that can be accomplished by riots. Yet, the hostility is still
there because of the white community's unwillingness to understand
ghetto problems and its consequent inaction. It is understandable
that the angry people in the black community have moved from
self-destruction toward things that perhaps make a little bit more
sense to them. Attempts to ambush policemen are indicative of a
new tactic of militants who are aggrieved by the attitudes and practices of law enforcement agencies. We saw it happen in Cleveland
recently; we saw it happen when a police officer was ambushed in
New York; we saw it happen in Oakland; there was an attempt
to assassinate the police chief of Newark; it's begun in Gary, and
I dare say that this pattern will be repeated and accelerated.
In Cleveland, my home town, the reaction to the events that
have taken place is a great deal different from what might be
expected. Three snipers were killed, three policemen were killed,
and the alleged leader of the sniping action, a man named Ahmed,
was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. The Law
Director of the City of Cleveland and the Director of the Legal
Aid Society told me that there are now at least five groups that are
prepared to take the same kind of action which made Ahmed and
his followers seem to be patriots, not criminals, in the eyes of some
in the black community. I venture to say that, if those five groups
*Former Director, Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program.
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are destroyed in the same fashion as Ahmed's group, five times
that number will spring up.
We have a very serious problem, and we must speak frankly
about it. The heart of the problem of violence does not lie in the
intracacies of credit and housing, which all poor people face. I think
that the heart of the problem is an insensitivity on the part of some
in the so-called establishment, and some people who maintain our
government, maliciously demonstrated to ghetto residents by some of
the officers on the police forces of our cities. Until we come to
grips with the malice of the police, we cannot begin to solve this
problem of violence.
Let me tell you how that "official" malice manifests itself
after the gun battle between Ahmed's band and the police. Indications are that the gun battle was an ambush. Within two hours
of the outburst, two Negroes were killed 40 blocks away. When
the Law Director of the city of Cleveland- who is a black man
-and
the Director of the Cleveland Legal Aid Society -who
is
also black - heard of the guerilla warfare, they immediately left
their offices to contact members of the Circle of Afro-American
Unity, a black coalition. While they were meeting at the coalition
headquarters, 60 blocks from the location of the guerilla action,
a Cleveland police captain and two other officers came to the door
and fired shots at the people who were meeting there. Everybody
hit the floor. The Law Director managed to make his way to the
door and confronted the captain, who didn't believe that he was
the Law Director of the city of Cleveland. When the captain was
finally convinced, he jumped into his police car and fled the scene.
In the hours immediately after those events, the Cleveland
police radio was filled with racial obscenities and attacks upon the
mayor and other public officials of the city of Cleveland. This,
to me, is strong indication that a general feeling of bigotry and
hostility exists in the Cleveland Police Department and probably
in most other American police departments. This attitude, which is
shown every day in the ghetto by police viciousness and abuse, is
present in other institutions, including our courts. I want to know
when we are going to do something about it. When are we going
to stop talking about law and order as if it were a one-sided thing
to be imposed upon the community by the guns of the police
department?
If the bar associations and lawyers want to bring an end to
the escalation of this conflict, we cannot simply equip our police
with more and more sophisticated weaponry to be used in the
guerilla warfare of the ghettos. It is absolutely necessary that we
focus on one of the most serious sources of this problem, the
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widespread prevalence in our police departments of personnel who
rely on violence alone to maintain order in the community. If it is
demoralizing to a police department to withdraw trigger-itchy officers from an impacted area, as Judge Brennan from Detroit has
indicated, then I say to hell with the morale of the police department. We simply need a different type of police department which
will no longer terrorize the ghetto.
We must focus upon that issue. What can we do? There are a
number of things. We should have more sophisticated screening
processes for police personnel. For example, psychological tests
should be administered to prospective employees of the police departments to determine their attitudes and biases. We must make
certain that those men who cannot deal effectively with minority
groups have little or no contact with minority peoples in the
ghettos. If we don't remove such policemen completely from the
police departments, then we should put them in positions where
they are unable to use violence in their work. This cannot be done
by lawsuits, and it cannot be done by legislative action. It involves
administrative decisions of the mayors and other public officials
of our cities. These public officials will respond to public pressure,
and I suggest that pressure should be brought upon them by the
Bar. The bar associations should focus specifically on this problem
without fear and without compromise. Irrelevancies, such as issues
of police morale, should be eliminated from discussion. Lawyers
must talk sense to the public officials of our cities and alert them
of the probable outcome of the conflict unless immediate action is
taken concerning the police malice.
The Federal Government can also aid in solution of the problem.
I feel that no funds should be provided to police departments under
the Safe Streets Act' for the purchase of additional weapons until
they have demonstrated, as a precondition of receiving that money,
that they have implemented an effective system for weeding out
irresponsible and unthinking policemen from their departments
- until they can demonstrate that their men will not misuse those
weapons. Of course, provision should also be made for continued
screening of the police departments to ensure continued vigilance
in this regard.
What has been said here today by all of the speakers is certainly
Exhibit A of a most compelling case as to what is really happening
in our communities. I hope that we can go back to our own homes
and remember that this is a problem which requires immediate action
on our part.
' Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197.

DENIAL OF RIGHTS TO BLACK CITIZENS A SPECULATION ON THE RELATION TO
VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISORDERS
By LEROY D.

CLARK* AND CHRISTINE P. CLARK**

While much public attention is given to the crimes committed
by black citizens, little is heard about the unlawful acts and practices
which are being committed against black citizens. Professor and
Mrs. Leroy Clark uncover several startling inequities in the present
manner of administering laws to the residents of the ghetto community, and they thoroughly document their proposition that the
rights of black people receive little real protection and even less
public concern. As the situation becomes worse, Negroes are led
to an ever-diminishing respect for the law. Inevitably, the Clarks
explain, some Negroes respond to what they consider to be the
violent effect of illegalities directed against them by bringing violence to the streets of their city.
INTRODUCTION

THE Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders indicates that the overwhelming majority of one
form of group violence - riots or civil disorders - occurred
in black communities. The following report on negative attitudes
towards the law and its relationship to violence, therefore, will
concentrate primarily on the attitudes of America's black citizens.
Much of the nation's attention is presently focused on law
violations committed by its black citizens, but this article will explore
those violations of law which are committed against black citizens,
on the general theory that respect for law may be weakened if a
group of citizens experience little protection in law for themselves.
Section II will examine violations of the rights of black citizens in
the creation and maintenance of ghettos and Section I will be
devoted to other illegalities (primarily civil rights violations) which
may affect attitudes toward the law.
I. ILLEGALITIES AGAINST BLACK CITIZENS THAT
AFFECT THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD LAW

A. Employment Discrimination
1. The Facts
For the majority of Americans, employment begins the cycle
of better opportunities identified with American life: education,
*Former NAACP Legal Defense Fund Counsel to the Poor People's Campaign; Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
**A.B., Bryn Mawr '(1960) ; LL.B., Yale Law School (1965).
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housing, health, and leisure time for activities. The unemployment
rate is the one index of the extent to which many Americans may
not purchase these benefits. This rate for whites ranges from 6 percent during recession periods to 2.5 percent (1953) or 4.1 percent
(1966) in times of economic expansion.' The unemployment rate
for nonwhites is usually double that for whites.'
Several reasons for this unemployment gap and the differential
in economic opportunities which this gap reflects relate to historical
deprivations of nonwhites in America. Inferior education and conditions of health create limitations on the ability to get and hold
jobs. As an integral part of this cycle of deprivation, employment
tests and union requirements reinforce the widely held impression
that white skin or a white cultural background are primary requirements for most -and
the better - employment opportunities in
America.' If this cycle of deprivation was the sole determinant of
the economic deprivation of nonwhites, then a claim of employment
discrimination would be less tenable than it is. However, the nationwide experience is that employment discrimination does exist. For
instance, the neutral requirement of educational attainment is far
from determinative in job success, for whites get jobs with less
education than is required of nonwhite applicants. Unemployment
rates, as of October, 1965, were more than twice as high for nonwhite high school graduates than for white graduates.4
The types of jobs available to nonwhites, as compared to whites,
are also likely to be determined by factors other than educational
attainment. Forty-two percent of all white male workers who have
completed four years of high school hold white-collar jobs, as
compared to 22 percent of nonwhite workers of equivalent education. Among service workers, 23 percent of all nonwhite males who
have completed four years of high school hold such jobs, whereas
only 5 percent of similarly educated white males find their talents
so employed.' Similar statistics are available to add support to the
1

U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, NEGROES IN THE UNITED
STATES: THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION, chart 15 at 20 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEGROES).

2 Id.
3 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUB.

TESTING: GUIDE SIGNS, NOT STOP SIGNS (1968); 33

No. 10,

EMPLOYMENT

Fed. Reg. 14392 (1968)

(U.S.
Department of Labor, validation of employment tests by contractors and sub-contractors subject to the provisions of Executive Order 11246); M. SovERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 177-205 (1966). Several
reports in this area have been administratively restricted. They are: W. ENNEIS, EMPLOYMENT TESTING: SOME APPLICATIONS TO TITLE VII COMPLIANCE (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Research and Reports, August 1968) ;
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
MENT TESTING PROCEDURES (August 1966).

supra note 1, chart 20 at 24.

4 NEGROES,

5 Id. at 204.
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inference that discrimination remains a significant factor in determining employment opportunities for nonwhite citizens.'
Income is another index of the operation of factors, other than
educational qualifications, in employment. The statistics of 1963
differ little from those of 1958, a recession year. Without exception,
at each level of education whites earn at least one-third more than
nonwhites. Put another way, in 1958 nonwhites never earned more
than 70 percent of the earnings which whites of identical educational
achievement received; in 1963, an increased proportion of 73 percent
7
was attained by nonwhites.
2. The Unions
The organization of workers into unions helped them secure
increased pay, job security, and other protections. To the extent that
black workers were a part of unions they benefited also. There are
several reasons why the union movement, however, has not represented the interests of black workers. Unions have been relatively
unsuccessful in reaching the unskilled or semiskilled occupations
where most black workers are found. Further, some unions have
actively discouraged management from hiring black employees
and have diluted the effectiveness of black union members by
requiring racially segregated locals, especially in the South. In many
instances, union rules demand the continuation of collective bargaining arrangements that protect the majority of white workers
who have obtained seniority but freeze black workers into menial
positions.
Unions have also run closed apprenticeship training programs,
which are the key to entering the skilled trades. While blacks constitute approximately 11 percent of the general population, a report
of the U.S. Department of Labor in January, 1968, indicated that
they constituted 3.6 percent of the 225,000 registered apprentices."
Complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) of racial discrimination by unions loom significant. In
1967, 884 charges of racial discrimination out of 4,786 were specifically directed against unions.9 These figures do not include the
charges where a union was a joint respondent with an employer or
employment agency. For example, the first federal court decision
settling a complaint of racial discrimination found that a union
had acquiesced in discriminatory bars to transfers to better paying
8d.
7

1d. at 208.

8 U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Press Release (Oct. 5, 1968).
9 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1967).
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jobs and less pay for black workers than for white workers doing
equivalent work.' 0
3. Mechanisms for Relief
The same government which has over the years compiled these
statistics has also sought to remedy the inequities they reveal by
improving its own employment practices and establishing mechanisms whereby aggrieved individuals may seek relief." Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 Congress established the EEOC and
empowered it to direct its attention to four major groups affecting and
determining the national job situation: public and private employers,
public and private employment agencies, labor organizations, and
joint labor-management apprenticeship programs. Although Congress
has not seen fit to grant this Commission either subpoena or ceaseand-desist powers, the Commission can receive and investigate charges
of employment discrimination, and individual Commissioners may
initiate charges if they have information that the law against
employment discrimination has been violated. If investigation confirms that there is "reasonable cause" to believe that a violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act exists, conciliation with the
violating companies is the ultimate recourse for the EEOC. It can,
however, refer cases to the Department of Justice for more forceful
legal action and the Attorney General, at his discretion, may undertake court action. The Civil Rights Act also provides the alternative
route of litigation to any individual complainant who can find the
legal resources to pursue his claim of discrimination into and through
18
the federal courts.
Thirty-two states have statutes prohibiting discrimination in
employment and establishing commissions for enforcement.' EEOC
is required to defer to these state commissions for a limited period
of time in order to allow them to resolve the complaint. It is obvious,
in the face of the above data indicating massive and continuing
racial discrimination, that these commissions have largely failed
to end racially discriminatory employment practices. For example,
the New York Commission, established in 1945, is the oldest one
in the United States, and New York City has long had a Commission on Human Rights; yet, an industrywide survey done by EEOC
showed a disproportionate absence of nonwhites in New York City
10 Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967).
" NEGROES, supra note 1, at 43-45.
12 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
13 Id.
14

EQUAL

(1967).

EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

SEcoND

ANNUAL

REPORT

16

1969

DENIAL OF RIGHTS

white-collar employment in finance, communications, and in the
100 major corporations doing business there.'" Inadequate budgets,
the absence of emergency injunctive powers, and undue reliance
on conciliation explain the inability of state commissions to substantially reverse discrimination in employment."6 The result is that
black citizens lose confidence in these agencies and resentfully
acquiesce in discrimination in employment as the "normal" course
of events. Many black citizens never make complaints to their state
commissions, assuming that the likelihood of relief is small, if at
all possible.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is hampered
by the lack of enforcement power. The failure of Congress to grant
enforcement power to a federal agency reflects some nationwide
ambivalence about how much "law" there can be in prohibiting
practices which are so clearly a part of the American grain.
In 1968, EEOC had 6,056 cases which were recommended for
investigation. 7 There were 514 cases for which there were both
a finding of reasonable cause of discrimination and a completed
conciliation within the year. Of these, 201 led to a settlement satisfactory to both parties; in 265, no settlement could be reached, and
48 were "partially successful." 8 Clearly, the majority of the cases
considered by the EEOC are unresolved.
Since the majority of cases are not referred to the Department
of Justice for further enforcement action, complainants with legitimate claims of discrimination in states lacking fair employment
practices commissions have no remedy other than private suit. It is
unlikely that an aggrieved petitioner could handle a complicated
suit in federal court without counsel. Technically, the court could
assign counsel to handle the matter, but in Southern States where
the Bar avoids civil rights cases, such a complainant is not likely
to seek, or to receive, its assistance. Private civil rights organizations,
who retain local black attorneys and interested white attorneys, give
concerned attention to these cases. To date, however, the civil rights
organization litigating most cases of employment discrimination
under the new Act has filed fewer than 90 cases.1" These figures
15Hearings Before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on Discrimination
in White-Collar Employment 582 (Jan. 15-18, 1968).
16M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 19-60

(1966).
Memorandum, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLAINT STATISTICS: JULY 1, 1967-JUNE 30, 1968, (1968).
18 Internal working statistics as reported during interview with Kathleen McMillan,
Conciliator, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Oct. 16, 1968.
19 Internal Memorandum of Robert Belton, Associate Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. (March 1969).
17Internal
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mean that most complainants whom the Commission had found to
be discriminated against received no redress whatsoever. Private
litigators are aware that the Commission takes almost a year to
even begin conciliation, although federal statutes require charges
to be filed within approximately 90 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice.2 ° Indeed, some respondents who were sued
before conciliation efforts began, although the 90 days had long
since elapsed, successfully had their cases dismissed in federal court.
The Commission explained that staff shortages caused the delays.
Eight cases have been appealed to the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
raising this issue but some complainants have been waiting more than
a year for a resolution of their cases.2
B. Education- Segregation and Inadequate Resources
Prior to 1954, the entire school system of the Southern States
was totally segregated by race. This situation existed until 1954
because Plessy v. Ferguson2 1 interpreted the fourteenth amendment
of the Constitution as permitting the state to separate the races in
schools as long as these schools were equal in all respects. Brown v.
Board of Education23 overruled Plessy and made it unconstitutional
for the state to segregate by race and required the states to proceed
with "deliberate speed" to desegregate the schools. During the 58
years between Plessy and Brown, however, schools for black children
were markedly inadequate and inferior to those provided for white
children and violated the rights of black children, even under the
Plessy standard.2 4 Not only were black children provided inadequate
educational resources, but often black teachers were paid less than
white teachers for performing the same jobs.25
In the 15 years since the 1954 Brown decision, the segregated
school system in Southern States remains almost intact in its total
violation of the constitutional rights of black students. As of 1966,
only 16.9 percent of the black students attended school with white
students in 11 Southern States, and the overwhelming majority of
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 706d, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(d) (1964).
Memorandum of Robert Belton, Associate Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. (July 1968). The issue has been resolved in the Fifth
Circuit by Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (1969).
S163 U.S. 537 (1896).
S347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24 Brief for U.S. Government as Amicus Curiae at 17, Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Government's brief cited a report from the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare indicating that the "estimated cost of equalizing
Negro schools is in excess of two billion dollars."
25Alston v. School Board, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693
(1940) ; McDaniel v. Board of Public Instruction, 39 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Fla. 1941).
20

21 Internal
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schools which were all black in 1954 are still all black.2" This can
only mean that despite the approximately 300 suits by private litigants to desegregate southern school systems, suits by the Department of Justice, and efforts to secure desegregation by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, most southern school
boards are still consistently violating the educational rights of black
citizens. As the desegregation process has proceeded, some black
teachers have illegally been fired or demoted from supervisory
positions, 2 7 parents have been threatened, and violent attacks have
been made on students exercising their right to transfer to previously
28
all-white schools.
Racial segregation in northern schools is almost as entrenched
as it is in southern schools. In a U.S. Commission Report on 75
urban centers, it was found that 75 percent of all black students at
the elementary level were enrolled in schools that were 90 percent
or more black. In the same cities, 83 percent of all white students
in those grades attended schools which were 90 percent to 100
percent white. 29 This has usually been characterized as "de facto"
segregation, and the Supreme Court has not as yet found segregation
which is not mandated by state law or actively arranged by the
30
school board to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
However, some northern school boards which have been sued have
been found, under this standard, to have actively segregated black
students, in clear violation of their constitutional rights.'
Black students are not only isolated within the public school
systems of the country, but are also the most overcrowded, have a
lower percentage of certified teachers (most of whom have nonacademic college majors and low verbal achievement levels), and
are the oldest and most poorly equipped. On a per student basis,
less money is spent on ghetto public schools than on suburban
1966-67,
at 7-9 (July 1967). This figure covers schools which are not 100 percent Negro; in
1965 the figure was 7.5 percent. The percentage of those attending schools less than
95 percent Negro is much smaller (9 percent). Thus, much of the 16.9 percent figure
includes a considerable amount of "token" integration.
See, e.g., North Carolina Teachers Ass'n v. Asheboro City Bd. of Educ., 393 F.2d 736
(4th Cir. 1968) ; Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Wall
v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967).

26 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,

2

28 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL

RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE

SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES

35-42 (1967).

29DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (1966) ; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3-6 (1961).
0

3See, Deal v. Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1966) ; Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1965).
31 See Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965);
Wright, Public School Segregation - Legal Remedies for de Facto Segregation, 40
N.Y.U.L. Ray. 301-02 (1965).
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public schools." The consequences of these conditions of deprivation
are predictable: black students drop out, they perform poorly on
achievement tests, and teachers evidence negative attitudes toward
the students which further reinforce the spiral of failure. 3
C. Voting Rights
The first title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was designed to
protect the individual right to vote in federal elections without
regard to race or color.3 4 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 3 provided
the further protection of direct federal action to effect speedier
registration and exercise of voting rights without the extensive and
delaying litigation required under previous civil rights legislation.
Under it, literacy knowledge or character tests are suspended in any
state or political subdivision where such a test was required as of
November 1964, and where less than 50 percent of voting age
residents either were registered or had voted in the 1964 presidential
election. Such a standard, designed to reach the particular political
exclusion of Negroes in the Southern States, also incidentally
covered counties in four non-Southern States. In every Southern State,
the percentage of registration of both nonwhites and whites increased substantially after passage of the Act, 6 with the registration
of nonwhites in Mississippi leaping from 6 percent to 60 percent
of the voting age population in a 3-year period.8 7 The number of
Negro officeholders more than doubled." However, historically
entrenched resistance by southern whites to the enfranchisement
of blacks did not simply end. Techniques of avoiding or diminishing
Negro political participation have been employed at each stage of
their attempt. Whites dilute the black vote, once it is obtained, by
limiting its bloc effect and merging it with that of whites; they
prevent Negroes from becoming candidates or assuming office; they
exclude Negro registrants from precinct meetings, omit them from
voter lists, exhaust them with interminable waiting lines, give
erroneous voting instructions, and harass them while trying either
to vote or to protect their right to vote.3 9 Negro determination,
32 DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATION,

summary at 9-20, (1966).
Id. at 21; see also, K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO 128 (1965).
3442 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964).
3542 U.S.C. § 1973 '(1965).
3SExcept North Carolina, where the percentage of nonwhites increased from 46.8 percent
to 51.3 percent. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 13
(1968).
37U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 13 (1968).
38Id. at 214-21. The majority of black office holders listed on these pages has taken
office since 1966.
39U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 13 (1968).
33
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despite these obstacles, to pursue their basic legal and American
right to vote continues, and their registration rates rise.
The pattern of discrimination against blacks in their efforts
toward full political participation does not alter at the level of
party politics. Local white politicians ignore whatever pronouncements of equality are made at the state level. Mississippi pretends
no such pronouncements and requires its residents, black and white,
to take an oath which includes an endorsement of racial segregation
in order to vote or to seek candidacy in primary elections.4 0 The U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights found that the national policies of the
parties do little more than outline the morally desirable, and that
national committees have established no requirements of local party
organizations which affirmatively seek the elimination of discrimination.
D. Administration of Federal Programs- denial of rights in
health, farm, school lunch, and commodity distribution programs
Employment, education, and voting rights directly determine
individual potential for participation in American life, but there
are several other problem areas which are important even though
not ordinarily considered major. Such matters as access to health
facilities, the allocation of food commodities, and the use of federal
agricultural services are relatively indirect, and the public at large
as well as eligible participants are often unaware of the availability
of benefits under these secondary programs, which, nevertheless,
have long term and large-scale effects on total communities. These
"benefits," once established, create statutory rights for eligible
participants, and it is a violation of the federal statutes to withhold or curtail them on an arbitrary basis."
Nutrition for children clearly affects their health and consequently, their capacity to learn; nevertheless, a national citizens'
committee confirmed that administration of the National School
Lunch Program discriminated against the poor, who most needed
better food.42 Another such committee established that needy people
go hungry in the United States, that over 300 of the poorest counties
in the nation receive no food assistance programs, and that antiNegro hostility has motivated much of the local refusal either to
institute such programs or to administer established programs without regard for race.4
40

1d. at 145.

Cahn, New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REv. 929 (1968).
'2 F. ROBIN, THEIR DAILY BREAD 32 (1968).
41
43

CITIZENS 'BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION IN THE UNITED
STATES, HUNGER, U.S.A. 53 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as HUNGER].
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Governmental analysis of farm programs established by federal
law shows that the Co-operative Extension Service, the Farmer's
Home Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, all established by
federal law, are invariably administered with open and clear racial
discrimination. To mention but a few examples, there is discrimination: in the assignment of training work and in the offices of the
few Negro personnel employed, in the denial of technical assistance
to Negro farmers, in the lower loans allowed only for limited subsistence purposes (rather than for capital investments, which white
farmers get), in the exclusion, not only of Negro professionals from
policy-making positions, but also of Negro youth from 4-H services
and from open competition.4 4 The findings of discrimination in
1965, 1967, and 1968 were identical.45
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs.46 Hospitals and other health
facilities such as nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, research
grants, and programs in public and mental health financed with
federal monies under this title are required to serve all patients and
to provide access to those who are professionally qualified without
regard to race, color, or national origin. Those facilities completed
on or after January 4, 1965, and no longer receiving any federal
financial aid, are not covered by Title VI.47 Under Title III, the
Attorney General may, at an individual's request, initiate suit
against any public facility that discriminates, whether constructed
by a state or any other political subdivision.4" A survey by a state
advisory committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights showed,
in three different years over a 5-year period, some progress in
equal opportunity in hospitals; the final assessment in 1967 was,
however, that "while Negro patients are now accepted in the
former 'white hospitals,' basically the old pattern of segregated
hospital care still remains, in large measure, in effect.'"
An aspect of health not readily reached by health legislation,
as much as by a real elimination of the network of discrimination,
44U.S.
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(1965).
45Id. See GEORGIA STATE ADVISORY COMMISSION TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS IN
GEORGIA (1967); ALABAMA STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION

ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SLRVICE
IN THE ALABAMA BLACK BELT (1968).

4642 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
47Id.
48
49

Id.§ 2000(b).
TENNESSEE STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
EMPLOYMENT, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, AND HEALTH SERVICES IN MEMPHISSHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE 83 (1967).

DENIAL OF RIGHTS

1969

is the lower health standards which victimize nonwhites in America.
Their rates of premature births, of postneonatal mortality, and of
death are all higher.5" Clearly, better education leading to improved
employment and housing for previously deprived people will result
in higher levels of health that benefit the nation as a whole.
II.

ILLEGALITIES CONNECTED WITH THE MAINTENANCE
OF THE

A. Housing -

GHETTO

Segregation and Deterioration

Constant and extensive mobility of southern Negroes has impacted areas in large northern cities now known as "ghettoes." Open
racial segregation and unchecked invasion of the rights of blacks
in the South, together with rumors of freer conditions and better
employment opportunities in the North, have attracted Negroes
there at ever increasing rates (1960 census figures show that 54
percent of American Negroes then lived in the South, where they
constituted 20 percent of the Southern population). Between 1940
and 1963, 3.3 million nonwhites left the South, more than one
million of whom settled in the large cities of the Northeast and
the north-central regions. More than half of these settlers lived in
census tracts where the population was at least 90 percent Negro
and where the density per square mile far surpassed that of other
largely white tracts. 5
Regular infusions of mass numbers of people for whose arrival
there had been no planning led to quick and steady deterioration
in already old housing facilities. One comparison of the housing
occupied by white and nonwhite families headed by a male, veteran
and nonveteran, showed that in both owner-occupied and renteroccupied units, nonwhites consistently lived in worse facilities than
did whites.12 Further, the median value of nonwhite war veterans'
homes was but 72 percent of white nonveterans' homes, and 66
3
percent of white war veterans' homes.
At the present time, the extent to which residential segregation
and discrepancies between white and nonwhite housing standards
are symptoms of housing discrimination is not clearly established.
However, it is reasonable to conclude that racial discrimination in
the housing market is at least a substantial factor in creating the conditions described above and is therefore widely prevalent in our
society.
50

See, NEGROES, supra note 1, at 221-24 and HUNGER, supra note 43, at 34-37.

supra note 1, at 3.

51 NEGROES,

52Id. at 240.
53
Id. at 241.
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The extent to which the various forms of housing discrimination
are illegal, as well as inequitable, varies from place to place and from
situation to situation. There are presently 17 states and the District
of Columbia which have laws prohibiting various forms of housing
discrimination. 54 (In each of those states where there is a law against
discrimination and a substantial number of black citizens, there is
still intense "ghettoization" in urban areas.)
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed at the height of national
conscience for the denial of citizens' rights to American blacks, did
not cover housing. Housing was the most recent "right" granted
federal protection by the Congress. Under the Federal Fair Housing
Act of 1968, 5" those previously without legal recourse can attempt
to purchase some "federally assisted housing" with greater assurance
that their economic capacity will be the sole criterion.5" However,
there are limitations such that major parts of the housing market
are not affected. The Act covers large apartment houses and subdivisions where there is a first sale and also, housing financed with
federal monies since 1962. Since December 31, 1968, all federally
financed housing is covered except for single-family houses
sold or rented by the owner and small multiple-dwelling housing
occupied by the owner. One year later, single-family dwellings
will be open to all purchasers under this Act if brokers' services
and racial advertising are used.5" It is important to stress that all
housing in which there is no federal financial participation, in one
form or another, is not covered by the Act.
Little can yet be said about the operation of the Housing Act.
It is difficult to specifically document the existence of widespread
illegal housing discrimination against black citizens. However, the
inference is clear and convincing that such practices continue to
exist on a large scale, and this conclusion is even more apparent to
the black citizens against whom the discrimination is practiced. In
September 1968, a Senate committee voted $9,000,000 to enforce
the Act, but the House and Conference Committee voted nothing,
apparently on the basis that existing appropriations were sufficient.58
Thus it appears likely that insufficient funding is inhibiting effective
enforcement of the Act.
%AMERICAN
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B. Public Housing
One of the major contributors to the "ghettoization" of black
citizens was a federal program of public housing that was designed to assist low income families. This program, initiated in
1934, has always had a high proportion of black applicants, and
their percentage increases. In 1952, nonwhites occupied 37.9 percent
of the available public housing; this figure increased to 46 percent
by 1961." 0 As of 1956, about 70 percent of the black tenants in
public housing lived in segregated projects. 60
Local public housing authorities usually claim that the resulting segregation was not an active policy of the housing authority
itself (as it was before 1950, when federal policies requiring segregation were changed), but due solely to the individual choices
and requests of both black and white tenants. The Federal Public
Housing Administration, created in 1937, long took the position in
suits to desegregate public housing that it could not procedurally
be sued in the District of Columbia, where its main office was
located, nor in the district of the local public housing authority
which received federal funds.61 This procedural block to litigation
impeded the desegregation of public housing projects.
It is clear, however, from subsequent refinements of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, that the constitutional rights of tenants are violated when public funds are used to
achieve segregated housing. It was only in 1964 that the Department
of Housing and Urban Redevelopment specifically ruled that it
was the duty of local public housing authorities to cease racial segregation of tenants and to secure locations of new public housing
in such a manner as to minimize the potential for racial segregation.6"
C. Urban Renewal
In addition to public housing, urban renewal was another
measure to counter the rate and extent of slum blight. Under this
program, slum neighborhoods were cleared at government expense.
The project was then given to private developers at favorable rates
which encouraged immediate reconstruction on a massive scale.
By 1957, after the program had been in existence for 8 years,
family relocation services had arranged housing accommodations
59
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for 91 percent of the 48,028 families displaced by urban renewal
projects;63 nonwhites constituted 76 percent of the total number."
By 1961, the absolute number of families requiring relocation had
increased threefold to 124,998,6" and the proportion of nonwhite
families required to relocate still remained high at 66 percent.66
By that time, however, less than 9 percent of those reported as white
entered public housing whereas the percentage for nonwhite families remained near 25 percent.6 7 These figures show that nonwhites
have constituted the bulk of those displaced by urban renewal over
a 4-year period, and that during this period, a fairly constant proportion of nonwhites had to resort to public housing, even though
an increased percentage of those displaced by urban renewal were
white.6" This seems to be an index of racial discrimination operating in the private housing market, but to the extent that most
public housing was racially segregated, urban renewal was aiding
the racial concentration.
Although there is no clearly established legal right to housing,
decent or otherwise, access to housing according to purchasing power
is a basic assumption for most Americans. One requirement for the
relocation of families displaced by urban redevelopment is that their
rehousing accommodations meet local standards of what is "decent,
safe, and sanitary."69 As of 1961, the reports concerning the condition of relocating quarters indicated that the cumulative percentage of housing which did not meet these standards was nearly
8 percent. For whites, that percentage was 5 percent; for nonwhites,
10 percent.7 0 Even such protective measures as governmental relocation services, therefore, were subject to a substantial consideration in the American housing market, i.e., color. Nonwhites constituted the majority of those displaced; they had to move more often
to public housing, and they were more likely to live in substandard
housing under the urban renewal program.
D. Slum Housing -

Ineffective Tenant Remedies

Since antidiscrimination commissions have not lessened racial
concentration in ghettos and since persons with low incomes have
63 HOUSING AND

HOME FINANCE AGENCY,
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HOME FINANCE AGENCY, URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY,
RENEWAL PROJECT AREAS-THROUGH DECEMBER
[hereinafter cited as RELOCATION 1961].

at 6 (1958).
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1d. at 11.

Id. at 10.
id. at 13.

66 While the percentage of nonwhites was decreasing from 76 percent to 66 percent, the
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69 H-ousing Act of 1949, tit. I, § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1958).
70RELOCATION 1961, supra note 64, at 17.
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a limited housing market, it is necessary to examine whether the
legal process affords adequate remedies for the repair and rehabilitation of deteriorated housing. Legal remedies which can effect
only repairs are totally inadequate because 5.2 million of the 9.5
million seriously deficient housing units are so dilapidated that the
repair would be more costly than razing and new construction.
About one-half of these units are in urban slums."
In most states, the tenants of the units which are reparable
have no direct right to make repairs and to deduct the costs from
their rent. Landlords are favored under most laws in that a lease
is not treated like a contract; under a "contract" approach, the tenant
would be free from his obligation to pay rent when the landlord
failed in his obligation to make repairs.7 2 In New York State, which
does have some form of tenant "self-help," a tenant may deposit his
rent with the court after Housing Code violations have been recorded and have remained uncorrected for at least 6 months. 3 The
effect of this remedy is diluted, because an understaffed Buildings
Department may not have recorded the violations and the economic
sanction may be of little significance to the landlord if the rents
are low. There is no assurance that the repairs will be made.
Code enforcement by municipalities has likewise not provided most tenants with prompt and effective relief.74 Where the
city Housing Department relies cn criminal sanctions against slum
landlords, the courts typically impose small fines which the landlord simply pays as a cost of running the business, and continues
to leave the premises unrepaired. The city is also hampered in any
attempt to use the rents of tenants to finance repairs, since the
rents are usually inadequate to make repairs on property which has
been neglected for long periods of time. In some instances, the city
has taken entire buildings into receivership, but this practice entails
a time-consuming process of choosing buildings which can be repaired, and is limited by the extent of funds the city can provide
above and beyond the income provided by rents.
E. The Absence of Legislation to CorrectInequities
Many conditions which confront the ghetto resident contribute
to the intense awareness there of unfair treatment. These are con71 D. HUNTER, THE SLUMS: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 33 (1966).
t
2 Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707 (1886); Price v. Pocahontas

Fuel Co., 49 F.2d
39 (4th Cir. 1931 ). "[U)nfitness . . . does not as a general rule constitute an eviction
or justify the tenant in abandoning the premises and, on such grounds, making defense
to an action for rent." See also, 32 AM. JuR. Landlord and Tenant § 654, at 515
(1941).
73
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 755 (McKinney 1963).
7 Gribbetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement, Remedies and Sanctions, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1254 (1966).
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ditions which he perceives as "wrong," but for which there is no
presently existing remedy. Given the lack of sophisticated political
organization among the poor, legislation to correct inequities in their
living conditions usually lags far behind the need for such legislation,
thus contributing to the ghetto resident's feeling that the law does
not operate for him. There has not been a nationwide survey to
compare credit practices and consumer prices in ghetto areas with
such practices and prices in other neighborhoods, but some studies
have shown higher prices and interest rates in ghetto communities.7"
To some extent these higher costs may be a result of the higher costs
of servicing a ghetto community (e.g., higher incidence of pilferage or higher insurance rates) and the difficulty in collecting
from economically insecure persons, but, nevertheless, higher costs
do create a sense of being singled out for an unfair practice.
A ghetto resident, because of limited education, may also be
greater prey to -misleading advertising or burdensome contracts.
Consumer problems are also marked by inadequate procedures in
litigation, for studies have shown that many ghetto residents are
subjected to default judgments in actions for which service of
process was never even attempted.7 6 Also, wage garnishment practices in 20 states permit creditors to attach the wages of workers
through court action without a hearing or a trial,77 thus giving the
creditor leverage to collect on contracts to which the debtor may
have a defense. The very threat of garnishment may be sufficient
to make a frightened debtor pay an unreasonable amount, since
garnishment of wages may cost an employee his job. New York
is the only state which has passed legislation to protect employees
from loss of employment when their wages are garnished. The
omission of migrant workers - many of whom on the East Coast
are black - under NLRB and minimum wage legislation is another
78
example of an absence of protection.
There are other inequitable situations which are not easily
susceptible to individual litigation and may be correctable only
through massive infusions of resources, which again presuppose
effective political influence. Sanitation services in densely populated
ghetto communities, for example, appear grossly inadequate. Also,
the lack of health services probably contributes to a mortality rate
75

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL

ADVISoRY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 139 (1968)
DISORDERS].

76 2 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 1, at 9-10 (1966).
77 CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 75, at 140.

7829 U.S.C. § 213 (1964).

[hereinafter cited as CAVIL
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three times as high among nonwhite babies from 1 month to 1 year
79
old than among white babies in the same age group.
SUMMARY: THE LINK BETWEEN THE DENIAL OF RIGHTS
AND VIOLENCE

This examination of the denial of rights has not included the
racial discrimination that occurs in the selection of juries, in public
accommodations or in welfare practices; nevertheless, it presents
a picture of the massive and illegal abuse of rights which belong
to black citizens of the United States. Liberties, achievements and
pleasures - not to mention the basics of employment, decent and
fairly priced housing, and educational opportunities - taken for
granted by most Americans are rarely enjoyed by black Americans.
This article emphasizes the problems of employment because
employment is essential to providing access to the basic necessities.
Employment leads to the purchasing power which in turn can
provide housing. Clean housing and adequate space for children
provide the proper conditions for their study. Clearly, higher health
standards increase the capacity to enjoy and contribute. Sets of crosseffects become apparent even though they are not readily separated
and measured; but the ability to earn a living begins the chain
reaction.
During the civil disorders of summers past, a dominant concern of the rioters with the securing of goods became evident. The
recent report of the Presidential Commission found that the typical
rioter was a high school dropout, was "usually under-employed or
employed in a menial job" and sought not primarily to vent spleen
on whites but "the material benefits enjoyed by the majority of
Americans." 0
The long-range correction to our basic societal disorders will
come primarily through granting the right of equal education; to
the extent that this right is systematically denied, the education of
black children will determine, as it has already, the patterns of
their participation in - or alienation from - American society.
Grossly inadequate education defeats motivation and feeds the
dropout rate. Such removal from the usual means of mobility for
the low-income community causes young people to become easy
prey to the temptation of attaining economic benefits through
illegal means. For young black people, the crimes committed will
not typically be the white-collar crimes of embezzlement, tax fraud,
or the like, but will involve the kinds of property-seeking crimes
79 HUNGER, supra note 43, at 34-37; CXVIL DISORDERS, supra note 75, at 136.

80 CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 75, at 4.
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which the poor commit, namely theft, robbery, and looting, which
carry a greater potential for violence.
Major civil rights are little more than paper legalities for
American citizens who are black. Laws against discrimination in
employment, in housing, in education, in voting, and in varied federal programs have scarcely begun to eliminate the exclusion and
disadvantages inflicted upon a percentage of the American citizenry
who are not white. This failure can mean only that whites continue the acts, established as illegal, that perpetuate the discriminatory pattern. The result is that one sector of the American public
selects some illegal acts by members of another sector to decry
("crime in the streets"), while at the same time ignoring their own
less blatant illegalities that cumulatively prompt the acts decried.
The widespread attention accorded the illegalities committed by
some blacks, as opposed to the widespread illegalities committed
against many blacks, makes its black victims cynical.
The conception of what laws "ought" to be obeyed (the
"moral" motivation as opposed to deterrence through anticipation
of punishment) differs profoundly for ghetto blacks and for the
average white. Law prohibiting racial discrimination does not have
the legitimacy and validity in the eyes of whites that other laws
have, and whites are less hesitant about violating them than, for
example, the laws prohibiting theft. The antidiscrimination laws
are probably regarded as were 1920's prohibition laws - to be
honored in breach. They are seen as a general statement of principles
but not really a statement of legal prohibitions which entail a strong
possibility of detection, certainty of sanctions, and public "disapproval" for having disobeyed the law. Those in government
charged with enforcement of laws protecting minorities respond to
the general white public's view; statutes making racial discrimination
criminal rarely result in prosecution and civil proceedings are subjected to delay, conciliation, infrequent use of the contempt power,
and compromises not wholly satisfactory to the complaint.
On the other hand, some blacks who participate in riots have a
diminished regard for the laws protecting property- perhaps corresponding to the white disregard for civil rights laws - because
the property they attack is owned by persons who are the symbols of
a society which has unlawfully or unfairly kept them in their insecure, unlivable circumstances. The law, with only the threat of
sanctions, has a limited potential for continually securing nonviolent, conforming behavior from a sizable minority which feels
strongly motivated and perceives itself as striking out against unjust
conditions. Since the ultimate goal of the correction of intolerable
and inequitable conditions is easily seen as "just" and "right," blacks'
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concern over the means to reach the goal is weakened. Indeed, militants characterize any dispute about means, particularly any questions about morality, as the diversionary activity of intellectuals,
"Uncle Toms," or those lacking courage. This view that any means
are appropriate is reinforced when resistance of general white
population and inadequate enforcement resources undermines the
laws designed to protect blacks. It is possible, theoretically, to increase surveillance, apprehension and punishment of a rebellious
minority, but the potential for gradually creating a repressive regime
for the majority community also increases.
In summary, it can be said that the law is effective in controlling
antisocial individuals with the threat of penalties, but as for unlawful actions by the general public or even a sizable group within
it, the law ultimately can function only through consensus and acceptance. There have been recent attacks on the courts and other
enforcement officials for their cautious approach in the area of
racial discrimination, especially by lawyers in the civil rights field
who see their efforts diluted. 8
Some of the caution, especially by federal officials on the
executive side, is attributable to political "expedience" diluting
strict law enforcement, but a more basic restraining influence is
the knowledge that a coercive instrument like the law is inadequate,
and may lose even a limited effectiveness, if implemented vigorously
in the face of widespread opposition. The average white citizen who
violates an antidiscrimination law may simply conceive of it as an
individual act of discretion as to whom he will work, live or associate with. The problem is that these individual acts taken together
have accumulative and institutional effects which contribute to a
functional anarchy in relations between blacks and whites. (This
breakdown in mutual obligations is evidenced in black militant
statements that "the oppressed are not bound to respect any of the
rights of the oppressors.")
81 See Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237
(1968). The author suggests that the Court was in error in adopting the "all deliberate speed" formula in school desegregation because it encouraged opponents of
desegregation to adopt delaying, evasionary tactics. However, the author states, "I
am forced to recognize that even if the court had functioned as I suggested it
should have [adopt a position that immediate desegregation was mandated], we would
probably be no nearer to the elimination of racism in this country than we are today."
Id. at 248.
He thought, however that the "image" of the Court would have been improved
if it had been more forthright. But that is the nub of the problem-would the image
have been improved amongst the resisting southern whites? Or if the Court had moved
immediately against de facto school segregation in the North would its "image" have
been improved amongst the white middle class who thought that they had purchased
a "good" (predominantly white) school by their move to the suburbs? The Court as
Mr. Carter ultimately acknowledges is a weak reed in the face of mass white racism.
It is a "political" as well as "judicial" institution, and its constituency is broader
than blacks or lawyers with an interest in the precise logical development of the law.
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Reports and studies frequently mention the loss of confidence
in remedial procedures where they have been instituted. 2 Equally
important is the fact that such procedures require the most of the
victim, who is least able to spare the time, energies, and money
for the diligent pursuit of his claim. For example, there is considerable evidence that a disproportionate number of black defendants
are executed for the crime of rape in the South (398 of the 443
executed were Negro) and nationally, for all crimes, though 11
percent of the population is nonwhite, 53 percent of those executed
for capital offenses were nonwhite; 3 however, the courts have not
sustained this claim as a denial of equal protection, primarily on
the ground that more definitive proof was needed to show that race
largely determines who receives the death penalty. Such proof
would require extensive and detailed information of all the death
penalty cases in a given state over a number of years and the isolation of a large number of variables. The average defendant,
especially if black, has not had the resources necessary to pursue
such a claim."
Black people, who on every social index consistently rank lowest
in their participation in the standard American fare, know that
it is not their recent arrival in this country that causes this fact.
They also recognize the basic inconsistency between labeling certain
basic rights as "inalienable" and then requiring blacks alone to
employ special measures to attain these "inalienable" rights.
Even to seek the federal legislation securing the rights of
equal housing, employment, and voting, the civil rights movement
in the South has had to employ special measures of nonviolent
protest demonstrations, which were really a lobbying effort. The
southern participants, primarily black, were able to absorb the
physical assaults and mob attacks from whites during the course of
their nonviolent demonstrations because of the impact on the national conscience and the possibility of securing protective federal
legislation; however, the nonparticipating northern black who read
about, heard, or saw televised accounts of violent attacks on the
demonstration participants, had no sense of "achievement," but
simply viewed the endurance of the assaults as self-degrading before
82
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supra note 75, at 4;

TEXAs ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S.

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AT KELLY AIR FORCE BASE,

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 17 (1968).
83 NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS No. 42, EXECUTIONS, 1930-1967, at 10-11 (1968).
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The center for the Study of Criminology and Criminal Law, directed by Professors
Marvin Wolfgang and Anthony Amsterdam, has recently compiled data invaluable to
such defendants. Its review of capital punishment in rape cases confirms that in the
South in 8 out of 11 states, no factor of chance other than race influences the application of the death penalty. The destruction by fire of the data for the remaining
states precludes any conclusion about them.
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vicious whites. In a paradoxical way, it seems that the northern
observers of these illegalities against black protesters were left with
a strong sense that blacks were continually to be the butt of unlawful
action by whites.
Most persons, white and black, probably expect that there
will be laws that provide legal redress for the gross wrongs which
they experience. When this is not the case, a particular feeling of
vulnerability may result. The average layman may not have the
sophisticated view of law as a developing phenomenon in which
"wrongs" are progressively corrected; this may be even more true
of the low-income person who is not active in the political process.
The sense of vulnerability may lead to one of futility and anger,
which in turn could lay the foundation for the response of violence.
This feeling is even more vivid in blacks, who believe that wrongs
affecting whites will be corrected, while those affecting blacks
will not.
Beyond the area of clear rights is that of clear wrongs. These
are the inequities which have not yet been declared illegal by legislation. The typical practicality of Americans and the determination
to change the intolerable is also a characterization of those Americans who are not white. In the ghetto, where all the riots have
occurred, the incapacity to alter the daily vestiges of slavery which
ghetto inequities represent has led some to the use of violent methods
to bring about this change. Black ghetto Americans believe that
violations of humanity implied in lower health standards, inadequate municipal services, and higher prices, ought to be against the
law and that if they are not, then the law does not operate for them.
We may lament the fact that, increasingly, protest is taking
place outside our established political and legal framework in
forms which frequently are destructive and self-defeating. But
our laments are likely to sound hollow and to be unavailing if we
do not take steps which will make possible a response to just
85
grievances within our established political and legal processes.

This quote concludes a 250-page report on the determined and
deliberate denials, by American whites, of the ballot to American
blacks. Political participation has traditionally been the route and
means of correcting abuses and of having the interests of particular
groups expressed. Blacks have been blocked in their efforts to take
this route. This fact may have prompted some to take other routes;
one has been violence in the streets.
On the other hand, the daily denial of decent housing, equal
educational opportunities, and employment is a kind of "violence"
against blacks which has low visibility, because the physical con85U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 179 (1968).
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comitants are realized only over a long period of time, in such
indexes as a higher disease rate, malnutrition (which can lead to
mental retardation), and a high mortality rate.
This low level, indirect violence must be ended in order to
end the violent response of its victims.

ADVOCATES FOR THE POOR
By

MAYNARD

J. TOLL*

AND JUNIUS L. ALLISON**

Messrs. Toll and Allison present a thought-provoking discussion on the subject of legal services for the poor. The authors
admit that the growth of legal aid has been impressive; in particular,
they cite several dramatic innovations made by the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association in providing competent advocates
for the poor. But they emphasize that full representation for the
poor is not yet a reality. Using the framework of specific problems
faced by counsel, the authors demonstrate the complexities of
adequate representation and further suggest that the responsibility
of a true advocate for the poor is not only to immediate problems
but also to underlying causes.

W

HY all the talk about lawyers for poor people? The oath
taken by every member of the legal profession binds the
lawyer to make his individual contribution. The growth of legal
aid on an organized basis, from its start in this country more than
a half century ago, is illustrated by the 500 legal service centers
for civil matters and the 300 defender offices. Even though there
has been strong disagreement concerning how free legal assistance
is to be given, every lawyer supports the general proposition that all
indigent clients - especially those with worthy causes - should have
legal advice and representation provided without cost, or at a
nominal charge. Many lawyers go further, saying that there is a
moral obligation here; that a right exists which cannot be ignored.
Certainly in a case where one is charged with a serious crime, a legal
right to counsel exists. The United States Supreme Court says so.1
And who would apply a less compelling rule where a widow is
being wrongfully deprived of her modest home? Or in a case where
a child has been illegally taken from the mother? Or where an
unscrupulous money lender is demanding a pound of flesh? The
recourse here is obvious: See a lawyer. If one cannot pay, the case
will be accepted on a charity basis, or perhaps a little can be paid
each month over a period of time. Or the troubled individual may
go to the legal aid office. In our society, we say, such injustice will
not be permitted to go unchallenged. These are easy questionswith easy answers.
*President, National Legal Aid and Defender Association; member, O'Melveny &
Meyers, Los Angeles, California; A.B., University of California, 1927; LL.B., Harvard, 1930.
**Executive director,National Legal Aid and Defender Association; A.B., Maryville
College, 1933; J.D., John Marshall, 1936.
1

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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What do we say about the full representation of the "poor"
on a basis comparable to the wide gamut of services a law firm
renders a corporate client who can pay a handsome retainer? Is
not this, or at least something approaching this, a goal?
There are several reasons why this is a difficult question. In
the first place, how can an advocate have "the Poor" 2- that nameless, voiceless, amorphous segment of society, having little in common
except economic status - as his client? It doesn't make much sense
to speak of "representatives of the poor." In fact, we are not certain
that we agree when we talk about the composition of the poor. The
Economic Report of the President observes that:
Some believe that most of the poor are found in the slums of the
-

central city, while others believe that they are concentrated in areas
of rural blight. Some have been impressed by poverty among the

elderly, while others are convinced that it is primarily a problem

of minority racial and ethnic groups. But objective evidence indicates
that poverty is pervasive. To be sure, the inadequately educated,
the aged, and the nonwhite make up substantial portions of the

poor population.3
By the same reasoning, we cannot say that the rich as a class
or even the middle class have lawyers. To be sure, the Bourbons
have their counsel. So do the corporations, the taxpayers' leagues,
and several other alert economic interests. Such representation is
generally provided to individual clients. But helping one member
of the fraternity with a problem that grows out of or is related to
the economic status gives aid and comfort to all the others.
Our history contains numerous examples of other groups that
struggled over long periods of time to obtain recognition of their
rights, and made significant headway only when legal counsel was
obtained: Labor, in its growing pains, on the long road to the
Wagner Act, was impotent until unions developed and counsel
presented their complaint to the legislatures and the courts ;4 Women,
Definition of the word "poor" is very difficult:
For most people poverty is a word without specific meaning. The Gallup
Poll suggests that people at different income levels do not define it in the
same way. Many men who make $10,000 or more per year think of the poor
as those with less than $5,000 per year; many who make substantially less
than $5,000 do not think of themselves as poor at all. This word poverty,
which is used so loosely, is in reality a very complex concept that can be
defined, measured, and analyzed in many different ways.
Preface to H. MILLER, POVERTY, AMERIcAN STYLE at ix (1967).
3 The Problem of Poverty in America, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, January,
2

1964. Cf. J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY at 323-33 (1958).

4Justice Louis D. Brandeis has said:
The leaders of the bar, without any preconceived intent on their part, and
rather as an incident to their professional standing, have, with rare exceptions, been ranged on the side of corporations, and the people have been
represented, in the main, by men of very meager legal ability. If these problems [regulations of trusts, fixing of railway rates, the relationship of
capital and labor, etc.] are to be settled right, this condition cannot continue.
A. MASON, BRANDEIS 101 (1946).
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pressing for emancipation, made few solid gains prior to the Cable
Act of 1922;1 Children, depending upon adults to speak out for
them and being caught in our peculiar federal system, found the
United States Supreme Court passing back to the states responsibility for banning child labor." Other groups are the Negroes who
waited so long for recognition of their rights, even though they
had the assistance of the NAACP and the strong National Urban
League, and the farmers, who had less cohesive organizations to
represent their interests.
But in spite of these historic illustrations of what legal counsel
means to hapless people in need, the groups involved in those cases
were more viable than "the poor": not so dispersed, with more indigenous leadership and, even more significant, generally possessed
of more sanctions to support their causes. The poor have votes, but
they are not disciplined. They can dramatize their plight by sit down
demonstrations and marches, but the effect is shortlived. At one
time, when they were the majority group in our society, the financially
distressed were the special wards of politicians. Now, being in the
minority, their political importance has waned.
Regardless of this, the poor now have our attention. New approaches must be developed to keep poverty from being self-perpetuating. In this endeavor, the lawyer as an advocate is a key factor.
Another reason why it is difficult to represent the poor is that
they are "hard to reach." Individuals and groups occupying the
upper four-fifths of the population have a far more sophisticated
attitude about seeking out legal counsel. There is intragroup communication. It is much easier for them to reach a consensus on
their problems and on what should be done to prevent or reduce
future difficulties.
Regardless of how we look at the poor - with differing views
on definition, composition, and extent-it seems obvious that the
spokesman for the poor is first of all an advocate for one or more
indigent individuals, whose cases may affect many others in similar
situations.
A further issue must be faced when we consider the type and
scope of services to be rendered. Of course, there is no wide divergence of views here if the representation follows the conventional
pattern: (1) Defending against garnishment of wages, (2) staying
evictions, (3) challenging the summary dismissal of an employee,
(4) questioning an administrative ruling on welfare payments, (5)
working out an arrangement for an overextended debtor, and (6)
5

Preface to

S. BRECKENRIDGE,

MARRIAGE AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF WOMEN at ix (1931).

6 H. BARNES, SocIry IN TRANSITION 524 (1939).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

representing a defendant charged with theft. No one will deny
that these are needed services. But binding the surface wounds
may not be enough. A good lawyer, seeing the immediate difficulty
caused or aggravated by some condition, practice, ordinance, or
statute - most likely beyond the comprehension of the client would feel it his duty as counsel to make further inquiry, to appraise
the factors contributing to the immediate trouble, and perhaps move
in behalf of this client to have the cause eliminated or at least
modified.' Is not this marshaling of evidence, this advocacy in the
forums provided by our system of jurisprudence - administrative,
judicial, or legislative - the traditional work of a lawyer? Should
the fact that the client is poor change the picture?
To provide specific examples to think about, let's take some
experiences that began with clients' requests for help in the six
categories listed above.
(1) Garnishment'
In handling the instant emergency, the lawyer became aware
of, or already knew, the following combination of circumstances
and facts that made the "simple legal aid problem" more significant:
(a) The almost illiterate client signed a confession of
judgment note at the time of the purchase, and he did not know
that a judgment had been taken against him.
(b) The action was brought by a "finance company" which
purchased the paper from the installment seller. The carrying
charges (difference between the cash and time prices) were
not subject to limitations on interest rates.
(c) This was one of a large number of similar complaints,
many clients saying that the articles purchased were faulty but
that the creditor disclaimed responsibility (being an "innocent
purchaser for value" or "holder in due course").
(d) The exemption allowed under the state garnishment
law was practically nonexistent.
(e) The rate of wage earner bankruptcies in the state
was much higher than in jurisdictions with less harsh garnishment laws.
What is the duty of the lawyer here?
7

The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, JANUARY
15, 1969, Canon 7 states, "A lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal
limited only by his duty to act within the bounds of the law."
Disciplinary Rule 7-101 (A) (1) states, "A lawyer shall not intentionally: fail to seek
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by
law . .

"

B Based on cases of the Chicago Legal Aid Bureau decided before the Illinois laws

relating to garnishment, confession of judgment notes, and holders in due course
were modified.
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(2)

Staying Evictions9

After the tenant had reported the landlord for code violations
and participated in forming a tenants' union, an action was brought
to have her evicted. Investigation by the legal services staff revealed:
(a) There was solid indication that this was a retaliatory
move by the landlord, even though technical grounds existed
to support the proceedings (30-day statutory notice).
(b) The tenant lived in an overcrowded slum area in a
large city where housing facilities were difficult to find. Thus,
rents were high in spite of the substandard tenements.' 0
(c) The inspector found more than 40 code violations
on the property.
The facts of this one case illustrate how significant a "simple"
landlord-tenant matter can be when there is an advocate for the
poor in a real sense.
(3) Summary Dismissal of Employee"
A migrant worker was fired when he refused to cut sugarcane
at an hourly rate that was below the minimum wage set by the Sugar
9

See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), reV'g, 227 A.2d 388 (D.C.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967). This case, brought by the Neighborhood Legal Services Project
of Washington, D.C., resulted in the court ruling that a "retaliatory" eviction would
not be upheld, thus adding a new dimension to landlord-tenant law. In the decision,
Judge J. Skelly Wright said, "To permit retaliatory evictions, then, would completely
frustrate the effectiveness of the housing codes as a means of upgrading the quality
of housing in Washington." 397 F.2d at 700-01.
The following comment gives an additional implication of the wide effects of bad
housing:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread
disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by
reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed
make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore,
a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place
from which men turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as
an open sewer may ruin a river.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). See also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 371 (1959), where the Court observed that:
The need to maintain basic, minimal standards of housing, to prevent the
spread of disease and of that pervasive breakdown in the fiber of a people
which is produced by slums and the absence of the barest essentials of
civilized living, has mounted to a major concern of American Government.
We are not suggesting that the lawyer should correct these conditions. But, is he
not, by training and experience, the best qualified to marshal and use evidence for his
client in such a way that those who are responsible will take proper action?
10 Reports to the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) from lawyers
in legal aid offices indicate that in many parts of the country a single lease form,
weighted in the landlords' favor, is widely used. There are many do's and don'ts for
the tenant, but few for the landlord.
11 These facts were obtained by Junius L. Allison in April, 1968, when he was a member of an evaluation team that made an on-the-spot study of the South Florida Migrant
Legal Services Program. See also the testimony of Joseph C. Segor, Deputy Director
South Florida Migrant Legal Services Program, before a Subcommittee on Migrant
Labor of the Committee on Health, Welfare, and State Institutions of the Florida
Legislative Council, Friday, May 3, 1968 [Manuscript in files of NILADA].
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Act of 1948. Supporting data included the following information,
some of which is not directly material to the specific issue of this case:
(a) Four hundred workers had been imported from the
West Indies (after the Secretary of Labor determined that importation would not adversely affect U.S. labor).
(b) There was no labor organization for these migrant
workers.
(c) When a group of workers refused to work until they
were paid the minimum wage, the employer called approximately 100 armed police to the camp. (He said he feared a riot.)
(d) In this atmosphere, the workers were told to do the
work or leave. When they decided to go home, they were told
to board buses that would take them to the airport. Instead, two
buses drove to a nearby police station and the workers were
jailed on charges of unlawful assembly, with bonds set at
$11,500 each, even though they were all indigents.
(e) Many of the workers were living in makeshift shelters
in the camps - no walls in some, many so filthy that walking
on the floors was difficult, some with no toilet facilities, others
with one outhouse for more than one shack, no running water
in most, children undernourished and many had worms.
Where does the lawyer begin, and how far does he go?
(4) Administrative Decision on Welfare Payments1"
An application for an Aid to Dependent Children allowance was
denied on the grounds that the client had not lived in the state one
year. Residence requirements were a part of the state law. The applicant felt that the ruling was unfair to her and the children.
Should the constitutionality of the statute be questioned by the
legal aid lawyer?
(5) The Overextended Debtor13
Facts revealed by most of the poor clients who owe more than
they can pay are frustrating to the lawyer who listened to the same
complaints yesterday and will hear the same tomorrow; lack ot
12

Over 40 states have residence requirements for welfare payments. Such requirements
have been challenged in Connecticutt (successfully), District of Columbia, Illinois,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The following cases are now pending before
the United States Supreme Court: Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C.
1967) ; Smith v. Reynolds, 227 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; Thompson v. Shapiro,
270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
See Note, Are Residence Requirements Unconstitutional Burdens on Welfare Recipients?, JOHN MARSHALL J. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 307 (1968); Note, Residence
Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes -1,
51 IowA L. Re. 1080 '(1966).
13
These comments are based upon cases handled by the Chicago Legal Aid Bureau.
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education in budgetary matters, desire to have "things" other people
have, high-pressure selling, loan-by-phone advertising, undisclosed
interest rates, some unscrupulous salesmen (door-to-door or in
shops), inferior goods sold to captive buyers, wage assignments,
conditional sales agreements, harsh garnishment laws, and the outand-out fraudulent devices practiced upon the easiest victims the ignorant poor.
What is the duty of the "advocate for the poor" beyond the
problem stated by the client?
(6) Defendant in a Criminal Case
Assume the client had been picked up by the police during
one of the recent riots; that he was held without opportunity to
make bail; that the lockup was unsanitary; that after conviction
the accused was committed to an institution without a program of
rehabilitation. Does not the defense lawyer's responsibility extend
beyond the actual trial (and appeal) to include an interest in what
later happens in the correctional phase of criminal justice, and is
the defense lawyer not the best equipped citizen to assume leadership in preventive measures? These questions suggest a vision much
broader than the present concept of the defense lawyer's role, but
they must be considered if the poor are to have full representation.
There are further but more specific questions for the legal
profession, particularly for those lawyers who are in decisionmaking
positions:
(A) Does the lawyer accept a reasonably fair compromise for
his client, rendering the basic issue moot? Can he ethically take any
other course of action? If a compromise is the easy way out, the
ethical way, the best for the immediate problem, how will the
lawyer ever get to a broadly remedial action? Should he talk his
client into going forward? Should he actively search out another
client? Should he wait until the right client with the right cause of
action comes in?
(B) In order to dramatize the social and economic conditions
that contribute to problems of poor people, can the advocate for
the poor seek bizarre "test" cases? Is the test case the end or the
means when the lawyer knows that the test case is often the only
way to correct an unfair practice or change a harsh law? When he
also knows that a favorable court decision does not necessarily bring
about the desired result for the client, what can he do to win the
war, not simply the battle?
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(C) What about publicity1 4 (advertising or solicitation, as some
prefer to say)? Admittedly, we cannot communicate with the
isolated poor as we do with the middle class. How can we tell
them to seek the advice of a lawyer before they get into trouble?
They don't read the ABA-sponsored "Family Lawyer." There is no
annual legal checkup. Handouts and meetings in the community are
usually quite ineffective.
(D) What should a public defender do about the problem of
bail for indigent defendants; about improving relations between
police and ghetto residents; about conditions in the jail; about probation and parole?
(E) When should the lawyer for the poor person advise court
action? In the District of Columbia there were complaints that the
volume of tenants' cases brought by the Neighborhood Legal
Services Project was clogging the court calendars: "It's expensive;
it's time-consuming." Yet we hear no outcry over a trial involving
a corporate matter that takes many months or a year. But we are
told the money involved in legal aid cases is insignificant. Should
we not remember that often there is something more than dollars
at stake - a principle, an inequity, a practice that harms more than
the immediate client? Corporations spend thousands of dollars in
tax litigation directly involving only a minor sum. Why? A plaintiff
in a libel suit that takes months to try asks for one dollar in damages.
Why? At the local, state, and national levels, industries employ law
firms, members of their own legal departments, and lobbyists to
watch for commas and small words in legislation. Why?
Over the years the poor have had no such legal watchdog, no
such spokesman, no such recourse to our cherished tribunals.
But, should the poor be permitted to sue "the government,"
even with the help of legal services receiving some financial support
from tax sources? If the answer is no, then the legal aid offices
cannot accept cases involving affirmative action in the fields of
public housing, unemployment compensation, social security, welfare,
or against any other department, commission, or bureau of the local,
state, or national government. Will such a decision leave the
individual with any recourse against proliferated bureaucracy?
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PRELIMINARY DRAFT, JANUARY
15, 1969, Canon 2 is entitled, "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." Disciplinary Rule 2-102 of
Canon 2 states:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting
from that advice, except that:
(B) A lawyer may accept employment that results from participation in
activities designed to educate laymen to recognize legal problems . . . or to
utilize available legal services if such activities are operated or sponsored
by: (a) A legal aid office or public defender office ....

14 THE
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Further, would not such a position reduce the independence of
the lawyer, a step which might lead to similar restrictions on
the private bar? Many lawyers believe the common law doctrine
that the king can do no wrong is obsolete and cannot apply
in modern times when there are in the federal government alone
45 independent agencies in the executive branch, plus about 70
ad hoc boards and commissions.' " The Constitution gives the indigent person who is accused of killing a government officer the
right to have counsel at state expense. In large segments of the
country most criminal matters are prosecuted and defended by
lawyers employed by the county and paid out of the same treasury.
The Congress has appropriated money for individuals to pay legal
fees in civil rights cases. Then, can we with reason shield the government bureaus from answering in our courts grievances pleaded
by indigent citizens?
The Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice calls for an expanded role for
counsel:
It seems likely that as counsel becomes more involved in criminal
cases on a regular basis, he will be called upon to do more things....
Lawyers participating in programs to counsel prisoners have discovered that many of those consulting them are more interested
in and more in need of help with their civil law difficulties ....
Frequently they confront a whole complex of problems involving
employment, housing, consumer credit, and family status ...
Defense counsel needs ready access to a number of auxiliary
services resembling those available to a modern and well-equipped
probation office. 16

The National Legal Aid and Defender Association is very conscious of its responsibilities as the national organization of legal
aid and defender services. Currently it has taken or is taking the
following steps to maintain its logical role of leadership for motivating and developing competent advocates for the poor:
(1) Greatly expanded its board of directors to make the governing body more representative.
(2) Revised the standards for local civil and defender offices.
(3) Enlarged the headquarters staff, including addition of a
director of research, to increase capacity for field work and other
services to member offices.
(4) Presently in the process of creating a national evaluation
council to encourage better legal assistance to indigent clients.
(5) Appointed a special review committee to study the present
15
6

See generally U.S.

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL, 1967-68.
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 151 (1967).
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staff structure and functions, and is now moving to carry out many
of the recommendations.
(6) Named other special groups to study and advise the association on such current problems as housing, urban affairs, and
OEO relationship.
(7) Encouraging the formation of a Clients Council to improve
communications with its constituency.
As examples of what the NLADA is doing beyond the traditional services of a national association, two activities - one just
beginning and one in its second year - are briefly outlined.
A. Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
In the spring of 1968, Howard Westwood, member of the
NLADA Board of Directors, initiated a move to give the poor a
voice in the rulemaking process of federal agencies. Provision of
such opportunity for the financially distressed to be heard will
require amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act, Mr. Westwood pointed out. The Act provides that government agencies must
give public notice of any proposed rule to afford an opportunity
for interested persons to participate in the rulemaking process. Such
persons are also given the right to petition for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of rules. This means that organized labor, business,
commercial, and professional interests - through their staffs, by
attorneys of lobbyists -can
be heard to express their views. But
indigent people who are vitally affected by these rules, having no
funds to employ lawyers, are deprived of a voice in this important
process.
Now, encouraged by Mr. Westwood, who is also a member of
the newly created Committee on Rulemaking, Administrative Conference of the United States, the NLADA policymaking body has
taken steps to bring about the needed changes. A member of the
NLADA staff has been assigned to assist Professor Arthur E.
Bonfield, Consultant to the Commission, in drafting working papers
for committee consideration. The committee gave the proposal
of Counsel for the Poor priority on its agenda. In June, Congressman Michael A. Feighan introduced H. R. 1776 in the House of
Representatives, a bill "to fill a void in the APA by making it possible for representatives of the poor to participate in rulemaking
by federal agencies." It authorizes the Attorney General to make
a grant to the NLADA to enable it to expand its staff and facilities
in order to provide representation for the poor in connection with
rulemaking by administrative agencies. Similar legislation was in-
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troduced in the Senate (S. 3703) by Senator Philip A. Hart on
June 28, 1968. H. R. 1776 has been introduced in the 91st Congress.
The NLADA staff and board of directors are moving rapidly
to press for favorable action on these proposals and making plans
to be able to assume the responsibilities of Counsel for the Poor in
the rulemaking process.
B. Community Counsel Demonstration Project
In 1967 the NLADA filed an application with the Legal
Services Program of the OEO for funds to develop a Community
Counsel demonstration project. This new organization was to be
a kind of research and action clinic- a pilot study to demonstrate
that the legal process in the hands of those who understand and
appreciate its use is broad enough and flexible enough to provide
adequate remedies for poor people (especially the residents of slum
areas) who might otherwise resort to civil disobedience. The objective was to divert illegal self-help efforts and violence in the
streets to more civilized and legitimate procedures, such as the use
of the conference table and the courts to settle disputes.
The grant was approved in April of 1967, and the NLADA
incorporated a separate agency to administer the program. The
board of directors was composed of leaders of the legal profession,
including the president of the American Bar Association, one former
president of the ABA, a former president of the Chicago Bar
Association, a former general counsel of the Ford Motor Company,
a highly regarded labor relations lawyer, and a member of a prominent law firm in Baltimore. Representatives of the poor are also
on the board.
The project, with offices in Detroit and Chicago, has been
controversial from the beginning. But this was anticipated. William
D. Marsh, the director, writes that his lawyers "serve as counsel for
organizations and groups seeking to combat poverty conditions in
slum areas. Staff lawyers labor to identify and develop the legal
processes necessary for slum residents to participate in resolving
their own problems and rebuilding their communities. Attention is
focused on community-wide problems such as urban renewal, model
cities, public education, hospital and medical services, housing development, code enforcement, tenant rights and public abuses." 17
The program also has more than 30 VISTA lawyers assigned to
Chicago and Detroit to supplement the work of the regular staff.
17COMMUNITY LEGAL COUNSEL REPORTER, April 1968. The REPORTER is published
irregularly by the National Association of Community Counsel, a special project of
NLADA. Copies may be obtained from Community Legal Counsel, 116 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60603.
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A summary of matters handled the first year gives some idea
of the range of problems:
CCDP has encountered a host of different types of community
problems. Staff lawyers have identified and assisted more than 150
different organized groups. They range in size and activity from
informal block clubs consisting of a handful of residents concerned with a single problem to relatively well financed community
organizations using full-time, paid staff to work for solutions
of a broad range of community-wide problems.
In working with these organizations, CCDP staff have attended over 627 of their meetings and have undertaken to counsel
and/or represent them in 669 different matters. For statistical
purposes, these matters have been broken down into eight categories: landlord-tenant, urban renewal, housing development, public
housing, economic development, welfare, police-community relations, and other. 18

Access to legal aid should be a "legal right," resolved the
American Assembly on Law and the Changing Society at its historic
meeting in Chicago in March of 1968."9 The Assembly further
recommended that:
1. Civil legal services for persons without sufficient means
should be further expanded. Criminal defense services, both public
and private, should be made adequate to defend indigent persons
accused of crime. Federal, state and local government support of
the activities of legal aid and defender facilities deserves to be a
permanent element of public policy. These agencies should be
expected and encouraged to deal not only with emergency and shortterm matters but with fundamental legal problems- such as legislative programs, constitutional questions and the legality of agency
and executive actions. They should be expected and encouraged to
participate in the development and enactment of new legislation
2
that is of interest to their clients. 0

The findings of this Assembly- composed of over 100 leading
lawyers, businessmen, labor leaders, government officials, and
scholars from other segments of our society- should be carefully
noted.
An honest objective view of the problem we face should convince the most doubtful that providing advocates for the poor, when
we count all the costs and review the alternatives, is not only a
professional responsibility: It is a conservative, economical program.

18NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY

COUNSEL,

YEAR END PROGRESS REPORT

11 (1967). This report is published by Community Legal Counsel as its annual
report. This report may also be obtained by writing Community Legal Counsel, 116
South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60603.

'9 THE

AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON LAW AND THE CHANGING SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE

AMERICAN ASSEMBLY

ON LAW AND THE CHANGING SOCIETY

2 (March 17, 1968).

CLOSING THE CONFIDENCE GAP:
LEGAL EDUCATION'S ROLE
By

ALAN MERSON*

One aspect of America's present urban dilemma is a crisis
of confidence in the legal system. Professor Merson has been intimately involved in recent efforts to bridge this "confidence
gap" in Denver, Colorado, through his activities in the Denver
Model Cities Program and as Director of Urban Legal Studies at
the University of Denver College of Law. In order to meet this
confidence gap, he urges the legal profession to address itself
not only to providing more adequate legal representation of
the poor, but also to institutional reform, legislative revision, and
community education. He details the involvement of the College
of Law in the Model Cities Program, the success of which suggests
a very special role for legal education in discharging this responsibility. The law school may thus be viewed not only as a vehicle
for professional education, but as an institution committed to developing a wide range of human resources in the larger community.
INTRODUCTION

T

HE urban crisis is not simply a crisis of economic deprivation;
it is, in its most significant dimension, a crisis of confidence in
the American system. Without attempting to define "the American
system," we can surely say that its legal framework and the legal
institutions it has spawned are prime determinants of the economic,
social, and political arrangements which characterize it. If indeed
there are defects in "the establishment" which have caused this
crisis of confidence, it is not surprising to see the legal establishment
share much of the blame.
"How can we view the legal system as a vehicle for social
change when every day we see it serving only the interests of the
wealthy and the powerful?" This is a question repeatedly asked
of lawyers who seek to serve the poor and thereby attempt to
offer legal alternatives to self-defeating violence. It is certainly
a question which has arisen often in Denver's recent efforts to
bridge this confidence gap.
To be critical of existing legal institutions and current
methods of distributing legal services is not to deny a rather remarkable disposition on the part of the legal profession generally
to promote a more egalitarian distribution. The efforts of the
Office of Economic Opportunity to provide greatly expanded neighborhood legal services has received strong support from the Amer*Associate Professor of Law and Director of Urban Legal Studies, University of Denver College of Law; A.B. 1956, LL.B. 1962, Harvard.
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ican Bar Association and from many state and local bar associations.1
However, as everyone acquainted with legal aid is well aware, simply
providing more lawyers to handle individual cases will never meet
the demand. A recent study in Denver has demonstrated the liklihood of ever-increasing caseloads far outstripping the capacities
of even greatly expanded staffs.2 The study clearly demonstrates
that most legal problems are unperceived." Adding lawyers to
neighborhood law offices in a usual and often niggardly arithmetic
progression, however laudable and necessary, may well create a
new Malthusian dilemma by simply promoting legal needs in a
rapidly accelerating geometric ratio.
This point, hardly a matter confined to the Denver area, has
not been lost on thoughtful leaders in the legal services field.4 The
concept of group legal services, while not yet bearing the American
Bar Association's seal of approval, 5 has survived constitutional
challenge6 and is certainly one hopeful response to the growing legal needs of middle class and low income clients. Furthermore, current efforts in Chicago and Detroit to make group representation relevant to the common needs of large numbers of poor
people, e.g., public housing tenants and welfare recipients, may
I The

Office of Economic Opportunity's Legal Services Program evolved from the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 508 (codified in various sections of 42
U.S.C.), Title I1-A of which denotes a purpose "to provide stimulation and incentive
for urban and rural communities to mobilize their resources to combat poverty through
community action programs." Id. at 516. (This statement of purpose has been broadened by a 1967 amendment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2781 (Supp. 1969) ). Although the Act
did not specifically authorize a legal services program, the report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare indicates a legislative intent not to exclude such
a program. S. REp. No. 599, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3501 (1965). The House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted a resolution on February 8, 1965,
pledging cooperation with the Office of Economic Opportunity in developing an
expanded program for legal services to the poor. CCH Pov. L. REP. § 6110 (1968) ;
51 A.B.A.J. 548, 551 (1965). See also the remarks of Louis F. Powell, Jr., at the
National Conference on Law and Poverty, reprinted at 51 A.B.A.J. 751 (1965).
Somewhat later, state and local bar associations added their endorsement of the program. See In Re Community Legal Services, Inc., No. 4968 (C.P. Ct., Philadelphia
County, May 10, 1967). This is not to deny the often grudging nature of the endorsement and the occasional challenges to the program's legality pressed by certain state
and local bar associations. CCH Pov. L. REP. § 6110 (1968).
2
G. SYKES, LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR IN THE CITY OF DENVER (Research Report of
the College of Law, University of Denver, financed under a grant from the Office of
Economic Opportunity, 1968).
3 Id. at 60.
4 See Address of Earl Johnson, Jr., Director of the OEO Legal Services Program, in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 17, 1967, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HARVARD CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY 1 (1967).

5 The A.B.A. Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services recommended the
sanctioning of group legal services arrangements at the August 1968 Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association. 54 A.B.A.J. 851 (1968). Action was deferred,
however, to permit further testimony by spokesmen for state and local bar associations. 13 AMERICAN BAR NEws, No. 11, at 6 (Nov., 1968). The House of Delegates
again deferred action on this matter at their January 1969 meeting.
6
See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) ; and United Mine Workers of
America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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provide patterns for emulation nationally.7 The Office of Economic
Opportunity's Vista Lawyer Program,' together with pioneering
efforts in group legal representation on a statewide basis by California Rural Legal Assistance and Alaska Legal Services, 9 suggest
a national justification, both urban and rural, for restructuring legal
aid to accommodate the group model.
In looking to group legal services and group representation as
appropriate responses to the legal system's crisis of confidence, there
is a tacit assumption that providing representation, individually
or collectively, to those previously unrepresented can begin to
build greater confidence in the legal system. While this is probably a fair assumption, it is questionable that representation in
whatever form can do the job alone. Institutional reform is, and must
be, a concurrent goal. Thus, municipal law can probably be administered more effectively and inspire greater trust among denizens
7See 1 COMMUNITY LEGAL COUNSEL REP. 1 (1968):

Community Legal Counsel (CLC) is the operating name given to a combination of two legal assistanace programs: (1) the Community Counsel
Demonstration Project, funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity's
Legal Services Program as a pilot study in poverty group representation; and
(2) the VISTA Community Counsel Project, supported by OEO's Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). The National Legal Aid and
Defender Association (NLADA) is the sponsor and recipient of the Legal
Services Program grant. National Association of Community Counsel
administers both projects under contracts with NLADA and VISTA.
CLC maintains offices in Chicago and Detroit. Its lawyers serve as "corporate" counsel for organizations and groups seeking to combat poverty
conditions in slum areas. Staff lawyers labor to identify and develop the
legal processes necessary for slum residents to participate in resolving their
own problems and rebuilding their communities. Attention is focused on
community-wide problems such as urban renewal, Model Cities, public
education, hospital and medical services, housing development, code enforcement, tenant rights, and police abuses.
CLC's services range from advice to representation in litigation and appeal.
Assistance is provided in all types of organizational activities from incorporation and obtaining tax exempt status to actions for declaratory judgments and injunctions. CLC lawyers research appropriate law and advise
clients of opportunities, rights, and responsibilities. They explain the legal
implications of various activities and, if necessary, suggest possible alternative courses of action. They provide guidance in documenting community
needs and abuses and assist in developing the legal and moral arguments
necessary to obtain public understanding and support for group activities.
See Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office - OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services,
56 GEO. L.J. 742 (1968).
8 Advocates of Change- A Challenge for Lawyers, 4 VISTA VOLUNTEER MAGAZINE
16 (Mar., 1968).
9 Both programs were funded in 1966 by the Office of Economic Opportunity to
provide legal services primarily to the rural poor. The California program, led by
James Lorenz and Gary Bellow, has had a profound effect on the legal stance of
California's migrant farm workers, resulting largely from its well-publicized efforts
to halt bracero importation and to prevent a drastic reduction in medical services
to the poor. See Cray, Social Reforms Through Law, THE NATION, Oct. 14, 1968,
at 5-9. The Alaska program, slower in starting, has pioneered in the use of nonprofessionals as investigative aides, enabling it to establish the kind of rapport with
Alaska's native poor to gain acceptance as "house counsel" for various native groups.
See Howitt, Alaska's OEO Program Gets Under Way With Offices in Four Cities,
6 ALASKA L.J. 97 (1968) ; D. Pearson & J. Anderson, Hickel Balked at Curbing
Alaska's Water Pollution, The Denver Post, Jan. 7, 1969, at 16, col. 3.
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of the ghetto if New York City's pattern of neighborhood city halls
were to be followed. 10
In some instances, however, institutional change may not be
nearly so beneficial as bypassing an institution entirely. For example,
rather than expanding what may well be an already topheavy court
structure, the administration of justice might be enhanced by excluding from the primary jurisdiction of the courts two important
classes of cases: (1) those involving housing and (2) those involving the claims of finance companies and collection agencies.
In both classes an arbitration procedure could be developed to relieve the courts of their large caseloads and to supply a professional
expertise more suited to an administrative framework than the
adversary system." So long as the courts are in a position to reassert
jurisdiction in cases where arbitration fails, it is difficult to see
how even compulsory arbitration of this type can unduly prejudice
either side.'
If the substantive law itself is unfair to certain classes of
people, institutional innovation will obviously be of limited value.
One need not be especially astute to perceive that landlords and
sellers have traditionally been the beneficiaries of both legislation
and judicial doctrine in their favor and against the interests of
tenants and consumers.' Clearly, the only way to restore confidence in the law's ability to administer evenhanded justice when
the substantive law itself is discriminatory is to redress the balance
through basic legislative changes. Thus, more recent legislation defining the rights and duties of landlord and tenant tends to abandon
medieval property law concepts in favor of a contractual approach,
emphasizing mutuality of obligation. 1 4 The Consumer Credit Pro10 See

NATIONAL

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NA-

5 (1968) ; The City and the
Slum: New York Experiment in Communication, unpublished address by Robert M.
Blum, Assistant to the Mayor, City of New York, in Portland, Oregon, March 30, 1968.
11
See remarks of Dr. Edgar S. Cahn in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HARVARD CONFERENCE
ON LAW AND POVERTY, supra note 4, at 55-59.
12 The Cleveland Legal Aid Society has been supervising the Hough Housing Improvement and Arbitration Project, described in the Society's PROPOSAL FOR THE HOUGH
HOUSING IMPROVEMENT AND ARBITRATION PROGRAM (Jan. 20, 1967), and summarized in CCH Pov. L. REP. §§ 7730.35, 7425, & 8300.44 (1968). See Note, supra
note 7, at 770-73 (1968) ; Tenants' Grievances Pressed in Rabbinical Court, 3 LAW
IN ACTION 1 (Aug., 1968). See also remarks of John A. Spanogle, Professor, UniTIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 294-9

versity of Maine Law School, adumbrated

in

1966 SUMMARY

OF CONFERENCE

PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 7.

13 Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor, 1 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 9,

13-16 (1966) ; Willier, Legislation to Help the Poor Consumer and How to Get It,
in OHIO STATE LEGAL SERVICES ASSOC., COURSE ON LAW AND POVERTY: THE
CONSUMER § 2.01 (1968).

14 See, e.g., Michigan's recently enacted Tenant's Bill of Rights, embodied in [1968
Mich. Pub. Act No. 297, § 1, and codified in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5637
(Supp. 1969). See generally Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal
for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966).
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tection Act' 5 and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 1 6 are similar
but somewhat less bold attempts to redress the balance respecting
consumers' rights and remedies.
In addition to (1) more and better legal representation, (2)
institutional change and innovation, and (3) legislative reform, the
most enduring ally of social change within the ordered framework
of existing institutions would be community legal education on a
much broader scale than now exists anywhere in this country.
In spite of notably ambitious programs in Cincinnati, Atlanta, New
Haven, and Kansas City,' 7 the techniques currently employed, i.e.,
pamphlets, talks, and occasional radio and television dramatizations,
fail to realize the potential afforded us by the communications
media's present state of the art.'" Furthermore, community legal
education has not received the kind of support and intellectual
input from those responsible for professional legal education which
one might have expected. Indeed, in all of the approaches mentioned thus far to meet the legal system's confidence gap, the
law schools have, with rare exception, 9 failed to provide aggressive
leadership.
How, then, can legal education begin to provide leadership to
the profession and to the community in meeting pressing urban
needs? To gain even a preliminary perspective, legal education must
necessarily be viewed in the larger context of university involvement
in community affairs. Unless one is willing to retreat into the
elitism of Jacques Barzun,' ° a view of the university as an institution
of, by, and for the community is inevitable. Thus, the university
may have important teaching and research goals, but if /'affaire
Columbia demonstrated nothing else, it should prove that expec15

15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (Supp. 1969).
16 Revised Final Draft, UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE. There is a substantial
question whether either act will, in fact, materially advance the interests of low
income consumers. A joint NLADA-OEO task force, although critical of several
features of the UCCC, concludes that "it represents a fair compromise between the
position of reputable merchants and extenders of credit and the position of the consumer." Major ProgramEffort Urged on UCCC, 3 LAW IN ACTION 8, 9 (Dec., 1968).
17 The programs in Cincinnati, Atlanta, and Kansas City are operated by OEO-funded
legal aid societies. See Harris, Community Legal Education: Its Role in Legal Services,
27 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 91 (1968) and the remarks of Ralph Crisci in 1967 SUMMARY
OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION

177-80. The New Haven program is conducted by the OEO-funded Dixwell Legal
Rights Association, Inc., which is directed by a law student. See Note, supra note 7,
at 747-53.
8
1 See H. MENDELSOHN, OPERATION GAP-STOP, A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF
COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES IN REACHING THE UNREACHABLE POOR (Feb., 1968).
This project was financed by the U.S. Office of Education and operated by the
Communication Arts Center of the University of Denver.
19 See note 24, infra.
20
J. BARZUN, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: How IT RUNS AND WHERE IT'S GOING
(1968).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

tations concerning the university's role unavoidably include an
element of community service. Surely, the university need not be
dragged kicking and screaming into accepting this responsibility.
The very nature of the institution as a repository of learning
would appear to argue for the employment of that learning in
resolving the knottiest of society's dilemmas.
The Dean of the University of Denver College of Law, Robert
B. Yegge, has recognized the significance of community service as
a law school function, not only for its intrinsic worth but also for
its unique pedagogical value.2 Consequently, the University of
Denver College of Law, which in 1904 had become the first law
school to grant credit to students working in a legal aid clinic, embarked decisively upon a course of thoroughgoing community involvement in collaboration with the Denver Model Cities Program.
Other law schools, notably the University of Detroit Law School,
have made similar commitments to urban involvement. 2 2 What
follows here is simply a brief chronicle of one law school's contribution to erasing the confidence gap.
I.

DENVER'S URBAN PROGRAM

The Department of Housing and Urban Development designated Denver a "model city" on November 16, 1967.28 This proved
21

The University of Denver's Administration of Justice Program, founded by Dean
Yegge in 1963,
is a unique attempt to bring law and the social sciences together in a fully
[The Program] is staffed by lawyers, social scientists
cooperative effort ....
and members of the judiciary ....
The aims of the program embrace teaching, research and service to the
community. Participation by law students forms an integral part of the
program's activities and provides a significant opportunity for the student
to deepen and broaden his understanding of the law in operation.
69 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER BULLETIN: COLLEGE OF LAW
16 (Dec. 30, 1967). See also 1968 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE PROGRAM.

22The University of Detroit School of Law received an OEO grant in the fall of 1965
to launch a program of community legal education, representation of indigent clients,
and a restructuring of its curriculum to focus on urban legal problems. Its law
review, renamed the Journal of Urban Law, concentrates on the legal problems of
the urban poor. Law schools at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of
Michigan are funded by OEO to train Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyers.
The training is designed to provide the participating lawyers with a background in
the field of poverty law in preparation for a year's field work with legal services
programs throughout the country. Similarly, George Washington University and New
York University are offering programs for VISTA lawyers which lead to the degree
of Master of Laws. Harvard Law School, already administering its highly successful
Community Legal Assistance Office, will initiate on July I of this year an LL.M.
program for prospective teachers in clinical-legal education. 43 HARVARD LAW
RECORD 1 (Oct. 6, 1966); 20 HARVARD LAw SCHOOL BULL., at inside front cover

and at 6-9 (Jan., 1969).
23 The effect of this designation was to provide the city of Denver with a 1-year planning

grant of $223,000.
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to be the catalyst for the University of Denver College of Law's
entry into the community development arena. Although there is
hardly a necessary dependence upon the existence of a local Model
Cities Program for law school community involvement, it may be
instructive to take a brief look at the particular federal enterprise
which afforded the law school its best opportunity for urban action.
Quite clearly, there are any number of federal, state, and local
programs which might provide a similar handle for law schools in
virtually every part of the country.2 4 Several of these programs, including Model Cities, lack a specific legal emphasis; however, that
in no way negates a major role for law schools in such programs.
Viewing the Model Cities Program as a prototype for law
school community involvement, let us first examine the program's
statutory purposes and then see how, in fact, institutions of legal
education may advance virtually every one of these purposes.
To paraphrase the literature of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Title I of the Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of 196625 provides for a new program designed to demonstrate how the living environment and
general welfare of people living in slum and blighted neighborhoods
can be substantially improved in cities of all sizes and in all parts
of the country.26 It calls for a comprehensive attack on social, economic, and physical problems in selected slum and blighted areas
through concentration and coordination of federal, state, and local
efforts. 2' The statute provides for financial and technical assistance
to enable cities to plan, develop, and carry out comprehensive local
programs containing new and imaginative proposals to create
"model" neighborhoods. 2 Any municipality, county, or other public
body having general governmental powers (or two or more public
bodies acting jointly) is eligible to participate.2 9
Thus, the Model Cities Program is designed to exert a substantial impact upon the basic problems of human and physical
24 Chief among these is the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Oppor-

tunity. However, the Departments of Justice, Health, Education and Welfare, and
Housing and Urban Development all possess funds which a fertile mind can channel
into law school coffers. Title XI of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968 will
probably be providing up to $75,000 for virtually every law school interested in
providing an expanded clinical experience program for its students. Pub. L. No.
90-575 (1968). See also Hetzel, The Model Cities Program: A New Opportunity
for Legal Skills, 27 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 107 (1969).
242
U.S.C.A. § 3301 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
2

6 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
URBAN LIFE: A PROGRAM GUIDE TO MODEL NEIGHBORHOODS IN DEMONSTRATION
CITIES, HUD PG-47, § 1.1.1 (Dec., 1967).
2 Id.
8 Id.

242 U.S.C.A. § 3312(3) (Supp. 1969).
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deterioration in the urban environment. The program at the local
level is required to deal with the most deeply rooted social and environmental problems of a neighborhood. The Act itself lists the

following purposes :30
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

to
to
to
to
to

rebuild or revitalize large slum and blighted areas,
expand housing,
expand job and income opportunities,
reduce dependency on welfare payments,
improve educational facilities and programs,
(6) to combat disease and ill health,
(7) to enhance recreational and cultural opportunities,
(8) to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency, and
(9) to establish better transportation between homes and jobs.
Note that purpose eight is the only one to have a direct relationship
to the law. It was natural, therefore, that the University of Denver
College of Law's formal participation in the 1-year planning phase
of the program was restricted to developing innovative approaches
to the extension of legal services to the poor.3 With this rather
limited mandate, however, the law school has found it possible to
broaden the base of its involvement to include activities in each of
the four areas mentioned above in which the legal system's confidence gap must be closed.

II.

REPRESENTATION AND ADVOCACY

To meet even its limited contractual responsibilities, it seemed
apparent that the College of Law would have to go far beyond
simply interviewing the officials of agencies now involved in rendering legal services to the poor. The Model Cities Act itself suggested the direction our program had to take, i.e., close involvement
with the residents of the designated neighborhoods in an attempt to
30 42 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (Supp. 1969).
31

The College will undertake a specific study of the legal problems of the
residents in the Model Neighborhood Areas in order to develop a system
or systems which can more adequately meet the needs of the residents' legal
problems which are presently not being met because of the current limitations
of the existing services and institutions available to the residents.
The College will work with the resident planning committees on PoliceCommunity relations and legal aid, the Resident Steering Committee, and
the Resident Policy Task Force, primarily, and secondarily wire all other
resident planning committees, in order to obtain resident reponse and
ideas as to their existing legal problems and to assist in devising methods
available to provide possible solutions to these problems.
Agreement of July 3, 1968, between the City and County of Denver and the University of Denver.

LEGAL EDUCATION'S ROLE

1969

define the major problems and to design programs to meet them.8 2
Accordingly, faculty members and law students working with them
were invited to meet regularly with the resident planning committees
of the Denver Model Cities Program. Resident committees were
created to deal with such concerns as physical planning, adult
education, welfare, manpower, legal services, police-community relations, and economic development. One faculty member was designated a "technical coordinator" to the committees on legal services
and police-community relations to assist both committees in supplying needed data and in informing them of alternative courses
of action to be considered as responsive to the problems uncovered.
The role of the law students was somewhat different. They were
to act as advisors, counselors, and advocates for the committees with
which they worked. They were not only to inform the committee
members of alternative courses of action and to assist in articulating
the needs and desires of the committees, but to represent the committees in dealing with third parties. Note that the law students
did not simply work with those committees having a special interest
in law reform. They acted as advocates and counselors for every one
of the 13 resident committees created to deal with the nine statutory
aims.

33

3242 U.S.C.A. § 3303(a) (2)

(Supp. 1969) requires "widespread citizen participation
in the program . . .." The Department of Housing and Urban Development has
outlined some rather extensive performance standards for citizen participation. For
example:
In order to provide the citizen participation called for in the Act, there must
be some form of organizational structure, existing or newly established,
which embodies neighborhood residents in the process of policy and
program planning and program implementation and operation. The leadership of that structure must consist of persons whom neighborhood residents
accept as representing their interests.
The neighborhood citizen participation structure must have clear and direct
access to the decision making process of the City Demonstration Agency so
that neighborhood views can influence policy, planning and program decisions. That structure must have sufficient information about any matter to
be decided for a sufficient period of time so that it can initiate proposals
and react knowledgeably to proposals from others. In order to initiate and
react intelligently in program matters, the structure must have the technical
capacity for making knowledgeable decisions. This will mean that some form
of professional technical assistance, in a manner agreed to by neighborhood
residents shall be provided.
Where financial problems are a barrier to effective participation, financial
assistance (e.g., baby sitting fees, reimbursement for transportation, compensation for serving on Boards or Committees) should be extended to
neighborhood residents to assure their opportunity to participate.
Neighborhood residents will be employed in planning activities and in the
execution of the program, with a view toward development of new career
lines, including appropriate training and modification of local civil service
regulations for entry and promotion. Memorandum COA Letter No. 3, from
the Model Cities Administration of the Dep't of Housing and Urban Development to all prospective applicant cities, Oct. 30, 1967.
33 See Note, A Honky in Povertyland, 46 DENVER L.J. 130 (1969) for a report of
one law student's participation in the program.
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The theory which helped define the law student's role is based
on the assumption that poor people will never develop a loyalty
toward the legal system until that system is shown to be capable
of being manipulated for their benefit. The poor have long viewed
the legal system as an instrument of exploitation and lawyers as
the system's agents for exploiting them. By providing the resident
committees with at least a modicum of legal competence, it was
hoped that this pattern might be reversed.
Throughout most of the past year, there have been 12 law
students working on a day-to-day basis with the resident committees. By and large, the students have been able to inspire an
amazingly high degree of trust in themselves and in the role of
legal advocacy. There have been occasional problems with role
identification when students were said to have exceeded their mandate and to have become advocates for one or another faction
within a committee.3 4 These instances have been surprisingly rare,
however, compared with a generally high level of professional
responsibility, resulting in approbation by program administrators
and residents alike.
The foregoing is not to suggest the absence of serious risks
to the law school in promoting this type of legal advocacy. In the
first place, the role of the law students has been, and will continue to be, badly misinterpreted. Thus, law students have been
accused of foisting their own ideas upon a group of ignorant and
easily influenced citizens.3 5 Local officials who are challenged by
citizens' committees represented by the law students may prefer
to view the law student as an instigator rather than as an advocate. 6
As might be expected, the strongest pressures thus far have
34

3

38

This is made more likely because there are representatives from two minority
groups - Mexican-Americans and Negroes - serving on each committee. There is a
tendency, too, for the committee chairman to view the student advocate as his
personal counselor.
This accusation was made by the Executive Director of Denver's Commission on
Community Relations in a letter to the team of Federal officials responsible for
reviewing Denver's Model City Plan: "In final analysis, in working through the
proposals page-by-page, word-by-word, it becomes more and more evident that the
residents were not speaking to the establishment - the assigned law students were
projecting their pre-conceived ideas, and foisting them on the Model City program
as ideas of the residents." Letter from Minoru Yasui, to Dr. Henry Welch, Chairman,
Mr. Philip Milstein, Vice-Chairman, Interagency Policy Task Force, Denver M'lodel
City Program, Sept. 30, 1968.
Mr. Yasui's comments may not be entirely unrelated to the vehemence with
which the Denver Police Department was then denouncing proposals of the Resident
Police Community Relations Committee, treated infra at note 45.
This has happened on more than one occasion, when the law student has done nothing
more than draft a letter called for by committee members and signed by the committee
chairman.

1969

come from the
citizens pressing
For a law
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local police with respect to the representation of
37
for changes in departmental structure and conduct.
school willing to risk a certain amount of opproattendant political and economic insecurity, the

37 The Resident

Police-Community Relations Committee has had difficulties in its
dealings with the police almost from the date of its creation on May 14, 1968. The
committe's initial concern was with the "stop-and-frisk" procedures then employed
by the Denver Police Department. The Chief of Police was invited on several occasions
to meet with the committee, but at no time did he do so. As summer approached, the
committee became increasingly concerned with the number of relatively minor incidents in largely Negro Northeast Denver, incidents in which mace and tear gas were
rather extensively used by the police. Within a week's time in late June, a Black
youth was shot by a patrolman and a Mexican-American youth was shot and killed
by another police officer. On June 25, the committee met and drafted a proposal for
establishing citizen patrols in the Model Neighborhood, known as Community Action
by Local Marshals, later as Community Action by Local Men (CALM). The proposal's
aim was as follows:
The purpose of CALM is to directly involve members of Denver's
minority communities in promoting community harmony by establishing
working lines of communication between the police and target area residents, and eventually to establish a cohesive force of dedicated young men
whose purpose is the betterment of the quality of life of all residents of
their communities.

CALM is to include 100 young men from the Black and Mexican communities to be employed to operate in those areas covered by Police Districts
1, 2 and 4. Ninety-five young men, 17-25 years old, will be employed, four
additional men will serve as commanders, and one minority community
member as a chief. This personnel would work one shift per day, seven days
per week.
Identifiable uniforms would be worn. For immediate implementation,
arm bands would serve. Personal cars could be funded for use immediately.
City cars to be applied for in the ensuing weeks. All personnel will, of
course, be unarmed at all times.
The Resident Police-Community Relations Committee, Proposal for Community Action
by Local Men, 1 DENVER MODEL CITY PLAN (APPENDIX I) 12-13 (Nov. 29, 1968).
Several attempts were made to contact the Chief of Police and have him participate in drafting the proposal. These efforts were unavailing. Nevertheless, the proposal received the approval of the local community action program and was handcarried to the OEO office in Kansas City. OEO officials there expressed their admiration for the program and promised to press for its implementation when funds became
available.
On June 28, the CALM proposal was officially submitted to the police department for comment. The only comment came in the form of public denunciations
of the proposal in the local press. The Denver Post, July 3, 1968, at 2, col. 2. CALM
was branded the work of Black Militants who were "making unreasonable demands."
Id. The only possible justification for such a charge was that one member of the
Police-Community Relations Committee was identified as a Black Panther and another
as a self-proclaimed Black Militant. The remaining six active members of that committee could in no sense be said to have any links to militant organizations. It should
be noted, too, that the committee's two student advocates - Kyle White and Robert
Condlin - actively participated in drafting the proposal. The fact that by July 19th,
the Denver Police Department had been bludgeoned into negotiating with the committee and had indeed been forced to give its grudging approval to the proposal is a
remarkable tribute to the ability and dedication of White and Condlin. The activities
of both students have, of course, been under heavy fire ever since, with resulting pressures on the law school to withdraw from its Model Cities role.
Naturally, the Police-Community Relations Committee's subsequent recommendations for psychiatric testing of police officers, establishment of a civilian review board,
human relations training for police officers, elimination of discriminatory hiring practices by the department, and a more aggressive campaign for recruiting minority police
officers served only to increase the pressure on the law school to withdraw its student
advocates. 1 DENVER MODEL CITY PLAN (APPENDIX I) 3 (Nov. 29, 1968). Fortunately, the Chancellor of the University and the Dean of the Law School, far from
being intimidated by the pressure, have continued to support vigorously the role of
student advocacy in the Denver Model City Program.
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benefits accruing from this kind of program are of a high order.
For one thing, it places the law school and its associated university
community in the van of institutions seeking needed social change.
It effectively catapults the law school into that select company of
those who are seen by the alienated as allies of meaningful change.
And it has done this largely because of the unique asset it, and it
alone, possesses- the law student. For the law student has attributes which are combined in no other person. He has developed
a measure of legal expertise which, while not complete, is sufficient
to enable him to gain access to the legal system for those whom he
seeks to represent. And secondly, in contrast to the licensed practitioner, his age is such as to create no generation gap, and his ties
to "the establishment" are much less direct and visible. If the program is properly supervised, he does not practice law in a traditional sense, but he brings the tools of law to the aid of the disadvantaged. In some senses, he is the organizer, negotiator, planner,
and advocate which the American Assembly asserts all future law3
yers will have to be. 1
If, as seems likely, the legal system's crisis of confidence is most
acute among the younger members of militant organizations like
the Black Panthers and Brown Berets, then the law student, aided by
his school and by equally committed allies within the practicing
bar, is in a position to provide meaningful legal alternatives to
39
otherwise inevitable violence.
III.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Seeking institutional reform is not a new role for law schools.
The university, including the law school, has long been looked
to by governmental and economic institutions for the expertise
needed to make these institutions function more effectively. What
is new today about the law school as an institutional reformer in
the urban arena is that it is being called upon not by its traditional
establishment allies, but by the poor and powerless to help them
confront and compete with these older collaborators.
In the context of the Denver Model Cities Program, the College
of Law was called upon to design the outlines of a municipal
3

8 THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON LAW AND THE

CHANGING SOCIETY 2 (Mar. 17, 1968).
39

One need not be especially astute to observe this issue being presented time and again
in the course of meetings with resident groups. The Denver Police Department notwithstanding, one of the signal achievements of the Denver Model City Program thus
far has been to include members of the more militant organizations within its resident
participation component. This at least permits the issue to be presented.
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ombudsman. The intent was to offer the disadvantaged an additional means of public redress and hopefully to create a far greater
measure of confidence that local government is prepared to respond
to legitimate grievances. Although the law school, with a generous
promise of assistance from the Ford Foundation,40 prepared such
a proposal and presented it to the Denver City Council, the ombudsman was unfortunately viewed by council members, under pressure from a hostile police force, as unduly violative of their prerogatives. Failure in this instance, however, hardly argues against
continued efforts of this sort.
Unrelenting police pressure was also decisive in preventing
adoption of certain fundamental changes in the structure of the
police department itself. Dean Yegge headed a blue-ribbon commission which, aided by six law students, was responsible for
several far-reaching recommendations.4 1 Although it could be argued
This was entirely due to the forceful advocacy of Professor Walter Gellhorn of
Columbia University on our behalf.
41
The City and County of Denver presently has two personnel agencies:
a.) The Civil Service Commission which deals with the policemen and firemen, known as certified employees, b.) Career Service Authority which
deals with all other city employees.
Because of this dual set-up, there is no question that duplications of
functions exist, thus creating a greater expense for the city.
The Committee is cognizant that policemen and firemen prefer to keep
their retirement and sick leave benefits under the present system; however
there is no question that the present system fails to devote as much time as
necessary for recruitment, promotion, management, etc. The Career Service
Board has more money, time and knowhow to better handle these functions. . . . Thus, your Committee recommends that the police and fire benefits protected by the Charter be retained . . . however, the recruitment,
testing and certification function should be transferred to the professional
secretariat of the Career Service Authority. In order to protect the impartiality of Career Service, all of the directors of the Sevice shall be appointed
by the Mayor with the advice and consent of City Council.
40

Mere experience no longer adequately serves the entire interests of
the significant charge of the safety services. In addition to continuing education in-service, efficiency also requires pre-training of those participating or
aspiring to participate in the all-important work of the safety services. There
isn't such a thing as "instant policemen"; thus, the trial-and-error approach must be first preceded by systematic education and secondly assisted,
in service, with the same carefully planned educational program.
The Committee feels that certain outmoded limitations upon the organization and practices of the Police and Fire Departments exist in the City
Charter and/or the various rules applicable. To accomplish fully the demanded service, the Committee would urge that change in law and/or regulations be adopted which would not only allow safety services cadet programs, but would also permit entry by persons employing special skills
into appropriate specialized positions.
Letter from the Civil Service Review Committee to the Honorable Tom Currigan,
Mayor of the City and County of Denver, Sept. 16, 1968.
Although the committee's recommendations were endorsed by the mayor, the
city council confronted 500 uniformed Denver policemen in its chambers on the
night it considered the report. It is hardly surprising that the report received not one
favorable vote. The Denver Post, Sept. 17, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
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that the failure of these attempts at institutional reform may have
produced increased bitterness in the minority community, one could
hardly suggest that no efforts at reform be attempted. Furthermore, minority group members have come to look upon the law
school itself as an appropriate vehicle for hastening reform. 42 The
law school's stature in this respect has been further enhanced by a
current, ambitious attempt at institution-building - the development
of a resident-controlled corporation for administering certain components of the Denver Model Cities Program.
The concept of Resident Participation, Incorporated, (RPI)
originated with residents of the target area neighborhood who feared
that at the conclusion of the Model Cities planning year there would
be no meaningful role for the residents in implementing the projects
they had helped design. Unlike neighborhood development corporations in other metropolitan areas with a primary emphasis on
economic development, 43 RPI was to be an umbrella agency for
both political and economic expression and control. Several law
faculty members, 12 law students, and sympathetic members of
the Denver Bar met with the putative board of directors of RPI,
chosen by each of the 13 Model Cities resident committees, and
evolved the articles, bylaws, and implementation strategy for the
corporation. When it became known that the Department of Housing and Urban Development was unwilling to view the corporation
as an appropriate delegate agency, at least until its capacity and
expertise had been demonstrated, a law student suggested the
creation of a "community development consortium" to be composed
of Denver's leading educational institutions and to act as a nurturing parent to the resident corporation for a 1- to 2-year period.
This consortium would provide (1) a channel for the funding of
Resident Participation, Incorporated, during this period and (2)
the training necessary for RPI to gain independent funding status
There is quite obviously an inverse relationship between the esteem in which the Law
School is held by "establishment" organizations like the police department and the
credibility it achieves in the minority community. Thus, the very hostility of the police
toward Dean Yegge's report has aided the law school in building bridges to the
Black and Brown communities.
43 See Note, Community Development Corporations:A New Approach to the Poverty
Problem, 82 HRv. L. REV. 644 (1969); Community Development Corporations,
address by H. R. Taylor, Urban America National Conference on Non-profit Housing
and Community Development Corporations, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 14, 1968;
42

The Ghetto & Co., Inc., 5 VISTA

VOLUNTEER MAGAZINE

4 (Jan., 1969).
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at the close of the period.4 4 Once refined, this concept has emerged
as the accepted pattern for community development under the
Denver Model Cities Program. 45 In retrospect, it seems doubtful
44 C. Administration and Organization

Initial Structure: The initial structure is based on the Community Development Consortium (CDC) which will represent the combined personnel
and resources of the Colorado Council of Churches, Inc.-Core City Ministries
(CCC-CCM), the Denver Center of the University of Colorado (CU) and
the University of Denver (DU). CCC-CCM will be responsible for the
direct participation of Target Area residents through the sponsorship of a
private, non-profit corporation formed by, and consisting of, the resident
planning component of the Denver Model City Program, Resident Participation, Inc. (RPI). The governing board of the CDC shall consist of two
representatives each from CCC-CCM, CU, and DU, and six representatives
chosen by RPI. The CDC shall be the delegate agency of the CDA (City
Demonstration Agency, the arm of the city government responsible for administering the Model Cities Program) responsible for the administration
of the continuing resident participation component of the Model Cities Program for the initial period of ten to twenty-four months.
Phase I- Training and Interpretation (6-13 months): The CDC will
first divide the Target Area into sensible, cohesive neighborhood districts.
It will then recruit and select 150 Target Area residents for training as
part-time community developers. Fourteen full-time staff personnel will be
employed to implement the program. The training of these residents shall be
the responsibility of the RPI staff, CU, DU and CCC-CCM and shall include
work in community development, effective leadership techniques, human
relations theory and practice, and the legal aspects of community development. Training will be provided for the trainees on a regular basis, and
they will be compensated for their part-time assignment. Included in this
training phase will be a program of interpretation of the Model Cities philosophy to all residents of the Target Area.
Phase II-NeighborhoodDevelopment (4-10 months): The CDC will
contract with RPI and the Denver Opportunity, Inc. (DO) (Denver's
local Community Action Program) for assistance in the development of the
neighborhood districts. The CDC, its newly-trained community developers,
the RPI staff, and DO community developers will then organize and develop affiliate resident organizations in each of the neighborhood districts
in the Target Area.
Phase III - Organization (1 month): The Articles of Incorporation
and the By-laws of RPI will be amended to provide for direct election of
the Board of Directors of the corporation by the individual neighborhood
districts within the Target Area. The name of the corporation will be
changed to Resident Action, Inc. (RAI). The neighborhood districts will
then elect the Board of Directors of RAI.
Final Structure (start of third year): RAI will be a delegate agency
of the CDA for the resident participation component of the Model Cities
Program and shall be eligible for designation as a delegate agency for other
projects of the program as well during the remaining years of the action
program. In addition, RAI will advise and coordinate the work of the
neighborhood districts. It shall also make application for funding and administration of projects outside of the Model Cities Program. The CDC
will continue to act in an advisory capacity to RAI. RAI and the CDC
(which will continue to employ a staff of community developers) will
jointly undertake the development and organization of neighborhood districts in areas of Denver not included in the Model Cities Target Area.
3 DENVER MODEL CTY PLAN, Ch. 1, at 1-3 (1968).
' There have been repeated attempts on the part of Denver Opportunity, Inc., to be
delegated the primary role for resident training and organization in place of the
Community Development Consortium. However, this was specifically rejected by
the Denver City Council in giving its final approval to the 1-year action program.
The Denver Post, Jan. 22, 1969, at 3, col. 2.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

that without the law school's prior efforts at institutional change
on the residents' behalf, the consortium, in which the law school
plays a key role, would have been accepted by the residents as their
agent.
The precise outlines of the consortium, its relationship to Resident Participation, Incorporated, and its phased withdrawal over
a 2-year period, accompanied by RPI's assumption of responsibility during the same period, have been the subject of continuing
negotiation for the past several months. As a participant in the
consortium, the law school will be called upon not only for its
legal expertise, but for newly crystallizing talents in the fields
of community development and organization. It will help design
new political structures based on indigenous precincts. It will
undoubtedly cooperate with other members of the consortium and,
indeed, other departments of the university to develop still other
institutions of community development, e.g., buying clubs, cooperatives, housing corporations, and credit unions. Thus, by assisting
Model Neighborhood residents in developing the types of institutions
necessary for their economic, social, and political well-being, the law
school will, in a very real sense, demonstrate how new institutions can
evolve within an existing framework to achieve fundamental, yet
nonviolent, change.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE REVISION

A prominent role for law schools in promoting legislative
change had existed long before the University of Denver College
of Law began its collaboration with the Denver Model Cities Program.4 6 Nevertheless, this activity has not only flourished but taken
on new dimensions in the Model Cities context. In a sense, Model
Cities has forced the law school into a polygamous relationship
with a number of other institutions by virtue of Model Cities'
emphasis on coordination.4 7 In the housing field, for example, it
could not ignore the work of the Metropolitan Denver Fair Housing
Center, a private nonprofit corporation funded largely by OEO
and the Ford Foundation to promote better and more racially
46 Legislative research bureaus have thrived for many years within several law schools -

most notably Harvard - and legislative drafting has long been one element
student's clinical experience at the University of Denver College of Law.
47 The Act enjoins participating cities to accomplish their objectives "through the
effective and economical concentration and coordination of Federal, State, and
public and private efforts to improve the quality of urban life." 42 U.S.C.A. §
(Supp. 1969).

of a
most
local
3301
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balanced housing throughout the Denver metropolitan area." The
Fair Housing Center's field workers acquire the kind of firsthand
knowledge of housing problems necessary in any attempt to bring
about corrective legislation. The Center has also served a valuable
coordinative function, bringing together the disparate activities of
the law school, the Denver Legal Aid Society, and other private
groups concerned with housing legislation.
Both as an additional element of its Model Cities commitment
and as a component of its newly expanded student internship program, the College of Law has begun the practice of assigning
student interns to the Fair Housing Center to work for up to 20 hours
a week on problems of legislative reform. 9 In addition to existing
legislative internships, the College of Law is creating new internships in the fields of welfare and consumer credit. By giving
the law student an opportunity to make the rounds with a welfare
caseworker or to spend an academic quarter observing the credit
departments of major retailers, he can approach his task of legislative
drafting with insight and informed judgment. Furthermore, the
Model Cities Program has built in an advisory role for target area
residents with respect to needed legislation. Theoretically, this
should provide the law school with several perspectives on legislative
revision. Thus, faculty and students have worked both with the Colorado Bar Association and with Model Neighborhood residents conCenter is a private, non-profit, action organization. The Governing Board of thirty is elected by the membership at its annual meeting.
Both the Governing Board and the policy-making Executive Committee
represent a cross-section of minority and majority citizens.
A staff of forty-five persons carries out the day-to-day work of the
Center under the supervision of the Executive Director, who in turn reports
to the Governing Board.
At the base of the Center's structure is strong community and individual support from the citizens of metropolitan Denver. It is financed by
contracts and grants from the federal Office of Economic Opportunity, the
Ford Foundation, the state of Colorado, the City and County of Denver,
local private foundations, local business and industry.
METRO DENVER FAIR HOUSING CENTER, INC., THE COMPREHENSIVE STORY

4The

METRo DENVER FAIR HOUSING CENTER, INC. 10

OF

(1968).

One product of this effort has been a new housing bill, drafted with the cooperation
of Legal Aid Society lawyers and the Fair Housing Center staff. As of this writing,
the bill, numbered as Senate Bill 300, has been introduced in the current session of
the Colorado Legislature. The Bill, entitled "A Bill Concerning Housing; Creating
Covenants by a Landlord with Respect to Certain Rental Housing; Amending the
Law Concerning Forcible Entry and Detainer; and Providing That Counties Shall
Have the Authority to Enact Housing Codes," appears to be dead for this session
of the legislature, however.
50 The original Denver Model City Plan contained a program for consumer law reform
to have been conducted under the supervision of Model Neighborhood residents. This
program has been replaced with a restructuring of the Denver Legal Aid Society to
provide for strong resident input on matters of suggested legislative reform.
4
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cerning changes in consumer credit law wrought by the proposed
Uniform Consumer Credit Code. This places the school in a unique
position to synthesize varying approaches to a common legislative
problem.
V.

COMMUNITY

LEGAL EDUCATION

Community legal education really embraces two quite distinct
activities. The first grows from the law school's recognition of
a responsibility not only for professional education but for educating the community generally about one's legal rights and responsibilities. The second function might more appropriately be
called "paralegal training," since it is designed to give laymen
whose work has a close relationship to the law the legal background
necessary for better performance of that work.
A. General Legal Education
In response to repeated urgings of the resident leaders of the
Model Cities Program, the College of Law is attempting to devise
truly creative and imaginative methods for communicating to the
community-at-large a citizen's basic legal rights and responsibilities.
More specifically, this effort is directed to the rights and responsibilities of welfare recipients, debtors, tenants, and criminal defendants. Obviously, this involves the development of educational
materials for dissemination through the news media. Far more
significant, however, is a newly formed partnership between the
College of Law and the University of Denver's Department of
Mass Communications which will result in a resident owned and
operated UHF television station directed to the informational, social,
and economic needs of the Model Neighborhood. 1
51

IN CAPSULE
Very briefly what is proposed is the institution in Denver of a small
U.H.F. TV station serving the special needs of local disadvantaged subpopulations. Because the returns from such an operation would be social
rather than economic, this would seem an apt area for the utilization of
Federal funds - on say, a two or three year pilot basis at least. Because of
the inherently experimental nature of such an undertaking the involvement
of the University of Denver in it would be invaluable, particularly because
of the corpus of knowledge and expertise in this particular area developed
of late by the University's Communication Arts Center.
FUNCTIONS
Such a TV station could serve the following functions:
(A) Very basically it would act as a tool to reach relatively isolated
sub-populations distinguished by two characteristics: (1) Currently they
are not adequately reached by those messages which serve to "tie-in" most
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Apparent is the almost limitless potential of such an undertaking as a vehicle for effective community legal education. With
the Department of Mass Communications providing the technical
training necessary for the operation, the law school providing its
legal expertise, and Resident Participation, Incorporated, providing
overall policy control, one would expect the resulting product to
bear a reasonable relationship to actual community needs.
B. Paralegal Training

The College of Law has already conducted a paralegal training
course for field workers of the Metropolitan Denver Fair Housing
citizens to the wider life of the community, and, (2) In so far as they
do receive communications of any kind their preferred medium is television.
(B) It would provide substantive evidence to the disadvantage of
government, community, and university concern with their problems, and
further, could serve to acquaint the community at large more thoroughly
with those problems.
(C) It would be an apt vehicle of social education regarded in its
widest context. ....
(D) It would be essential for such a station to be staffed to the highest
degree possible and progressively with local people of Negro and SpanishAmerican origin. Currently very few people from these ethnic groups work
in the TV industry. For any group not to be represented in this particular
industry is to offer a strategically important barrier to thorough involvement in the wider life of the community. The reason for the current situation
is not so much racial prejudice on the part of employers as a lack of
adequately trained personnel from the groups concerned. It would be an
important function of such a facility as that envisaged not just to train one
staff, but to find jobs in the TV industry for trained "'graduates," train
replacements, and, hopefully provide a stream of qualified TV personnel
for other stations on an on going basis.
(E) Perhaps the most important function envisaged would be one
already mentioned, i.e. the provision of broadly socially-educative material.
To provide only this kind of material would very likely lose the station its
audience. The pill is accepted because of its sugar coating not because of
its therapeutic contents. For this reason alone it would be essential for the
station to supply an adequate proportion of entertainment material. Further,
the particular populations with which such a station would be concerned
are to a large extent deprived of cultural material and entertainment-fare
geared to their own specific tastes. For example Mexican films are shown
occasionally in local movie theaters and occasionally Mexican entertainers
play locally. Such entertainment is never seen on local television. Here is a
real need that could be met. The position with regard to Negro entertainment is not quite analogous, largely because of the linguistic factor. But
there is scope here too. For example Negro comedians and singers who play
the Negro club circuit would be offered a wider audience.
Such a station could also function as a stage for locally developed
entertainment and dramatic talent and might provide a focus for local
ethnic efforts in the performing arts generally.
'(F) Lastly the kind of facility envisaged would also provide a perfect
setting, particularly in so far as the University of Denver would be intimately
involved in its operation, for continuing investigation of the role which can
be played by television in ameliorating current social problems.
An Outline Proposal for a Community U.H.F. Television Station Serving Denver's
Disadvantaged, Prepared by Harold Mendelsohn, Director, Communication Arts
Center, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, Aug. 1, 1967.
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Center."2 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of that 20-hour course
was the total reliance upon law students as paralegal instructors.
Under faculty supervision, the students prepared teaching outlines
in the fields of consumer protection, housing, welfare, domestic
relations, and criminal law. Although housing was, of course, the
prime concern of the trainees, they recognized the noncompartmentalized nature of the law and requested instruction in the other
areas. Indeed, the primary criticism of the course was its brevity.5 3
The paralegal trainees not only felt they had acquired greater
competence in their jobs, but they experienced an increased ability
to conduct their personal affairs more intelligently.54 Now beginning similar training are 20 welfare caseworkers who have
asked for substantially the same course but with a sharper focus on
problems more relevant to their work. 55 Thus, it appears that one
may modify the core curriculum in ways which will be most responsive to a particular training group.
Apart from policemen, who were given paralegal training
during 1968 with indecisive results, recipients of paralegal training
will probably include insurance adjusters, juvenile court officers,
probation counselors, and that newest of professionals, community
52

Mr. John Houtchens, a VISTA lawyer assigned to the College of Law, explains and
evaluates the course as follows:
The initial effort in paralegal education by the University of Denver
College of Law was conducted by law students over a three week period.
The class was composed of approximately 20 field workers from Metro
Denver Fair Housing Center who spent 20 hours listening to lectures on
housing, employment, welfare, family, criminal and consumer law.

The people in the class were of varied educational backgrounds. Most
had completed high school and a few had some college education. Their
concerns were mainly centered around the problems of the poor as tenants
in urban housing.
The goals of the course as designed seemed to be threefold; (1) provide
the class with an overview of the areas of the law with which they were
most likely to be concerned, (2) create an awareness on the part of the
class of potential legal problems, and (3) equip the class with enough
understanding of the law in their special area of interest that they could
render advice to their clients. This third goal was not designed to encourage
the unauthorized practice of law. It was designed to train those working
directly with the poor to help the poor understand their rights and duties
under the law to the same degree most middle class laymen understand
their rights and duties.
Given the fact that this was the first effort at the College of Law in
paralegal education, I believe it was successful in accomplishing its objectives. This is not to say that future efforts should simpy be modified
versions of the first. On the contrary, I believe there is much room for
further development and creativity.
Memorandum from John Houtchens to Alan Merson, Dec. 11, 1968.
53 "An evaluation questionnaire was completed by the class at the conclusion of the
course. The most striking general comment of the class was that the course was too
short. Several went further to say that they suggested the course go into more depth."
Id.
54 Id.
55 The Denver Department of Welfare has expressed an interest in having all its 200
caseworkers take the course.
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organizers.5" Indeed, we can move farther afield and see the value of
paralegal training for school administrators, social security officials,
employment service personnel, and a host of others whose work is
intricately bound up with the legal system but who have not been
provided with the requisite legal background.
In addition, Model Neighborhood residents have been seeking
employment in law-related subprofessional positions such as legal
secretaries, investigators, and aides in existing neighborhood law offices. Many of the residents possess the basic skills required for such
positions but lack the additional legal training necessary for them to
qualify fully. The College of Law is now modifying its current paranecessary
legal training curriculum to provide the additional training
57
level.
subprofessional
a
to
skills
to upgrade basic
CONCLUSION

Four approaches have been suggested for meeting the legal
system's crisis of confidence: Adequate legal representation, institutional reform and innovation, legislative revision, and community
legal education. We have seen something less than total commitment
on the part of the legal profession, including legal education, to
mounting an aggressive campaign on these four fronts. We have also
seen, however, that there may be a very special role for legal education in building bridges to close the confidence gap. When a law
school can begin to conceive of itself not only as a vehicle for
professional education but as an institution for community development, it will discover a much wider range of options to which
its resources may be committed. It may in fact perceive that the
reciprocal benefits of a commitment to community development
will materially advance its longstanding responsibility for professional education. For the continued viability and effectiveness of
the legal profession itself may well depend upon how quickly the
profession and its generative institutions acknowledge that closing
the confidence gap will admit of no further delay.

56 It seems entirely appropriate that law schools assume a major role in the training of

community organizers, since presumably it is the law school's function to instruct in
the techniques of planning, organizing, negotiating, and advocating. See THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 46.
57 Naturally, there will be a heavy emphasis on the procedural aspects of law, including
the nature and use of legal forms, pleadings, mechanisms of discovery, and the
requirements for service of process. Apart from the direct employment benefits
afforded by this kind of training, the program will undoubtedly serve to supplement
the activities mentioned under General Legal Education. Its most immediate effect
will be to provide a substantially greater number of the disadvantaged with a more
than casual exposure to the legal process.

RIOTS AND THE POLICE
By GRESHAM M. SYKES*
Drawing largely upon his varied experiences with the police
and their operations and upon his studies of riots in another selfcontained community - the prison - Dr. Sykes provides sobering
insight into the much discussed role of the police in creating the
tensions which lead to race riots. He suggests that the problem of

the police and riots is not just a matter of inadequate personnel that favorite whipping boy in the analysis of social problems. The
situation involves broader questions of political power, community
structure and the institutionalized functions of the police in the
structureand the institutionalizedfunctions of the police in the ghetto
-questions
which are not easily resolved by simplistic formulas.

I
The problems of the police in dealing with crime and the threat
of civil disorder in our cities have taken on a new urgency in this
era of drastic social change. And despite the variety we can observe
in the organization of the police and the special circumstances of
some cities, it is still possible to analyse the police and cities in general. Many people in police work, it is true, are apt to think that
their police force is something quite special, that the problems they
confront are unique. But the similarity of police forces throughout
the country is probably more striking than any dissimilarity, and it is
certainly true that every major; city in the United States is now confronted with a roughly similar set of social problems, so that it makes
sense to speak of the American urban crisis in which the police are
involved.
II
We can begin by pointing out that the social organization of the
police in the United States has certain basic features which pose serious difficulties for the effective performance of police functions even
under normal or routine conditions.
In the first place, a police force- unlike most social organizations- is scattered in space, fragmented into a thousand pieces.
Policemen do not do their work in one building or in one area; instead, they are dispersed throughout the community as individuals
or as small, relatively autonomous units. In this respect, of course,
they are somewhat like a military organization in combat, but even
the military usually operates with units of at least squad or platoon
size. As a result, the police have severe and persistent problems of
*Director, Administration of Justice Program College of Law, University of Denver.
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supervision, communication, and control, all of which serve to complicate their job.'
In the second place, the police are scattered in time as well as
in space, for the police, unlike the great majority of social organizations, are in continuous operation on a three shift basis. Observers of
such round-the-clock enterprises (mainly in the area of industrial
organizations) indicate that there are severe managerial problems of
maintaining discipline, standards of performance, and so on. 2
In the third place, in terms of social organization, police forces
have become monolithic structures, 3 resisting the outside pressures
and the inward scrutiny which would increase efficiency. The police,
in this sense, are a solid, impenetrable object, presenting an almost
impervious surface to criticism of any sort. 4 Most social organizations
- or at least most of -the ones which are centered on the performance of crucial social functions - are divided in that there are major
cleavages or breaks within the organization itself which act as a kind
of control mechanism. In the Army, for example, we have officers
and enlisted men; in the business world we have labor and management; in the university we have faculty and students. Each of these
segments, each of these parts of the organization, watches the other.
There is a system of surveillance within the organization, a system
of checks and balances, which helps to make the organization more
responsive to criticism, to the public airing of mismanagement, and
so on. Each of these organizational parts is quick to point out the
faults of the other - they help to keep one another honest. But all
this is largely lacking for the police. There is a division of sorts, it is
true, for there is of course a system of ranks; but if attacks come from
the outside, the police close ranks. "Never squeal on a fellow officer"
becomes all too often an overriding principle. 5
One important consequence of all this is that much of the public
believes that any complaint against the police which is investigated
1 Reiss & Bordua, Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police, in THE
POLICE: SIx SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25, 50 (D. Bordua ed. 1967).
2 W. MOORE, MAN, TIME, & SOCIETY 95 (1963).
3

On police organization generally, see Reiss and Bordua, Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police, in THE POLICE: SIx SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25;
JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT, A VIEW OF URBAN AMERICA FROM THE BOTTOM
50-51 (1968). On the related question of police solidarity, see J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL 52-54 (1966); Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 34 '(1953) ; Wilson, The Police and Their Prohlems: A Theory, 12 PUBLIC
POLICY 189 (1963).
P.

4

See, e.g., Clark, A Study of Police Isolation, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 307 (1965)
M. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY, chs. 7,8 (1965) on the isolation of the British police; Levy, Cops in the Ghetto, A Prohlem of the Police System,
in
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353-54

(L. Masotti & D. Bowen eds. 1968); P. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 31, 36-46; D. BAYLEY & J. MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE, CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA
5

51, 135 (1969).
P. JACOBS, supra note

3, at 31, 36-46.
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by the police will turn out to be a whitewash - and sometimes the
public is right, as evidenced by the disclosures of police corruption
in the 1950's and 1960's. Corruption can exist in a police department and go on for a long time because of extreme loyalty among
policemen at all levels. Furthermore, management reforms which
would make the police more efficient are frequently resisted, since
this would mean bringing in "outside" experts or accepting the concept of lateral entry.6 Almost every top-ranking police official in a
police force must come from the bottom rank of that police force,
never from somewhere else - a most ancient and archaic notion that
ties an organization to a geographical area and has many unfortunate
consequences.
III
All of this is obvious enough, I think, although it is often forgotten when people ask why the police don't function more effectively But in addition to the organizational problems which plague
the police, there are the problems which spring from the very nature
of police work itself.
Now it is possible to think of the police as having two main
functions. First, there is the task that most people think about, the
task of law enforcement - apprehending persons who have violated
the law and turning them over to the courts. And second, there is
the job of order maintenance- handling disputes and providing information, responding to complaints and handling crowds, and so on.7
There are a number of writers, such as Professor James Q. Wilson, who argue that no matter what the police might do in the next
5 or 10 years, it is very unlikely that they could become much
more effective than they are now in their job of law enforcement."
Only about 25 percent of all major crimes known to the police are
cleared by arrest,9 and it seems doubtful whether a great deal could
be done to raise that percentage. The largest number of crimes are
See, for instance, the overwhelming and successful objections of the Denver police
to a proposed reorganization plan reported in The Denver Post, Sept. 24, 1968, at 1,
col. 8. One of the proposed changes was to permit persons to "enter the departments
at levels suiting their special skills." Id., Sept. 17, 1968, at 18, col. 4.
7 See, J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 16 n.1 (1968). For a further development of Wilson's ideas regarding the distinction between "law enforcement" and
"order maintenance" and its significance, see Wilson, Dilemmas of Police Administration, 18 PUB. AD. REV. 407 (1968). Michael Banton originally suggested that the
police may be said to function in the first instance as "law officers" and in the second
instance as "peace officers." M. BANTON, supra note 5, at 6-7, 127. See also, Bittner,
The Police on Skid-row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 699
(1967).
8 Wilson, supra note 7, at 407.
6

9 See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS1965, Table 8 at 97. A total

clearance rate of 26.3 percent is reported for seven major crimes. Clearance rates
varied from 90.5 percent for murder to 19.6 percent for larceny. Id. at 97.
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in the area of crimes against property,1" such as larceny, and these
are typically offenses which pose serious difficulties of detecting the
offender, no matter what resources are available. Pouring more police
into a given area may decrease the crime rate, but criminals are likely
to go elsewhere to commit their crimes, the decrease is likely to be
temporary, and it is simply too expensive a procedure, in any case,
to keep up for a prolonged period of time.
To a very large extent, then, changes in the crime rate appear
to have little or no relationship with what the police do or do not do.
The absence of police might indeed mean chaos, but a major expansion of the police would probably have small consequences at best
- and any such consequence would be far overshadowed by changes
in the crime rate flowing from changes in social structure. For instance, the proportion of the population aged 15 to 20 has increased
greatly in recent years, due to the high birth rates during and after
World War I,1 and it is this segment of the population that contributes by far the largest share of crime.' Similarly, urban populations tend to commit more crimes than rural populations,'3 and the
percentage of the population living in cities (or in metropolitan
areas) in the United States increases every year. 1 4 And then, perhaps
most importantly, there is the question of just how much effect the
detection, apprehension, and punishment of the offender really has.
A number of studies suggest that at least 60 percent of men who have
been in prison keep on committing crimes when they get out.' " And
there is little evidence that more severe sentences would be a more
effective detrrent" - in England, 200 years ago, thieves took a public execution not as a warning but as a welcome opportunity to pick
more pockets.17
When we turn to the task of order maintenance, the picture is no
more reassuring. This is a task which does not really involve crime,
10 D. TAFT & R. ENGLAND,

CRIMINOLOGY 57 (1964).

11 R. THOMLINSON, POPULATION DYNAMICS, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 436-37 (1965).
12See discussion and qualification of this assertion in G. SYKES, CRIME AND SOCIETY
89-92 (2d ed. 1967). See also, Cressey, Crime, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS
136, 146 (2d ed. R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1961).
13Cressey, supra note 12, at 155.
14 H.

SHRYOCK,

JR., POPULATION

MOBILITY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, 295-334

(1964).
15 D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35 (1964).
16 For an excellent and brief summary and analysis of the evidence of the deterrent effects
of punishment, see W. CHAMBLISS, CRIME AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 360-72 (1969).
Chambliss suggests that punishment or threat of punishment is likely to deter only
instrumental criminal acts (as opposed to expressive criminal acts such as murder,
rape, drunkenness, etc.) or acts performed by persons who have a high commitment
to a criminal mode of behavior.
17
L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW: THE MOVEMENT FOR
REFORM, 1750-1833, at 178 (1948). See also, M. D'ARCHENHOLZ, A PICTURE OF
ENGLAND 187-88 (1790).
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as I indicated earlier, but instead is concerned with family disputes,
controlling demonstrations, handling drunken quarrels, and so on.
As it turns out, this work is often more time-consuming for the police
than trying to combat crime and absorbs a large share of their resources. 1 8 The difficulty is that this work brings the police directly
into conflict with large segments of the presumably law-abiding
public, most notably the poor and members of minority groups. When
the police start intervening in these areas, there's bound to be somebody who feels outraged or harassed. The Negro, for example, has
suffered from racial discrimination for so long that he's like a man
who has been flayed. He's sensitive to the slightest hint of an insult,
and, unfortunately, policemen are sometimes inexcusably heavyhanded and insulting, even when they do not intend to be. The police, rightfully or wrongfully, come to be seen as a symbol of the
Establishment, as a symbol of all the forces that have worked against
the Negro and the Spanish-American in this country for so long. The
policemen stand as representatives of a conquering army; and a large
number of the people in the ghetto view their efforts to maintain
order with fear and hostility.
All of this presents a basic question - Can the police cure this
situation? Can they significantly reduce crime and maintain order
without community tension? I think it can be argued that the answer
is probably no, at least in the immediate years ahead. To a large
extent, I think these matters are beyond the control of the police.
We can put the matter another way. There are a number of
writers today who argue that the police are unqualified, unintelligent,
rude, brutal, and intolerant. And, it is argued, if police departments
were filled with college graduates, if there were more Negroes on
the police force, and if police departments were under greater control
of the neighborhoods where the police are carrying out their tasks,
most of our problems in police-community relationships would disappear.' 9 It is quite possible, however, that this argument is wrong.
The problems would probably not disappear and they just might get
worse. The police might intervene more strictly than they do now
and increase community tensions. Negro officers might lean over
18

TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 13 (1967).

See also, Bittner, The Police on Skid-row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOCIOL.
REV. (1967).

19 See, e.g., Levy, Cops in the Ghetto, A Problem of the Police System, in RIOTS AND
REBELLION, CIVIL VIOLENCE IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY 347 (L. Masotti and D.
Bowen eds. 1968). James Q. Wilson characterizes these arguments as some variation
on the "bad men" theme. Wilson, Dilemmas of Police Administration, 18 PUB. AD.
REV. 407, 409 (1968). See also, A. NEIDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE
IN URBAN SOCIETY (1967), reviewed, Newman, 34 Am. SOCIOL. REV. 129 (1969)

(Newman is somewhat critical of the "bad men" theme he sees in Neiderhoffer's
book).
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backwards and be rougher on Negro offenders who were giving the
Negro community a bad name than would white officers. And the
conflict between neighborhood residents who want more police protection (small businessmen, home-owners, older people) and those
who want less (teenagers, young men hanging around on street corners, black militants) would not go away.
This does not mean that there is nothing to be done to help the
situation. In fact, there are a great many things that can be done by
the police and should be done. But I think we have to be realistic
about just how much can be accomplished by the police themselves;
and we must begin to understand that the problem of the police is
not just a matter of inadequate personnel - that favorite whipping
boy in the analysis of social problems - but involves questions of
political power and community structure.
IV
This leads to the major topic to be discussed - that is, the problem of riots and civil disorders. And I think we can come to a better
understanding of riots, of why they occur and what can and should
be done about them, if we examine an analogous attempt to maintain
law and order in a dangerous and perplexing situation.
Now for this we need a theory- although, unfortunately, the
social sciences do not have an explicit, definite, thoroughly proven
theory at the present time. But we can present the beginnings of a
theory for consideration and discussion, drawing on some ideas that
have been developed by studying prisons and prison riots.2" The
important thing is that for many people living in the ghetto, the
ghetto is a prison. The two situations are not so dissimilar and I think
we can learn from some of the similarities.
The starting point for the analysis of prison riots is just after
a riot has occurred. The rioters are subdued, the guards win back
control, the damage gets repaired, the broken glass is swept up and the prison administration is determined to enforce all the rules
and regulations, to follow a "tough" line. Men are to be in their
cells when they are supposed to be, there will be no loitering in the
passageways, there will be no gambling, and the passes needed to
move from one part of the institution to another will be examined
with care. There will be no illegal extras in the cells, there will be
no back talk from the inmates, and so on.
The prison administration then finds that it cannot run the prison
with this sort of a strict regime. They cannot use force or the threat
20

G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES, A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON
(1958). See also. Hartung and Floch, A Social-PsychologicalAnalysis of Prison Riots:
An Hypothesis, 47 J. QRIM. L.C. & P.S. 51 (1956).
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of force to accomplish all the tasks that must be performed within
the prison walls. They cannot use force to move 2,000 men through
a mess hall, just as they cannot use force - one guard with a gun
behind each inmate - to run the prison's machinery. Somehow, they
must persuade inmates to do what they are supposed to do; and this
means using some kind of a system of rewards and punishments.
But the rewards - the legal rewards - in the prison are very
few. It is hard to use the maximum daily wage (often in the neighborhood of thirty cents a day) as a meaningful motivating drive. There
are very few extra privileges which can legitimately be given. There
is Good Time (time off a sentence for good behavior), but all that
lies far in the future so that it is like a pension plan with all the concomitant difficulties of motivating people in the immediate present.
There is Work Time (time off a sentence for appearing on the job),
but it hardly assures conscientious work. And the punishments, too,
are sharply limited - these men are already being punished close to
to the limits permitted by society. So in this sense the inmates in the
prison and the Negro and the Spanish-American in the ghetto have
a good deal in common - they all live in a world of reduced incentives, both positive and negative.
How, then, can men be induced to keep the cellblock clean, to
keep out of fights, to do the sweeping, the cooking, the barbering,
etc.? The answer in the prison is frequently a system of small favors,
of letting an inmate leader know when a search for stolen goods is
about to take place, for example, so that he can pass the word on to
his friends much in the manner of a ward boss dispensing patronage.
The guards ignore minor infractions, such as gambling, minor theft,
and so on; and in return, the inmates help to keep things running
smoothly. 21 The prisoners, no less than their guards, want to "pull
their own time," to "pull an easy bit."
In short, the prison is made more tolerable, the frustrations reduced by not enforcing all the rules too strictly -and, most importantly, a group of inmate leaders is allowed to come into existence who has an important stake in maintaininga quiet and orderly
institution and who has access to a set of rewards to buttress their
position of leadership.
This situation, however, tends to be unstable in the prison. Inmates may gain so much power that in reality they run the prison,
not the guards or the prison administrative staff. There inevitably
comes a demand for a crack-down, for a get-tough policy. A guard
21 Compare the use of "small favors" in enhancing administrative control in a bureaucratic organization described in P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY, A STUDY
OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS IN Two GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 169 (1955). See
also, P. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 16 (1964).
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may be killed or a guard may be fired and go to the newspapers with
lurid stories of prison scandals. "Reforming the prison" or some other
version of "law and order" may become a part of a political campaign.
In any event, the prison authorities will frequently find themselves pushed to regain control of the prison, to enforce the rules
more strictly - and they are then driven to do away with the whole
system of compromises, of informal arrangements of a favor for a
favor which has helped to keep the prison on an even keel. The inmate leaders are discredited, and their privileges (which are an important basis of their power) are taken away. The result, very often,
is a disaster.
The destruction of the usual inmate leaders leaves a vacuum of
power, of leadership. All the frustrations of prison life begin to bite
more sharply on the general inmate population; and into the vacuum
of leadership there rush the wildest, most violent inmates who fan
the sparks of unrest. The inevitable discontents of prison life crystalize
around these new, bitterly hostile spokesmen and the prison explodes
into a riot.
The prisoners, of course, cannot really win - and they know
this in some fundamental sense. The prison authorities have far
greater resources at their command and they can always call on the
National Guard or the Army if things get too serious. But usually
they can keep the rioting inmates confined to one part of the prison
where they can be starved into submission. Hostages, of course, pose
another problem -a
problem, incidentally, which has not yet
occurred in the civil disorders in the cities.
So the riot gets broken. The guards win back control, the damage gets repaired, the broken glass is swept up, the ringleaders get
locked into solitary confinement or consigned to the hospital for the
criminally insane. And the whole cycle starts all over again. The inmates are much the way they were before, the prison rules and regulations are much the same - and the future holds little more than a
promise of endless frustration, disturbances, and repression.
As I have suggested, many of our cities today present something
of the same picture - similar enough, at any rate, to point to some
possible conclusions.
In the first place, no community, whether it is a prison or a city,
can be run by force alone over any prolonged period of time, in any
sort of stable fashion. The fact that such an arrangement runs counter
to our democratic values is important, but so too is the fact that the
continued existence of a government based on force alone is virtually
impossible. To some extent - probably to a very large extent people in a community must agree to the rules and be willing to cooperate with the agencies of government." This is a proposition,
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incidentally, which I think can be shown to be true even for a concentration camp. 8
In the second place, this cooperation and acceptance of the governing powers requires the development of leadership within the
ghetto - that is, within the Black community and, in some cities, the
Spanish-American community as well. We are familiar with the concept from the viewpoint of a theory of administration in terms of
span of control. 4 We are perfectly aware that there must be some
kind of a pyramid-like structure in an organization; and something
of the same thing must be true, in a political sense, in a community
- at least, in a democratic society. There must be centers of control
and of power and influence down at the neighborhood level, if the
system is to cohere. Voluntary associations of all sorts have traditionally served part of this role in American society - churches and
political groups, clubs and lodges, unions, occupational associations,
and so on. If these are destroyed we are left with a handful of rulers
and the great -mass of the ruled - essentially a vacuum of leadership
into which can rush the most unstable and most dangerous elements
28
in the community.
In the third place, it appears quite possible that a lack of accepted, trusted leaders in the minority group community was - and
is - an important element in the disturbances that are racking the
cities in this country.2 6 All too often it would appear that the White
community - the Establishment - has had very little knowledge of,
or interest in, the structure of leadership in the Black community or
the Spanish-American community. In fact, it sometimes seems as if
the so-called Establishment were deliberately trying to smash flat any
such structure coming into existence, in the most short-sighted, selfdefeating manner imaginable.
There is a great deal of loose talk, for example, about "militants,"
"extremists," and so on, in newspapers throughout the country. We
are all guilty of using such words, because they are a convenient sort
of shorthand. But very few people try to tie those words down precisely and see what they mean - and the police, I think, are about
as bad as anybody about this. The rhetoric, the speech-making of the
22 G. LENSKI,

POWER AND PRIVILEGE,

A THEORY OF SOCIAL

STRATIFICATION

51-58

(1966). See also, Becker, Who Makes the Rules? in LAW AND THE LAWLESS, A
READER IN CRIMINOLOGY 113 (G. Sykes & T. Drabek eds. 1969).
2
3See generally, E. KOGON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HELL (Berkeley ed. 1958).
24 See, W. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 48 (1962).
2W. KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY 236-37 (1959). See also, N.
BABCHUK & C. GORDON, THE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION IN THE SLUM (1962).
28 Harry Scoble has suggested that the Watts Riot of 1965 constituted the "accelerated
completion of an age-generational revolution peacefully initiated against 'traditional'

Negro leadership (during 1962-1963)." Scoble, Effects of Riots on Negro Leadership,
in

RIOTS AND REBELLION, CIVIL VIOLENCE IN THE URBAN

(L. Masotti & D. Bowen eds. 1968).
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329, 330
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Black Panthers, for example, is often taken completely at face value,
with few attempts to understand why the speeches are being made
and what they really mean. It reminds me of the psychiatrist, Dr.
Wertham, in his work with children and comic books. Dr. Wertharn
said that the comic books were obviously bad because one small
reader, when asked what he wanted to be when he grew up, told
Dr. Wertham he wanted to be a sex maniac. But all that proves, as
the critic Warshow pointed out, is that Dr. Wertham will believe
what any 6-year-old boy will tell him.27
What is really needed is a great deal more knowledge about
what is going on in our community, both Black and White, and
we must use this knowledge to support a strong and vigorous leadership in the ghetto, if we are not to leave a vacuum of leadership
which will explode into mob action. And "supporting leadership"
does not simply mean picking people you like or who happen to
agree with you right down the line.
There is a question of the extent to which Black Panthers or
any other group is a leadership element in the community - and just
what kind of leadership it is likely to provide. Actually, I think that
is strictly an empirical question and the answer is going to vary from
one particular community to another - and probably from one point
in time to another. In general, however, I think the striking thing is
the hostility which a great many policemen direct against the Black
Power movement in its various forms and against militant Black
28
spokesmen .
A number of explanations have been offered for this hostility,
such as the lower middle class origin of the policeman and a pervasive
racial prejudice.2 9 There is the resentment against the attempts to
aid the Negro economically on the part of those who have not been
notably successful in this affluent society but who are still not below
the poverty line -the sort of thing which was supposed to be so
much behind the support of Wallace and with whom, it has been
claimed, so many policemen identified themselves. And, of course,
there is the fact that the police believe - sometimes correctly - that
it is the Black militants who are sniping at them.30 I think we can
take it as a rather basic principle that people do not like people who
shoot at them or who are thought to be doing so.
27

See, F.

WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1954); Warshow, PAUL, THE
HORROR COMICS, AND DR. WERTHAM, 17 COMMENTARY 596 (1954).

See generally, The Police and the Rest of Us, An Atlantic Supplement, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March 1969, at 74.
2 See Lipset, Why Cops Hate Liberals- and Vice Versa, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
2

March 1969, at 76-83.

3o Id. at 82.
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The fact that these are rather glib and easy explanations should
not blind us to the strong probability that there is some truth in them
- but they are not enough. I do not think it is enough to explain
the depth of the hostility or its nature. Shortly after lecturing in a
one-week training institute for the police on police and minority
group relationships, I spoke to one of the policemen in the hall about
the breakdown in communications between the police and the Black
militants. I asked him how the police could keep order in such a
polarized community; and he said, with a bitter and quiet anger,
"We can always lock 'em up for treason."
A large share of the explanation, I think, must look to the fact
that the police are tremendously concerned with their position as
agents of legitimate authority. If they use force in the control of
crime, they really do believe that the force must represent the impersonal and just control of the state - and not a kind of scuffling
between two contending mobs. It must be clear to the police that they
uphold the public definition of "right" (or what they think is the
public definition) and that the criminal is "wrong." And that is to
say that the police see themselves engaged in a moral combat to a
much greater extent than most people realize. The police cannot
simply be the professional users of force for any end that happens
to be announced by community officials - the police, I am arguing,
must believe that the end is legitimate, that the end is morally correct.
This does not mean that the use of force cannot get brutally out of
hand, as in Chicago. But it does mean that the police tend to see the
victims of that force as "wrong" -and
that this is not merely a
81
rationalization for brutal behavior.
The same need is found, I think, in what I have called the maintenance of order. The police believe that they must rely on maintaining a position of impersonal authority which does not carry a partisan
taint. Firm, fair, just - and above all representative of the community's standards of proper behavior; that is what police so frequently believe they must appear to be.
Now I would suggest that when the police are asked to reach
out to so-called militant elements in the ghetto, they often feel that
they are being asked to compromise their position of moral supremacy.
To work out any kind of a modus vivendi with vehement, lower class
Black leaders is, in effect, to bring what they define as a criminal
class into a position of legitimacy - and, for the police, this is fre31 John

Q. Wilson writes: "In order to maintain morale the officer may have to rely
increasingly on police doctrine, a perhaps exaggerated conception of the rightness of
what he is doing, and a contempt for both the criminal and hypocritical noncriminal
elements of the population." Wilson, Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect:
The Chicago Case, in THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYs 137, 161 (D. Bordua
ed. 1967).
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quently intolerable. It is like asking a man who has been cuckolded
to sit down with his wife's lover and discuss how to bring up children. The adulterer may indeed know a good deal about it, but the
husband is not inclined to listen to him.
V
In conclusion, I think it is possible to argue that police harrassment is not the cause of urban unrest any more than the reform of
the police is a quick and easy answer for our problems. What is important, I think, is the political relationship and the power relationship between the white, affluent society and the poor, minority-group
community. I have suggested that if anyone tries to make that relationship one of harsh and complete repression, they will create a
situation which is far more explosive, far more pregnant with violence, than anything we have seen so far. And the crucial thing, it
seems to me, is that the country must learn that in its present concern
for law and order, the police are only one small part of a larger set
of problems which cannot be solved by coercion.

NOTES
A HONKY IN POVERTYLAND
INTRODUCTION

A

NEW dimension has been added to the War on Poverty - the
disadvantaged have ceased their appeals for assistance and
have started demanding the resources with which to help themselves.
Dissatisfied with the generalship provided by the liberal establishment, they seek to assume command. Signs of this charge are everywhere. There are petitions to government officials, organized welfare
recipients, and marches on Washington. Prominently displayed in
the background is a picture of a flickering match being touched to
a Molotov cocktail - the final resort.
The first Congressional recognition of this new activism is
found in Title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966.' It states, in part, that a local model
cities plan will be eligible for funding only if there is adequate
provision for participation and employment of target area residents
in all phases of the program.2 The desirability of such resident
inclusion in the planning and execution of programs in the model
cities target area has been emphasized by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, which administers the act.' However, very
little has been said, and even less has been done, about supplying
these residents with easy access to the sources of expertise necessary
to make their participation meaningful.
Denver, Colorado, for instance, developed a very complex
resident participation component for the planning phase of its model
cities program but failed to provide an adequate amount of technical
assistance in a form acceptable to the residents themselves. At the
top of the Denver structure was the Resident Policy Task Force,
a group of people representing organizations such as churches and
P.T.A.'s that are active in the target areas. To meet its responsibility
for directing the organization of resident participation, the Task
Force created several planning committees and assigned each to a
142 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3374 (Supp. II, 1966).
2Id. at § 3303(a)(2).
3 See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND

URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CDA LETTER No.1

(October 30, 1967) and Memorandum from G.A. Parker, Director, Model Cities
Program, Region V, Department of Housing and Urban Development, to all City
Demonstration Agencies, February 14, 1968.
130
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particular area of concern such as education, transportation, and
manpower. There was also a Steering Committee to oversee the
work of the planning groups. The membership of each of these
committees was drawn from the indigenous population of the target
areas. Each group examined and discussed problems in its particular
field and was to recommend programs to the Resident Policy Task
Force. These were either vetoed and sent back to the committee or
approved and passed on to the mayor and city council for possible
inclusion in the one-year and five-year model cities plans.
Core City Ministries, a nonprofit corporation, contracted with
the city to supply four field workers (minority group members) to
serve as advisors to and liaisons between the various planning committees. These field workers were neither capable of nor expected
to provide technical assistance in the planning of programs. This
was to be the function of the model cities technical staff. Unfortunately, the spirit of cooperation was noticeably absent in all contacts
between this all-white technical group and the committees with their
heavy Black and Chicano (Mexican-American or Spanish-American)
representation. For example, the employment specialist from the
technical staff was ordered out of his first meeting with the Manpower Committee by the members and warned of the dire consequences that would result if he ever attempted to return. The basic
problem was that the technical staff personnel were considered spies
of the Denver mayor by the committee members.
While rejecting the technical staff, the residents recognized
that they needed advice, particularly of a legal nature, if they were
to deal effectively with the city government. Like all citizens, they
viewed the bureaucracy as an indecipherable maze of regulations
hidden behind a bulwark of red tape. They knew that unless they
could receive sufficient legal advice to cut the tape and thread the
mazes, their participation in the model cities program would amount
to nothing more than rubber-stamping proposals prepared by the
bureaucrats.
The problem could not be solved by assigning a practicing
attorney to each planning committee. On the one hand, the experience with the employment specialist from the technical staff indicated
that even the best intentioned members of the establishment were
not welcome in the councils of the poor. On the other hand, few
practicing attorneys have either the temperament, the time, or the
desire to spend long afternoons and evenings listening to inarticulate
minority group members expressing their views about what is wrong
with society. And even if one were found who had the patience
to endure the meetings, the effort would probably fail the minute
he started talking to the committee members as if they were his
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clients. Instead of the unquestioning obedience with which members
of the middle class follow the instructions of their lawyers, he
would be met with open hostility and a dogged stubbornness impervious to reason. The militant poor desire, at least initially, a talking
law library, not a take-charge advocate.
In mid-April 1968, a different approach to the problem was
tried. A second-year student at the University of Denver College
of Law was assigned to the Manpower Planning Committee. That
group was just beginning to concern itself with Denver's application
for a Concentrated Employment Program (CEP). CEP is an approach to employment problems created by the 1967 amendments
to the Economic Opportunity Act. 4 The program is designed to
combine all job development, work experience, employment, and
vocational training activities into one program focused on the target
area. While not a part of the model cities program, the Concentrated Employment Program in a locality is required to integrate
itself into any model cities plans in that same area. 5
During the first seven weeks that the law student worked with
the Manpower Committee, this program led to a confrontation
between officials of the City of Denver and the resident participation
groups. The way in which the confrontation developed, the incompetent manner in which the city officials attempted to handle it,
and the complete breakdown of communications that resulted are
all narrated in the remainder of this Note. No attempt to made to
analyze or explain the behavior of the parties to this dispute.
Rather, the purpose is to analyze the role created for a student legal
advisor when a group of poverty area residents makes its first
attempt to wrest from established society some measure of selfdetermination.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS OF

1968

Early in 1968, an official of the Model Cities division of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development contacted the
special administrative assistant to Denver Mayor Tom Currigan.
He suggested that an attempt be made to secure funds from the
Department of Labor for a concentrated employment program
(CEP) in Denver. Since the program guidelines make the local
community action agency the presumptive sponsor, i.e., the administrator of the CEP, the mayor's assistant got in touch with officials
of Denver's Community Action Agency, Denver Opportunity, Inc.,
and attempted to interest them in applying for the program. Denver
442 U.S.C.A. § 2740(a)
5

Id. at § 2740(a) (5).

(Supp. 1968).
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Opportunity, whose existence has been characterized more by a string
of internal administrative crises than any positive accomplishments,
refused to assume the responsibility and suggested that the City of
Denver itself attempt to become the sponsor.
On February 2, 1968, Mayor Currigan sent a letter to the
Department of Labor's Manpower Administrator, Stanley H. Ruttenberg, requesting that the city be authorized to assume the sponsorship
of a CEP in Denver. Almost two months later, Mr. Ruttenberg
replied. In a letter dated March 26, 1968, he told Mayor Currigan
that "in the absence of compelling reasons, which transcend preference against such agency, the community action agency will be
given the first call as the presumptive sponsor."
Shaken by the possibility of losing two million dollars in federal
funds, the city called for tripartite negotiations between itself,
Denver Opportunity, and the regional representatives of the Department of Labor. Still wishing to limit itself to its intramural controversies, Denver Opportunity reaffirmed its wish to have nothing
to do with the sponsorship of a local CEP. The city again volunteered to accept the responsibility (and the money). The Department
of Labor officials finally agreed to name the city as sponsor if
Denver Opportunity would formally assign to it the sponsorship
rights. The members of the Denver Opportunity Board did exactly
that on April 4, reserving to themselves only the right to veto the
city's proposal if it did not meet with their approval. The next day,
on April 5, the city submitted its previously prepared proposal for
the 7-week planning phase of a CEP to the Department of Labor
in Washington, D.C.
During its meetings in March, the Manpower Committee, one of
the resident committees responsible to the Resident Policy Task Force,
discussed the CEP and attempted to determine what features should
be included in the final plan. Its prime concern was with the selection
of the person who was to administer the program, the CEP director.
Based on their bitter experiences with the failure of other poverty
programs headed by Whites, the members felt that the director
must be either a Black or a Chicano. On March 30, they drew up
a list of 15 minority group members whom they trusted and hence
felt were qualified to direct the CEP.
On April 9, the Resident Policy Task Force and the Steering
Committee held a joint meeting to discuss the city's sponsorship
of a CEP in Denver. The main topic covered was the directorship,
and it was reported that the city was considering two men as possibilities for the job. One, a White, was an official of the Colorado
Department of Employment. The minority community regarded
him as a bigoted agent of a discriminatory pillar of the establishment.
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The other candidate was a Mexican-American who was an employee
of Denver Opportunity. He was considered the Chicano equivalent
of an Uncle Tom, and hence was hated even more deeply than the
White. Those attending the meeting took this limited selection of
director candidates as an indication of the city's bad faith and
voted to ask the Denver Opportunity Board to reconsider its action
and attempt to regain the right to sponsor the local CEP.
Satutday, April 20
Due to the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, the Manpower
Committee did not meet on either April 6 or 13. The meeting on
Saturday, April 20, was thus the first gathering since the Denver
Opportunity assignment of the CEP sponsorship to the city. The
Core City Ministries field worker assigned to the committee explained to the members what had occured since they last met on
March 30.
The law student from the University of Denver was present
and offered his services as legal advisor to the committee. The fieldworker then explained the role of the technical staff in the model
cities structure. The members were not too impressed with the
qualifications of the "authorities" who made up the technical staff,
and a member suggested that one of their number be included as an
authority on poverty since, "those other people sure don't know
anything about it."
The committee turned to a discussion of the city sponsorship
of CEP. The distrust and resentment toward the city, based on past
promises never fulfilled, was absolute. The depth of this feeling
was indicated by one of the women who said, "If the city is going
to run this program, we'd be better off if there was no program at
all." The desirability of Denver Opportunity as a sponsor was the
next topic. Here again, the poverty agency's past failures were cited.
The suggestion was made that the residents incorporate themselves and seek to be designated as the CEP sponsor. The question
of procedures and expenses involved in forming a nonprofit corporation was raised, and the law student was asked to research the
problem and report to the committee at its next meeting. Then
followed a lively discussion of the possible composition of the board
of directors of such a corporation, most members agreeing that their
corporation would be a more acceptable sponsor if they included
representatives of "the establishment" on its board.
Finally, the committee examined other possible alternate sponsors of the CEP. After several were proposed, they were ranked
in order of preference. Topping the list was, of course, the committee's own proposed corporation. Core City Ministries was the
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second choice, subject to an investigation to make sure that it wasn't
secretly controlled by "the establishment." The Denver Opportunity
Board was reluctantly made a third choice. The idea of city sponsorship of the program was completely rejected. The committee
decided to hold a special meeting on the following Wednesday to
prepare an alternative planning proposal to be used to contest the
city sponsorship and then adjourned.
Monday, April 22

On the following Monday, the law student conferred with the
city official whom the mayor had placed in charge of the city's
CEP effort. He was told that the proposal submitted on April 4 was
for the funding of a planning period only. The $30,000 requested
would be used to study the manpower problems in the target area
and to prepare the final CEP plan which had to be submitted to
the Department of Labor for approval and funding by June 1.
The official assured the law student that target area residents
would be given a role in the preparation of the CEP plan. He gave
the student a copy of the planning proposal and showed him where
several of the members of the Manpower Committee had been
included on the CEP planning committee. When asked whether
these people had been contacted about serving on such a committee,
the official answered in the negative. The student suggested that
a letter be sent from the mayor to each person, officailly asking
him or her to serve on the planning committee. The theory was that
such a formal recognition of the residents might serve to smooth
their ruffled feathers. The official rather indignantly answered that
such public relations efforts aimed at the residents were of no
importance. "If they want resident participation, they'll serve on
this committee, no matter how we tell them about it."
On the subject of the CEP directorship, the official explained
that since the program was to be a city-sponsored activity, all
positions would have to be filled through the Career Service
Authority, Denver's civil service mechanism. He indicated that the
residents would be given some voice in the screening of candidates,
but that the final selection of the director was up to the mayor.
Relating to the student the administrative horrors that always resulted
when people from the minority community were placed in charge
of government programs, the official made it clear that he believed
that an individual from the resident target area would be unfit for
such a position as the CEP director. When told that the Manpower
Committee wanted the director to be chosen from their list of 15
trusted residents, he scoffed: "They'll never get that."
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Wednesday, April 24
The city official was invited by the Manpower Committee's
chairman to address a special meeting on April 24. The official
assured the members that the city wanted the residents to participate
in the planning phase of the CEP and had in fact argued for such
participation with the Department of Labor. The committee chairman
admitted that this was true, and the official seemed satisfied that
he had enhanced the city's image with the residents. When pushed
on the issue of appointment of the CEP director, he told the committee that whoever was appointed would serve only during the
planning period and could be replaced by someone else at the
beginning of the program's action phase.
Asked to explain how the city was able to submit its planning
proposal to Washington less than 24 hours after it had been assigned
the CEP sponsorship by Denver Opportunity, the official admitted
that it had been prepared several weeks in advance of the Denver
Opportunity Board meeting. He was then queried as to why the
Manpower Committee had not been consulted while the planning
proposal was being drawn up. He answered that he had not believed
that the members would be interested in a mere planning grant and
that they would not have been able to assist in its preparation
because of its technical nature. He warned the residents that time
was of the essence. The proposal for the action plan had to be
submitted to the Department of Labor by May 31 if Denver was
to get a CEP. In other words, "If you don't let us go ahead with
the program proposed by the city, there just won't be any CEP in
Denver, this year or ever."
After the official left the meeting, the hostility that had been
seething just below the surface while he had been talking finally
broke out. The city government, the official himself, the Career
Service Authority, and the mayor were all vehemently condemned.
To the members of the committee, it was an oft-repeated story hopes are raised by a new program; the city takes over and refuses
to recognize the real problems; the program fails, leaving them
more frustrated than before.
Because of the critical time element, the committee members
agreed to accept the city as sponsor, but only if the top seven staff
positions were filled from persons on the list of 15 acceptable
minority group members previously drawn by the committee. The
chairman announced that, "We'll try to communicate with them all
right, and if words don't work we'll use smoke signals." He also
told the committee that he had a contact in Washington, D.C., who
would prevent the Department of Labor from granting any money

1969

A HONKY IN POVERTYLAND

to the city for the planning phase until he had given his approval.
The meeting adjourned with the understanding that the chairman
would set up an appointment between Mayor Currigan and the
committee so that the members could present their demands to him
in person. The chairman promised to inform the members of the
time set for the appointment.
Saturday, April 27
The Manpower Planning Committee held its regular meeting
on Saturday, April 27. The chairman not being present ("He went
to Kansas City to see some people at the Department of Labor's
regional office"), the vice-chairman presided. The chief objections
to the city's sponsorship of the CEP were again discussed. The complaints seemed to boil down to three: (1) The Denver Opportunity
Board wasn't aware of what it was doing when it released sponsorship rights to the city; (2) No one on the Manpower Committee had
been consulted during preparation of the planning proposal; and
(3) The proposal failed to give the committee a voice in the selection of the CEP director.
The members were curious about what had happened to their
big confrontation with the mayor, none of them having heard from
their chairman. The field worker arrived at this point and announced
that the chairman had set up an appointment with Mayor Currigan
and then had failed to show up. Rather than being shocked or
angered at him for having let them down, everyone seemed to feel
that since city officials had treated them discourteously, their chairman had been under no duty to keep his appointment with the mayor.
After further discussion of the CEP issue, the committee decided
that the best solution was to draft a set of amendments and force
the city to incorporate them into its planning proposal. The law
student was asked to prepare a document which would give the
committee members not only a strong voice in the writing of the
final CEP plan but also the power to veto any portion of the plan
which they disapproved. Also to be included was a provision for
some sort of control over the selection of all program personnel.
The student was admonished: "Be sure that you don't leave any
loopholes that he (the mayor] can squirm through."
Once this was settled, the discussion drifted to the subject of
the CEP director. One of the Chicanos requested that the name of a
nonminority group member, a disbarred White attorney highly
regarded by the Chicano community, be added to the committee's
list of approved candidates for the job. In response to this, one of
the Black female members argued that the director had to be from
the minority groups since "we're asking for self-determination. If
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we get it and then appoint someone that isn't a minority person, we'll
be admitting we don't have anyone from the minorities who can
lead us. We're always talking about self-determination - let's prove
we mean it." Her argument was effective, and the request was denied
by Chicanos and Blacks alike. The meeting then adjourend, the vicechairman asking the law student to have the amendment completed
by noon on the following Monday.
Tuesday, April 30
The committee's amendments arrived by registered mail at the
mayor's office on Tuesday afternoon, April 30, creating a certain
amount of consternation on the part of city officials. They contacted
the vice-chairman and demanded to know what the committee
thought it was doing, telling him that the amendments were not
legally acceptable. He replied that they had been drawn up at the
direction of the committee, by its lawyer, were perfectly legal, and
represented the committee's terms for allowing the city to sponsor
the CEP. The director of the city's model cities staff then contacted
the University of Denver Law School professor who had assigned
the law student to the Manpower Committee and demanded an
explanation of the student's behavior. She was told that the student
had merely carried out the wishes of the committee. When asked
what was wrong with the amendments, she replied that poor people
just didn't have the right to ask for that much power!
Thursday, May 2
On Thursday, May 2, the city's CEP official appeared at the
regular meeting of the Steering Committee. He presented a memorandum from the city attorney which declared that the Manpower
Committee amendments were extralegal and must therefore be disregarded by the city. When asked why the amendment granting the
Manpower Committee veto power over any unacceptable portions
of the CEP plan was extralegal, he replied that the mayor and city
council were not allowed to delegate such powers. Then how, asked
the residents, could the city have granted veto power to Denver
Opportunity when accepting the assignment of the right to sponsor
the CEP? Hoist with his own petard, the official dropped all legal
pretenses and informed those present that a Department of Labor
representative from Kansas City was going to be in his office the
next day to sign the planning phase contract with the city, and that
he wasn't going to allow "you people" to cause Denver to lose a
two million dollar federal manpower program. On this pleasant
note, the meeting adjourned.
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Friday,May 3
Bright and early Friday morning, the Manpower Committee's
chairman led several irate members of the Manpower and Steering
Committees into the official's office. Though the arrival of this
resident group merely irritated the official, it apparently made
the Department of Labor representative feel somewhat like Custer
at the Little Big Horn. He suggested that perhaps the contract
should not be signed until these residents of the target area had
worked out their grievances with the city. Although somewhat
displeased with the suggestion, there was little the city official
could do but agree. While Secretary Wirtz's underling beat a hasty
retreat, the city official, local Department of Labor representatives,
and the residents discussed matters for about an hour. While perhaps
not a "tale of idiots," this exchange was nevertheless "full of sound
and fury, signifying nothing." The resident forces finally withdrew
in disgust.
In search of an alternative sponsor that would be acceptable to
the Department of Labor, the Manpower Committee next turned to
the Children's Educational Fund, a Roman Catholic charitable foundation formed in 1959. This organization had contractural experience
with both the Department of Labor and the Office of Economic
Opportunity and had an excellent reputation with both bureaucracies.
Its six-man board of directors met with several members of the
Manpower Committee that Friday afternoon, May 3, to discuss the
CEP. An agreement was reached by which the Children's Educational
Fund would assume the sponsorship of Denver's CEP and would
set up an autonomous board to administer the program. The Manpower Committee was to determine the composition of the board,
recruit its members, and perform all necessary paperwork. The only
control to be retained by the Fund was the right to examine all
subcontracts let out by the CEP board. The committee members
present were somewhat insulted by this condition. As one of them
said, "They're just saying to us that they know that Black folks and
Mexicans steal, and they want to be sure we don't steal any of
the CEP money." Nevertheless, they swallowed their pride and
agreed to the arrangement.
Saturday, May 4
The full Manpower Committee met on Saturday, May 4, to
discuss the latest developments in their struggle with the city over
the CEP. The committee chairman reported on the previous day's
negotiations with the Children's Educational Fund (CEF) and informed the committee that he had talked to "some people" on the
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phone and that the Department of Labor was ready to allow the
CEF to sponsor the program since the residents would not accept
city sponsorship. The committee agreed to approve the CEF as the
sponsor of Denver's CEP. The chairman then reminded everyone
that the June 1 deadline for submission of the final plan was but
one month away, so all turned to the task of determining the composition of the board which was to administer the program.
It was agreed that the 15 members of the committee should
constitute a majority of the CEP board's membership. This meant
that seats could be given to representatives from 14 different
establishment-oriented manpower organizations without endangering
resident control of the program. The chairman asked for suggestions
of possible candidates for these 14 slots. A Black activist, attending
the meeting at his own invitation, then took the floor. He prefaced
his remarks by dismissing the importance of deadlines. "That's all
bah, humbug. I say bah, humbug, to this time business." He then
asked the chairman why there had to be any outsiders on the board
at all. The answer was, "When you shave the deck, you don't want
to shave it so much that the Man is going to notice it." The honky
translation of this addage is that you should have a few of "them"
around for the sake of appearances, a philosophy similar to that
which underlies the hiring practices of most banks and stores.
Twenty-two organizations that conducted manpower programs
and hence had a legitimate place on the CEP Board were mentioned
as possible candidate contributors for the additional seats on the
board. The group struggled with the task of weaning organizations
from the list for almost 40 minutes. At one point, the law student
made a contribution sufficiently larcenous to appeal to the chairman
and was rewarded by being classed as a "pretty damn sharp dude,
as dudes go." The list was finally reduced to 14 groups acceptable
to the committee, and its approval of the composition of the 29
member board was expressed.
At this point, one member of the committee proposed that the
group cooperate with the city, even if its demands were not met.
He seemed to feel that a part of something was better than all of
nothing and that the residents could work to obtain more power
from the city after the program went into operation. He was
answered by one of the women members: "I'm tired of always
getting just half of a loaf. If we let the city get away with this now,
we'll be right back where we started. We'll never get the whole
loaf until we take it, and the time to take it is now." The committee
concurred with this latter viewpoint and then adjourned.
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Thursday, May 9
On May 9, an issue not directly connected with either the
Manpower Committee or the CEP came to a head at the meeting
of the Steering Committee. For several weeks there had been a
controversy over the contract between the city and Core City
Ministries. The city auditor, an independently elected official, had
refused to give Core City the lump-sum payments provided for in
the contract. Instead, he required that all expenses be submitted
to him so that he could issue checks to cover them. In short, he didn't
trust Core City to handle the money due it. At the May 9 meeting, the
Steering Committee decided to call a mass gathering of the members of all model cities resident planning committees to discuss
whether or not they should all resign in protest over the auditor's
actions. Since there appeared to be little of importance on the
agenda of the Manpower Committee meeting that Saturday, May
11, the mass meeting was scheduled for the same time and place.
As they were going to be there anyway, the Manpower Committee
members were not contacted about the special meeting. Denver's
two top model cities officials, one of whom also happened to be
the CEP official, were invited, along with the acting director of
Denver Opportunity.
Friday, May 10
All would have probably gone smoothly that Saturday if there
had in fact been nothing urgent for the Manpower Committee to
discuss. This, however, was not the case. On Friday morning, May 10,
the city, without notice to anyone, signed the contract for the CEP
planning phase with the Department of Labor. That afternoon, the
city further complicated matters by hiring as CEP director a Chicano
who happened to be on the list of those acceptable to the Manpower
Committee for the position. A Black, who had also been on the
committee's list, was hired as deputy director. Though this action,
like the signing of the CEP contract, was taken without consulting
any members of the resident participation committees, the news soon
spread throughout the minority community.
Saturday, May 11
Thus, on Saturday, May 11, the members of the Manpower
Committee arrived at their meeting with a great deal to discuss. Most
were pleased with the city's choice for CEP director, but they were
extremely upset that they had not been consulted before the action
was taken. At the same time, members of other planning committees,
Steering Committee members, the full staff of Core City Ministries,
and several city officials were also gathering in the same meeting
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room, each for his own purpose. The meeting was called to order
at 2:00 p.m. and the next four hours resembled a nonplay in the
best tradition of the theatre of the absurd.
A member of the Steering Committee opened the meeting by
announcing that everyone present must decide whether to walk out
of the model cities resident participation structure. Needless to say,
this announcement came as a bit of a suprise to the members of the
Manpower Committee.
One of the model cities officials was then given the floor to "tell
us the city's point of view." On the Core City contract controversy,
she explained that, although the city auditor was in the wrong,
he was an independently elected official and there was nothing that
the mayor could do to force him to change his behavior. She did
promise that the city would join as a party with Core City in a
breach of contract suit against him. She then reviewed the history
of the CEP issue in Denver and related why the city had signed the
planning phase of the contract the previous day. She claimed that
the Department of Labor had told the city that it would not accept
the Children's Educational Fund as the CEP sponsor. The city was
told that if it did not sign the contract by Friday, May 10, there
would be no CEP funds for Denver.
One of the Core City field workers then cautioned the audience
against taking any hasty action which might endanger the model
cities program itself. To this, one of the women on the Manpower
Committee replied: "Maybe we don't want model cities. What's in
it for us?" She asked her fellow residents what they thought they
were getting when here, at the very beginning of the program, it
was obvious that they again had no voice. All the promises of
participation they had ever received had been conditional, and she,
for one, was tired of being told what she needed by the establishment.
It was time for the minority peoples in Denver to take a stand, and
if it took the sacrifice of the model cities program to wrest the
control that they wanted from the establishment, then so be it.
The newly appointed deputy director of the CEP then took
the floor. Speaking primarily to the members of the Manpower
Committee, he told them that he would accept the position only
with their approval. He promised to see that the residents' ideas
were followed in the drafting of the CEP plan and implored them
all to "get together and decide what the heck we want."
The Manpower chairman asked why the city had ignored the
Manpower Committee when it selected the persons to fill the top
two positions in the CEP. When neither of the two city officials
present replied, he informed the group that "there's someone
coming back from Washington today who's going to be able to
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shed a lot of light on this whole thing!" He did not identify this
bringer-of-truth.
Several people rose to criticize the manner in which the CEP
director had been selected. All were in complete agreement with
the member of the Manpower Committee who said, "You couldn't
have picked a better man." Each, however, expressed strong reactions
-ranging from indignation to rage- to the fact that an existing
committee had been completely ignored by the city.
At this point, the acting director of Denver Opportunity attempted to justify the position his organization had taken with
respect to the CEP. This man provides an amazingly strong unifying
force throughout the entire minority community in Denver-he is
equally disliked by Blacks, Chicanos, and Indians. The group listened
to him for approximately four minutes and then asked him to leave.
It was becoming obvious at this point that no hope remained
for a viable dialogue between the residents and the city officials
present. Nevertheless, a member of the Manpower Committee made
one final, futile attempt. He told the model cities officials that he
and his fellow residents wanted the city to guarantee them a real
voice in both the planning and actual operation of all programs
that were supposed to be for their benefit. Explaining that token
representation was not enough, he asked, "Why can't the mayor
negotiate with us and give us some insurance? If he will, then we
can work together." The city officials, as usual, missed the point
entirely. Their reply rambled on about how valuable the present
participation scheme was to the city. The officials were asked to
follow the Denver Opportunity representative out the door of the
meeting room.
After the departure of the unwelcome guests, the Manpower
chairman informed all present that the city was merely trying to
pressure them. "If we hang tough, they can't touch us. We've got
to maintain our stance; that's the only way we can improve the
quality of our lives!" Another member of the Manpower Committee
then warned everyone about the evils of factionalism and urged
them to work to eliminate rifts within the minority community.
The deputy CEP director again took the floor and reiterated
to the group his intention to see that the final CEP plan reflected
every idea which the residents passed on to him. A motion was
made that the Manpower Committee approve him as the deputy
director. It was passed unanimously, and a motion supporting the
newly-appointed director of the program followed. This too passed
unanimously.
That which transpired from this point to the end of the meeting
is extremely difficult to describe. The dual purposes for the gather-
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ing - discussion of the CEP and the city's breach of the Core City
Ministries contract - were suddenly fused. The question became,
"Do we dissolve or do we remain within the system?" The grounds
for the suggested dissolution varied. To some, the issue remained
the breach of contract. To others, it was the fact that the city's
sponsorship of the CEP was now a fait accompli. Just what was to
be dissolved - all model cities committees, only the Steering Committee, or just the Manpower Committee - was another uncertainty.
These final 20 minutes of the May 11 "happening" are presented below in transcript form as the best way to convey to the
reader a true sense of what occurred. With a few exceptions for
close paraphrasing, the statements reported below are the exact
wording of the individuals to which they are attributed. Unless
referred to specifically by title, the various speakers are members
of the various committees present at the meeting. The product should
be labeled to warn the reader: Ye who enter here, abandon all
hope of discovering any threads of rationality running through
what you are about to read.
[The motions giving the Manpower Committee's approval to the
appointment of the CEP Director and Deputy have just passed
unanimously.]
Steering Committee Chairman: Now, let's discuss whether we're
going to dissolve or not.
Speaker # 1: We made a threat and now we have to carry it out. The
city is the CEP sponsor, and if we don't all resign, they'll
never believe another thing we say.
Speaker #2: What was the threat we made? I thought it just was
about the city contract with Core Ministries.
Speaker #3: What do the minutes say?
Secretary [after shuffling several papers]: I don't have the minutes
of that meeting with me.
Speaker #2: Does anybody here remember what the threat was?
Speaker #4: I think we can do the most good if we stay together as
a model cities committee. So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
move that we not dissolve.
Steering Committee Chairman: Then what am I going to do with
the letter I wrote because I thought everybody decided to
resolve [dissolve] the committees? I sweat blood over this
letter [flourishes approximately 20 sheets of paper covered
with double-spaced typing] and I intend to send it. It's going
to President Johnson, all of his advisors, all the Secretaries of
anything [i.e., the President's Cabinet], the Governor, all our
Senators and Congressmen, the mayor and all his assistants, all
of the newspapers, and Life magazine. This letter is really
dynamite, and I'm going to get a lot of heat for sending it out.
I've got five kids, but I'm going to send it anyway, even if I
go to jail! I thought I had you behind me, but even if you
back out on me, I'm going to send it anyway!
Director of Core City Ministries: You don't seem to realize that
by getting the people you wanted appointed to the top CEP
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positions, you've won a real victory here. And this was just
a skirmish; the real battle is just starting. Don't quit now.
Steering Committee Chairman: You're all backing out on me!
I gave my word to resign and my word is my bond. I'm carrying out the threat!
Speaker #2: But what was the threat?
Deputy CEP Director: Why can't we stay together and back his
letter?
Speaker #5: How can we do that?
Deputy CEP Director: Is there anything in your letter that would
stop us from backing it if we stayed together?
Steering Committee Chairman: Well . . . no. But, I've given my
word so I'm going to resign. It's a matter of honor!
Speaker #6: I've listened to all of you for hours and now I'm going
to have my say. What some of you are saying is "Burn, baby,
burn!" and I don't like that attitude. It's stupid! I don't know
if any of you remember, but during the war there was a concentration camp right out here at Fort Morgan where they
kept Japanese from California. And I mean it was a prison barbed wire, dogs, machine guns, the works. If we start this
"Burn, burn !" stuff we're all going to end up in a place just
like that. [General scoffing and expressions of disbelief.] Oh,
yeah? Don't forget, we're a minority. That means there are
more of them than there are of us.
Manpower Committee Chairman: You're not going to like this, but
I'm going to end debate by tabling the motion that's on the
floor. [Sounds of protest.] Nope, no argument. It's tabled.
[He leaves the room.]
Speaker #4 [somewhat bewildered]: Why can't we just pass the
motion? We can always change it later if we want to.
Deputy CEP Director [imploringly]: Remember, I'm going to be
working for you. Let's pass the motion and stick together.
Speaker #1: No! Table it. It's more like a threat that way.
Law Student: Why don't you put that threat in words? State in the
minutes that you're tabling the motion until you see whether
the city will honor its promises to you.
Speaker #1: Good idea!
Several people: Yeah, let's do that. [Manpower Committee Chairman returns.]
Manpower Committee Chairman: What are we doing? [He is
brought up to date by the secretary.] Fine. [Points to law
student.] Write that up in the form of a motion.
Speaker #4: That motion's okay, but [the Steering Committee
Chairman] is still leaving the committee.
Everybody: No!
Steering Committee Chairman: Yes!
Everybody: Why!
Steering Committee Chairman: I believe in death before dishonor
and I'm going to carry out the threat!
Speaker #2: [plaintively]: What was the threat? Doesn't anyone
remember? [Law student takes written motion up to Manpower Committee Chairman who starts to read it.]
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Speaker #7: Listen to me! I grew up in this neighborhood. My
parents have lived just two blocks away from here for 52 years.
This man here [puts arm around Steering Committee Chairman] has done a lot to help them and me and everybody in
this room. He has five kids, but he doesn't care! He's working
for all of us right now, and you're trying to back out on him.
[scornfully.] How cold is that! My God!
Manpower Committee Chairman [to law student]: Yeah, this
motion's just right -a
threat they can understand.
Speaker #7: Well, I'm not going to let him down! He says we
should resolve the committee so I'm going to resolve it with
him. Come on, let's get out of here.
Steering Committee Chairman [clutching his letter to his chest]:
Right!
Speaker #1: We'll form our own committee and show you all!
[Steering Committee Chairman, Speaker #7, and Speaker #1
get up and start for the door.]
Manpower Committee Chairman: That's it baby! It's all over now!
[He hurries out the door after Steering Committee Chairman,
et al.] [Meeting dissolves in confusion.]
CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the above chronology has given the
reader a reasonably clear picture of the events that transpired before
and during the first few weeks that the law student spent as an
advisor to the Manpower Committee. It does not, however, describe
adequately either the relationships that developed between student
and committee, the adjustments each was forced to make, or the
results of the contact.
The Manpower Committee did not welcome the presence of
the law student with any degree of warmth. Both the leaders and
the members were highly suspicious of this WASP who had suddenly
appeared in their midst. The process of acceptance by the leaders
was complicated by the fact that the first three meetings which
the student attended were each chaired by a different member of
the committee who had never seen him before.
Neither the chairman nor the vice-chairman was present at the
first meeting. The Core City Ministries field worker was running
the proceedings through a member who had been appointed acting
chairman. The law student arrived alone, walked into the room,
seated himself, and waited. The meeting opened and the acting
chairman asked the student to introduce himself and explain his
purpose in attending. He informed the members that he was from
the University of Denver Law School and was present to provide
any legal assistance which the committee might desire.
The field worker immediately rose and minimized the importance of such assistance. He stated that there was a technical staff -
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which included a legal component - built into the model cities
structure in Denver and that any help the committee needed could
be drawn from that source. He appeared to regard the law student
as a threat to his role as advisor of the committee. He conveyed
the feeling that he had an inside track with the establishment through
which he could provide information and personnel and thus meet
any needs which the committee might have.
The committee members themselves were not so much hostile
as indifferent to the student's presence. After a brief period of
watchful waiting, they were able to relax completely and ignore
him until some matter arose which required his opinion. It was
clear that as long as the student spoke only when spoken to, he
would be accepted by the members as a useful but unnecessary tool.
The second meeting attended by the student was chaired by
the Manpower Committee's flamboyant chairman. His initial reaction
to the presence of the student was clearly antagonistic. He seemed
on the verge of asking, "What the hell do you think you're doing
here," but waited while a member of the committee explained that
the Anglo was there to assist them. When it became obvious that
the student had been accepted by the members at the previous meeting, the chairman altered his approach. Instead of questioning the
student's presence, he adopted the field worker's tactic of disparaging
the importance of such assistance.
At one point in the meeting, a clash occured between the chairman and the student. In a discussion of the CEP, the chairman stated
that it was a legislative part of the model cities program. Since the
Department of Labor had gone to great lengths to make it clear
that such was not the case, the student corrected him. The chairman
snarled, "This committee is working on CEP and this is a model
cities committee. So CEP has to be a part of model cities!" The student backed down immediately, saying, "Oh, I understand it now.
I'm sorry. My mistake." He was answered with a curt nod and the
subject was dropped. Emerging triumphant from this test of strength,
the chairman subsequently relaxed completely with respect to the
student.
The chairman did not attend the next meeting, so the chair was
held by yet another person who had never seen the student, the vicechairman. Introducing himself to this individual and explaining his
purpose in attending the meeting, the student was again met with
hostility. However, when the vice-chairman saw that the committee
accepted the student's presence without comment and that his own
control of the members remained unhindered, he too relaxed. The
student had at last met and been approved by all the leaders of
the group.
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While the hostility of the leaders and the suspicion of the
committee members was overcome simply by maintaining silence,
the transition from a "seen-but-not-heard" visitor to an active, vocal
advisor and contributor was quite difficult. At first, the student
followed one rule - speak only when spoken to. He answered all
questions directly addressed to him by any of the members but
refrained from any other communication. Each question was answered
as briefly as possible. No attempt was made to comment on either the
validity or feasibility of the members' ideas and opinions.
When it seemed to the student that the committee had become
accustomed to his speaking in response to direct queries, he decided
to take the next logical step and propose, without being asked, a
possible solution to a problem under discussion. He waited carefully
for the proper time. Finally, an issue arose that was innocuous
enough so that no one had any strong feelings about its solution, a
point the student considered a prerequisite to his first uninvited
participation. The deliberations had reached an impasse. Every member had had a chance to speak to the problem, and no one was
certain as to the best way to proceed. At this point the student made
his suggestion. Fortunately, his idea was acceptable to all and was
in fact welcomed by the committee as the best solution to its problem.
Henceforth, these unsolicited advisory suggestions were continued
and, though usually ignored, were accepted as a matter of course by
the committee members.
The final advance was from a position of volunteering procedural solutions to one of offering opinions on major issues. The
initial move during this phase involved simple reinforcement of
the discussions. The student was careful never to offer an opinion
that departed from the general consensus, and no attempt was made
to interject opinions on any controversial issues upon which the
committee itself was split. The opinion offered had been phrased in
such a manner that it would not appear to be a mere repetition of
what the members themselves had said. It was thus helpful to
bread the meat of the opinion in a thick batter of alleged knowledge
about the secret machinations of the establishment, and spice the
whole mixture with a legal term or two.
Opinions on controversial subjects were eventually interjected
in the discussions, but in a rather disguised form. The student would
briefly state the issue being considered and then list a set of alternative positions which the committee could take. His own opinion
was carefully sandwiched between progressively radical layers. In
this way, he was able to impart a note of rationality on those occasions when the debate became so heated that little was being accomplished. Since the members were always willing to look at each of
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the alternatives, this tactic at least served to bring things back down
to earth, even though the student's camouflaged position was rarely
adopted by anyone else.
The student finally threw caution to the wind and directly
stated an opinion on an extremely controversial issue at the mass
"happening" of May 11. When it appeared that the advocates of
dissolution were about to carry the day and dissolve the resident
committees, he argued for the retention of the structure since it was
a basis of real, albeit limited, power. The statement appeared to
appeal to a few of those present; nevertheless, the student had interjected his own opinion directly into a heated discussion and had
gotten away with it. Even though this was done under extremely
favorable circumstances - i.e., many nonmembers were present who
had already expressed opinions and emotions had risen to such a
fever pitch that there was no time for anyone to reflect upon the
propriety of the student's comment - the precedent held at all
subsequent Manpower Committee meetings. The student was allowed
to comment on any issue, and his opinions were, on the surface at
least, given the same consideration as those of a regular committee
member. He was careful, however, to practice much restraint in
the exercise of this new liberty so as to avoid the appearance of
trying to take things over. If it appeared that some member was
about to express an opinion similar to the one he held, the student
remained silent.
At this point, a comment about apparel and clothing should
be mentioned. At the first meeting, the student followed the adage:
"If you are going to be a lawyer, look like one." Dressed as if for
a freshman moot court competition, he sat stiffly and tried to appear
wise. At the second and all subsequent meetings, he followed the
pattern set by the committee members themselves and adopted a
very informal if not somewhat sloppy attire. This seemed to be an
improvement, no doubt because it made the members less aware of
his presence.
Poverty area residents still demand that the lawyers who represent them in court drape themselves in the symbolic costume of the
profession. When they are away from the alien environment of
courtrooms and carpeted offices, however, and back in the meeting
room of their neighborhood centers, they seem to prefer jeans and
a sportshirt to a three-piece suit.
The committee's view of the proper function of the law student
changed as radically in the first few weeks as did the degree of
participation he was allowed in discussions. Initially, the student
was viewed by the committee members as an inert repository of
information- something like a legal bank account to be drawn
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on whenever need arose. He answered questions in straight hornbook
terms and performed minor research functions whenever requested
to do so.
After the second meeting with the group another role emerged.
The student became the committee's unofficial parliamentarian. It
soon became common for a speaker to halt in the middle of a
sentence and ask, "Now, is this motion phrased correctly?," or,
"Under parliamentary procedure, can we do this?" That is, such
occurrences were common when the discussion was calm and deliberate. As the intensity of debate rose, the reliance on, or even
recognition of, parliamentary procedure diminished proportionately.
The committee request that the student draw up the amendments to the City's CEP planning proposal marked the emergence
of the student as an articulator. The committee had developed
some unarticulated ideas which it wanted written in proper form for
presentation to the mayor. The committee turned to the law student
to perform this function. The group was quite pleased with the
amendments in their final form and, having thus proven his competence, the student was henceforth referred to by the members as
our attorney."
The group then began approaching the student for advice on
the rules by which the establishment operates. The members felt
very strongly that the most significant (and most satisfying) way
to defeat the powers-that-be was by turning their own tactics against
them. Already possessed of a large measure of expertise in this area,
the committee members looked to the student for sophisticated and
additional touches to add to their basic schemes.
It is difficult to point to any concrete results of an effort
lasting but a few weeks in duration. There do seem to have been
some visible benefits to the committee members, and the value of
the experience gained by the law student is immeasurable.
First and foremost, the committee appears to have profited
from the newly-gained ability to articulate its desires through the
student. At the same time, its members became more confident of
their own ability to deal with the establishment on its own terms.
Rather than being intimidated by the City Attorney's memorandum
regarding the proposed CEP amendments, for instance, they checked
with the student, found that the attorney was incorrect on certain
points, and forced the city to back off. This very militant aggregation
of minority group members began to feel that, because of the easy
accessibility to legal information and advice, they could accomplish
their goals within the system instead of resorting to violent means
outside of it. Whether this confidence will survive the disappoint-
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ment that surely must come to at least some of their efforts cannot
be answered at this time.
The law student, through his involvement with the committee,
was exposed to experiences on three different levels - working with
a client, working with a group, and working with minorities. While
the first is a benefit derived from most well-run student practice
programs, the other two are areas virtually untouched by legal education today.
On the first level, the student learned the art of determining just
what it is that a client wants from his usually disjointed requests
and explanations. Facts usually had to be pried from the committee
in several pieces and then carefully reassembled in their true relationships. There was also that first taste - both terrifying and
exhilarating - of the responsibility involved in dealing with real
issues and real people.
The experiences on the second level would provide the subject
matter for a two-semester sequence in group dynamics. How did
this group really function? How did its formal structure compare
with the informal interactions of its members? How were the conflicts between group and individual goals resolved? How did the
group decisionmaking process operate? This is material to which
a law student is seldom, if ever, exposed, and it was presented
in a form far surpassing in effectiveness the most eloquently
written sociological treatises.
Finally, for the first time in his life, the student was exposed
to the myths, feelings, and beliefs of members of minority groups.
He was forced to attempt to understand the true goals of the
Blacks and Chicanos. He saw for the first time how those goals
were being frustrated. Most importantly, he could see from
his neutral position the causes of the clash between the minorities
and the establishment and, as a result, began to see how those
clashes could be avoided. Knowing this, he may perhaps be able to
work a change in our society when, in the not too distant future,
he takes his own place as an attorney within that establishment.
Kyle B. White

RIOT CONTROL LEGISLATION:

A NECESSARY EVIL
INTRODUCTION

Asmany of the other articles in this issue have suggested, the

only true solution to the problem of riots and other racial
disorders is the elimination of the root causes of racial tension. To
this author's way of thinking, riots are a fruit of racial prejudice,
a state of mind. Prejudice is outwardly manifested in the wide variety
of forms of discrimination which appear in American society today
and which have been discussed at some length in other articles in
this issue. To be sure, the government has placed, and undoubtedly
will continue to place, legal limitations and restraints on discriminatory practices.' Unfortunately, since prejudice exists only in the
mind, it has been and will continue to be impossible to cleanse the
nation of all prejudice and discrimination with one whisk, or for
that matter, a multitude of whisks, of the legislative or judicial
broom. Ridding the country of prejudice will be a painfully slow
process. Consequently, there remains the ugly reality of possible
racial disorders in the years to come.
Once the possibility of rioting is admitted, the only logical
conclusion is that a comprehensive program for riot control is
needed. As the Kerner Commission reported: "Prevention is paramount, but the experience has shown that refusal to plan is foolhardy and can only compound the human agonies of civil outbreak."'
Although reactionary riot control plans are a distinct possibility,'
an intelligent plan can be developed if the purposes and effects of
the control measures are carefully examined.4
Essential to the sensible planning for any riot control is the
placing of riots in their proper perspective. Contrary to what the
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-b, 2204, 2205 (Supp.
2

3

1968) ; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973a-p (1965) ; Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
,ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 189 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER
REPORT].

See, e.g., Virginia House Bill No. 365, § 18.1-254.10 (1968),

which would have

required authorities to arrest any persons in a riotous assembly who failed to disperse
when ordered to do so. This proposal would also have permitted authorities to form
a posse to deal with rioters when authorities merely expected a riot. Fortunately, the
final bill, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-254-8 (Supp. 1968), provides discretionary arrest
power and permits the organization of private citizens to help disperse riotous crowds
only after such crowds have formed and failed to disperse.
4 See, e.g., Setting a New Course in Meeting Race Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 8, 1968, at 38; A Crisis that Won't Go Away, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1967, at
17-22; Insurrection: Outlook in U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968,
at 38.
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news media have often suggested, riots, even as serious as Watts,
Newark, and Detroit, are neither insurrection 5 nor guerilla warfare. 6
[T]he notion of an insurrection has little meaning, for snipers
have no intention or capability for holding territory, nor are they
[T]he guerilla conpart of a scheme to do so even temporarily ....
cept is also not relevant since guerillas are part of an organization,
a plan, prepare paths of withdrawal and develop
proceed with
7
sanctuaries.
The current type of riot is more an emotional outlet of the
hate and disgust which the generally law-abiding rioters' feel
toward a society which has treated them unfairly. "Riots . . . may
involve large numbers of people, many of whom are usually lawabiding . . . . [This is] because acts of rioting are irresistible elements of contagious emotion rooted in commonly shared and commonly expressed feelings of frustration and rage." Another related
fact about riots is that they are presently a much different breed
of disorder than the "race riots" of the first half of this century.1"
No longer do riots consist of violent confrontations between masses
of private black and white citizens. The confrontation is now between the authorities and black rioters bent upon looting and
destroying property. Consequently, any plan for control of rioting
should not, as some authorities have suggested, treat the riot area
as a war zone; 1 it should be treated as a part of the city in which
angry citizens are venting their emotions. "We have a very special
situation here in America. We're not just fighting an alien conspiracy; we are up against some of our own citizens . . . who have
many complaints about their lot in life."'"
A final and vitally important consideration in planning for
the control of riots should be the realization that only a very small
portion of the citizenry of a riot-torn area actively participates in
the riot. This portion has been variously estimated at between
5 Insurrection: Outlook in U.S., U.S. NEWS & 'WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968, at 38;
Kerby, Western Justice, 205 NATION 104, 105 (1967).
6Looting, Burning- Now Guerrilla War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 3, 1964, at
23; The New Kind of War, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1967, at 20.
7
M. JANOWITZ, SOCIAL CONTROL OF ESCALATED RIOTS 15 (1968).
8

CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN

THE CITY-AN END OR A BEGINNING 24 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA
RIOT REPORT]; The Real Tragedy of Newark, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., July

31, 1967, at 31 (hereinafter cited as Newark].
g Conant, Rioting, Insurrection and Civil Disobedience, 37 AM. SCHOLAR 420, 430
(1968).
'0 M. JANOWITz,, supra note 7, at 9-10.
'1 G. WILLS, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 39 (1968); Kurtz in Storyville, 206 THE
NATION 196 (1968).
12
lInsurrection: Outlook in U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968, at 41.
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2l a and 1114 percent of the population. In addition, only one out of
every four persons in the riot area approves of the rioting. 5 Therefore, riot control planners must be extremely careful to avoid the
overreaction which could harm and alienate non-participants.
With the foregoing principles in mind, the planners of riot
control can develop a more effective program which will afford
a maximum amount of riot control with the creation of a minimum
of friction between the authorities and the residents of the riot
area. Forward-looking riot control planning must necessarily consist of two elements: planning of the actions of the personnel who
will be deployed to control the riot and legislation to provide
both authority for and limitations upon the control procedures employed. This article suggests various provisions which might be
included in such legislation.
I.

SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATION

A learned student of the riots which have racked this country
in the past 5 years has suggested that riots develop in four distinct
stages. 6 The first stage consists of a precipitating incident, which
is most often an innocuous confrontation between the police and a
member of the black community. This incident, usually an arrest,
would go unnoticed except that it occurs at a time and place when
many members of a minority group are present. As these people
gather with others who have received the rapidly spreading word
of the arrest, the second stage of the riot ensues. This is a confrontation between minority agitators and more respectable minority
leaders. The former group denounces and shouts obscenities at the
white community, particularly the police, while the latter group
attempts to calm the situation. If the crowd is not dispersed peacefully, the third stage develops. It is characterized by window
breaking, rock throwing, and widely scattered looting, all carried
out by the rioters in a carefree, holiday spirit. If the authorities
turn a deaf ear to grievances or use too much force in an attempt
to suppress the rioters, the disorders will progress to the fourth
stage. This is the hard-core riot with widespread looting, destruction
of property, and incidents of sniping like that seen in Watts,
Newark, and Detroit.
A single article could not possibly survey legislation covering
all phases of riot control. Consequently, suggestions herein will
13 CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT 1.
14 KERNER REPORT

73.

15 Ransford, Attitudes of Negroes Toward the Los Angeles Riot, 3 L. IN'TRANS. Q. 191-

92 (1966).
18 Conant, supra note 9, at 420.
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concentrate on control of the third and fourth stages, emphasizing
provisions which might prevent the transition from the third to
the fourth stage.' 7
II.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

When the Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official
determines that twenty or more persons are engaged in illegal
activity which seriously threatens the public peace and safety, and
that these people cannot be controlled by usual police methods, he
may declare a state of emergency to exist in the city. Such state of
emergency shall remain in effect for a period not to exceed 2 days
after the cessation of conditions under which the state of emergency
was declared. For the duration of such state of emergency, the following emergency provisions shall be effective.

This provision is the grant of authority to invoke extraordinary
measures in the face of a developing riot situation. It involves the
admission that the riot has progressed beyond the point at which
ordinary police measures can be effective.
The fact that this provision is worded in the form of a city
ordinance granting power to a city official rather than a state
law granting power to the governor warrants comment. It may be
argued that governors, having a broader base of experience, should
be the ones to make the delicate decision of when excess police
power should be authorized. However, a city official, from a strictly
time-distance perspective, is closer to the riot. Furthermore, a
mayor will probably have a more intimate knowledge of the riot
area and of the capabilities of his own police force. For these reasons
the mayor of a riot city, rather than the governor, is the official
who should have the authority to invoke emergency powers.
Although mayors or other local officials should have the power
to declare a state of emergency, it must not be forgotten that during
a major riot cooperation and coordination of effort among local,
state, and federal officials will be vital to successful riot control.
Legislation to facilitate these efforts is discussed infra.
Although a city rather than a state official may be the best
qualified to act in a riot situation, any city which considers the
passage of a riot control ordinance must first determine whether
it has been granted such power by the state. "[M]unicipal corporations possess and can exercise such powers only as are granted by
the legislature in express words .... .. 1 Consequently, if a state
17A discussion of California's legislative effort to prevent riots from progressing from

the second stage to the third, CAL. PENAL CODE § 404.6 (West Supp. 1968), may be
found in Note, The Elements of Section 404.6 - Urging to Riot Law, 4 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 118 (1967).
18Pittsburgh, C.,C. & St. L. Ry. v. Town of Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421, 45 N.E. 587
(1896).
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statute does not grant to the city the requisite authority, any power
invoked by the mayor would be invalid and any action taken
pursuant thereto would be ultra vires.x9 However, state statutes
generally give cities the power either specifically to suppress riots2"
or, more generally, to preserve the peace and good order of the city. 2 '
The final consideration of this provision is whether or not
the authority to invoke extraordinary police powers violates personal
freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution. There are
three possible ways to avoid conflict with the Constitution.
The quick, extreme method for justifying excessive police
powers is a declaration of martial law. However, in an area under
martial law the authorities have the power to deny all Constitutional
rights2 2 and literally wage war against the rioters.2 8 As stated
earlier, violently suppressive measures may only add fuel to a riot
and create animosity in the minority community. Consequently, it
is hoped that the emergency powers proposed herein would be
used to control the riot before it becomes necessary to wage war in
the riot area.
At the opposite end of the scale, it has been suggested that the
present constitutional standards could be re-examined and broadened in the light of riot situations.2 " It is unlikely that some of the
extreme measures required for dealing with rioters could be brought
within the purview of normal constitutional standards, even when
expanded, without completely destroying the standards themselves.
Even if they could, such a broadening would be a dangerous precedent to set. It could very easily lead to a sliding scale of constitutional standards dependent upon the facts of each individual situation. Such standards might very well provide no protection.
The proper justification for the exercise of extraordinary police
powers lies somewhere between these two extremes. It is based on
the principal that there is a higher state interest in preserving the
peace and order of the city which will justify the usurpation of
certain constitutional rights. It is the underlying reason for limiting
the first amendment freedom of speech and expression when the
19 City of Topeka v. Huntoon, 46 Kan. 634, 26 P. 488 (1891); City of Red Wing v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 72 Minn. 240, 75 N.W. 223 (1898) ; Village of Ravenna v.
Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118, 12 N.E. 445 (1887) ; City of Waxahachie v. Missouri, K.&T. Ry., 183 S.W. 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
20
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 715.49 (Page 1953); TEx. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art.
1015(21) (Vernon 1963).
21

MAs.

GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40

§

21 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.27.372

(1965).
2 Powers Merchantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934) ; Wilson & Co. v.
Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959) (dictum).
23
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909).
2 Note, Riot Control: The Constitutional Limits of Search, Arrest and Fair Trial Procedure, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 85 (1968).
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speech presents a "clear and present danger" to the public peace
and order.25 The higher state interest can also be seen in laws
regulating automobile traffic" and the sale of liquor.2 7 Although
there is no case which expressly permits the use of such extraordinary police powers as envisioned by this legislation, the case
of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization2 s comes very
close to doing so by way of inference. In that case union organizers
entered Jersey City, New Jersey, which had, until that time successfully avoided extensive unionization. The union began peacefully distributing union literature and encouraging workers to join
unions. Under orders from the mayor, police illegally searched
union halls, seized union handbills, and expelled union organizers
from the city. The court said: "The evidence is not entirely clear
as to how many persons came to Jersey City . . .attempting to take

part in CIO activities upon the morning of November 29th, but
an examination of it indicates that ....
[w]hat they had planned
to accomplish presented no serious threat to the peace and good
order of [the city]."," The court further stated:
The reason given by Mayor Hague and certain of the other
appellants in their testimony for such acts upon the part of the
police was the necessity of preserving peace and good order in
Jersey City and obviating the possibility of riot, strife, and injury
to the speakers and citizens of Jersey City. It in no way appears,
however, from the record before us that the police of Jersey City
would have been powerless to maintain order .... 80

These two excerpts would seem to indicate that, had there been
a real threat of an incident in which the police could not maintain
order through ordinary measures, police action violating the individual's rights would have had some justification.
The procedures provided in the following proposed sections
(A through H) are commonly employed by authorities in a time
of riot. They are mentioned here for two reasons - to emphasize
their wide use and, more importantly, to embody all powers necessary to riot control in a single city official. Persons preparing riot
control ordinances should give careful consideration to the necessity
for unified control. In this regard, one decision must be made:
Which city official is to hold the emergency powers hereinafter
proposed? The mayor,"' as the chief executive officer of the city,
25Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1924).
Koplovitz v. Jensen, 197 Ind. 475, 151 N.E. 390 (1926).
People v. Frangadakis, 184 Cal. App. 2d 579, 7 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960).
- 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939).
29 Id. at 778.
30
1d. at 779.
31In some cities the chief executive officer may hold some other title such as City Manager. In any event, he is the official who should have the authority.
2

2

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

is the logical choice. Likewise, who is to have the emergency
powers in the event that the mayor is absent from the city when a
riot develops? It is likely that city charters provide a city official
to be acting mayor in the mayor's absence. However, this official,
because of the nature of his regular duties, may not be the best
qualified to declare a state of emergency and exercise emergency
powers. For example, in Denver, Colorado, the deputy mayor is the
Manager of Public Works.3 1 Consequently, if nothing to the contrary were provided in a riot control ordinance, the Manager of
Public Works would possess the emergency powers in the mayor's
absence. However, either the Manager of Safety and Excise3 1 or
the Chief of Police3 4 would be better qualified to decide when to
declare a state of emergency and what powers to invoke.
A. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
suspend the sale of alcoholic beverages in the city or any part
thereof.
The reasons for this provision are readily apparent. The holiday
spirit which prevails during the third stage of a riot can only be
increased by the addition of drunken persons to the scene. 3' Furthermore, sociological studies indicate that rioters whose inhibitions are
released by intoxication 36 will be more likely to take actions which
will propel the riot from the third stage to the fourth. 7
Unfortunately, this section has one serious drawback. It may
have the least effect in the riot area where it is most needed because
liquor stores are generally among those looted.3 8 Rioters bent on
destruction and looting will not be deterred by this section. 9 However, many less eager residents of the city who would be drawn
into the riot under the influence of alcohol may not participate.
Local officials preparing an ordinance which includes this provision must determine whether the mayor has the authority to
temporarily suspend liquor licenses. In some cases, this power may
be reserved to a state official. 40 In others, a local official, other
32

CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, § A2.2-1.

33

Id. at § A9.2.
34
Id. at § A9.4.
35

KERNER REPORT 49-50.

36 E. BOGEN & L. HISEY, WHAT ABOUT ALCOHOL? 79-80 '(1934) ; E. STARLING, THE
ACTION OF ALCOHOL ON MAN 141 (1923).

37 Newark Race Riot: Open Rebellion July 24, 1967, at 6.
38

39

Just Like Wartime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,

KERNER REPORT 24; CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT 46, 47.

KERNER REPORT 49-50.

40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.25 (Page 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 501, 504
(Purdon 1952).
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than the mayor, may possess the power. 4 ' In either event, legislation
would have to be enacted to enable the official holding the power
to delegate it to the mayor when a state of emergency is declared.
B. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may:
1. Suspend the sale of gasoline and other inflammable
liquids in the city or any part thereof; and
2. Make it a misdemeanor to carry gasoline or other inflammable liquids on one's person or in a vehicle in the
city or any part thereof except such as is contained in
the gasoline tank of the vehicle.
The obvious reason for this section lies in the necessity of removing the supply of gasoline from which molotov cocktails and
other fire bombs are made. These are the popular and widespread
tools of the arsonists who have caused much damage in recent riots.4 2
However, curtailing the sale of gasoline can have other desirable
effects. It would limit civilian traffic in the riot area; thereby restricting the mobility of rioters and increasing the mobility of law
enforcement officials. It would also limit traffic in parts of the
city which are not involved in the riot. This would release more
policemen from traffic control duties for service in the riot area.
C. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may:
1. Suspend the sale of firearms, ammunition, and explosives in the city or any part thereof; and
2. Make it a misdemeanor to carry firearms, ammunition,
or explosives on one's person or in a vehicle in the city
or any part thereof except that firearmsand ammunition
may be carried by persons on their own property.
Like the provision for the suspension of the sale of alcoholic
beverages, this section may have little effect in the riot area because
of looting and overt defiance of the law. However, it could have
pronounced effects in other parts of a riot-torn city. Members of
the rioting minority who live outside the riot area might be discouraged from spreading the unrest by arming themselves. Other
persons, disgusted with the rioters or fearing that the riot might
spread, would be discouraged from forming armed groups of vigilantes to provide "protection" for their neighborhoods or to carry
out attacks on the rioting minority - a very real possibility. 43 Even
if this section does not discourage the formation of such groups,
41

CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO,

'2 KERNER REPORT 25, 27.
41

G. WILLS, supra note 11, at 57-58.

§ A9.8.
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subsection 2 will provide authority for the arrest of and confiscation
of weapons from such groups.
D. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
impose a curfew on the city or any part thereof.
This measure serves a number of very useful purposes in riot
control. In theory, at least, a curfew keeps the vast majority of
the population of the riot area, who do not participate in the riot,
off the streets. 44 It can generally be assumed that the persons in
the streets during the curfew period are the troublemakers, although
this theory may not be true in all cases. The curfew decreases the
chance of orderly bystanders being injured by police action against
rioters and avoids the possibility of police action inciting nonparticipants to join the disorder. Furthermore, the imposition of a
curfew provides a readily available and easily proven charge for
which arrests of rioters may be made - curfew violation. For these
reasons, the declaration of a curfew is a most effective measure
for riot control.
E. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
cordon off and isolate the city or any part thereof, in which event:
1. Everyone except authorities, members of the news
media, and residents of the cordoned off area may be
excluded from such area;
2. Everyone except authorities and members of the news
media may be prohibited rom leaving the cordoned
area;and
3. Any member of the news media who incites any person
to riot may be excluded from the cordoned area.
The most essential purpose of this provision is to contain the
rioters, thereby preventing the riot from spreading. In Watts and
Detroit, effective measures were not taken early in the riot to
isolate the trouble when the violence was not widespread.4" Had
those riot areas been sealed off from the remainder of their respective cities, it is quite likely that the violence, loss of life, and property damage would have been greatly decreased.
A second purpose of this section is to prevent persons outside
the riot area from entering and participating in the riot.4 6 Outside
"Conant, supra note 9, at 430; M. JANoWlTz, supra note 7, at 9-10.
5

4 KERNER REPORT 49-50; CALIFORNIA RioT REPORT 20.
4 KERNER

REPORT 74; An American Tragedy, 1967 -Detroit,

1967, at 77.

NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7,
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agitators have also been reported in the riot area.4 7 Such activity
can only increase the burden of riot control.
This will also provide protection for the residents of the area
by excluding outsiders bent on retribution. Snipers and vigilante
groups seeking to "even the score" have been uncovered in these
areas." Also, armed, self-appointed guards of riot area business
establishments have been encountered. 9 Such persons present a
serious threat to the lives of the residents of these areas, both
rioters and nonparticipants alike. Moreover, such activities by outsiders can only increase the rage of the rioting minority, thereby
increasing the task of riot conrtol.
Cordoning the area would also protect curious and unsuspecting
passers-by from being caught and beaten. ° These tragic incidents
only provide another opportunity for escalation of the riot.
As important and helpful as sealing off the area from the
remainder of the city is, it may create two serious problems. First,
residents who are employed outside the area may be prevented from
going to work. Second, because of the widespread destruction of
buildings which has often occurred during riots, many persons may
be rendered homeless.5 Cordoning may prevent these persons from
getting to friends or relatives with whom they could stay. These two
problems must be considered by local officials and provision made
for their solution if many nonrioters are not to be alienated by this
riot control measure.
It is hoped that subsection three of this section, permitting
authorities to exclude from the area newsmen who incite rioters,
would not have to be used. However, it is provided because at least
one incident has been reported in which it would have been useful.
A newsman reporting on a disturbance, repeatedly encouraged
a black youth to throw a rock at passing cars for the purpose of
being filmed by the newsman. Eventually, the newsman got his
wish.5" Such positive efforts to incite riotous conduct cannot be
tolerated. Unfortunately, there appears to be no way to prevent the
passive encouragement provided by the mere presence of the newsmen at the scene of a disturbance without curtailing news coverage
in riot areas.
47 KERNER REPORT 29-30.

48Id. at

207; G. WILLS, supra note 11, at 57-58.

49

G. WILLS, supra note 11.
50
KERNER REPORT 24; Back of Riots: Discontent, Illiteracy, Criminal Element, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 30, 1965, at 22; New York City Deep in Trouble, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 3, 1964, at 26.
1
6 KERNER REPORT 61.

52 1d. at 205.
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F. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
empower police and other authorities to order crowds of more
than five persons to disperse, and, upon failure of a cyowd, so
ordered to disperse, to arrest those failing to disperse.
It should be noted that this proposal is different from the
usual unlawful assembly statutes. 5s These statutes are employed
under ordinary circumstances to prevent riots from materializing,
and their application is limited to assemblies which are riotous or
engaging in unlawful activity. Section F is not so limited in its
applicability. Any assembly in a riot area presents a threat to the
public order.
As previously mentioned, the foregoing provisions authorize
powers which most mayors or governors presently possess or can
exercise in times of civil disorder. The following powers and restrictions are suggested as valuable additions to the present powers.
G. Deadly force may be employed by police and other authorities
to effect arrests only in the event that:
1. Deadly force is necessary to effect the arrest;
2. The criminal to be arrested poses a serious threat of
death or serious bodily harm to the arresting officer or
others;
3. The arrestingofficer can see the criminal to be arrested
and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force will
create no unreasonable danger to other persons; and
4. The arresting officer has made known his intent to arrest or reasonably believes it is known to the criminal.M
This section provides a radical departure from common law
and from some statutory provisions. Under common law, law enforcement officials are permitted to use deadly force to arrest any
person reasonably expected of having committed a felony. 5 However, deadly force may never be employed in the arrest of a suspected
misdemeanant" Some states permit more liberal use of deadly
force in riot situations. In these states officials are exonerated from
culpability for any death of a rioter or bystander which results
53

§ 2923.51 (Page Supp. 1968) ; MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.521
(1968).
5 For an excellent discussion of a similar proposal to be in effect in both riot and nonriot situations, see Rhine, 'Kill or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 829 (1968).
55 Stinnet v. Virginia, 55 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1932) ; State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103
N.W. 944 '(1905).
58
Tuttle v. Forsberg, 331 Ill. App. 503, 73 N.E.2d 861 (1947) ; Holloway v. Moser,
193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375 (1927).
0 H1O REv. CODE ANN.
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during the dispersal of a riotous crowd.5 7 Such measures as these
cannot be realistically employed during riots without resulting in
wholesale slaughter of the type which took place in Watts, Detroit,
and Newark.
Even ignoring humanitarian arguments, widespread indiscriminate use of deadly force except under the conditions prescribed
by this section is senseless. It does not accomplish its purpose of
riot control. In one 14 block area of Watts, four rioters were killed;
yet, 37 buildings were damaged and 30 stores were looted."'
In another nine block area, three rioters were killed; yet, 35 buildings were destroyed and 39 stores were looted.5" In Detroit, it has
generally been acknowledged that the Army paratroopers, who
killed only one rioter,6 0 were far more effective in controlling the
riot than were the police and National Guardsmen 6 ' who accounted
for most of the other deaths.62
The apparent failure of deadly force to suppress riots should,
in itself, be reason enough to severely restrict its use. However, there
are three other advantageous reasons.
In the first place, deadly force, especially where unnecessary,
enrages nonparticipants as well as rioters.6 3 This can greatly increase the difficulty of post-riot reconciliation efforts.
Secondly, gunfire from authorities often ricochets for many
blocks. 64 As a result, officers blocks away from the firing often
believe themselves to be under fire from snipers, which causes them
to begin shooting back at imaginary snipers and delays their riot
65
control activities.
The third, and most important reason, is that many innocent
persons, not even part of the activity from which the shooting stems,
are killed or injured.66 Such injuries and deaths stem in part from
errant gunshots and in part from random shooting by authorities
who do not have their targets in sight. Two of the more outstanding
examples should suffice to demonstrate this point. In Atlanta, police
attempted to disperse a protest rally. As two of the officers chased
a group of black youths, a cherry bomb exploded at the officers'
feet. In response, the police fired several shots. Some of these struck
57 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 269 § 6 (West Supp. 1968) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS
(1968); REv. CODE WASH. ANN. § 9.48.160(3) (1961).
5 CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT, app., map enclosed.
59 Id.
60 KERNER REPORT 61.

61 Id. at 56.
62
Id. at 61.
6Id.
at 36.
6Id.

at 37-38.

65 Id. at 37, 45, 57.

" ld. at 35-38; G. WiLLs, supra note 11, at 52.
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a group of persons sitting peacefully on a front porch, killing a
man and injuring a young boy.67 In Detroit, National Guardsmen
manning a tank heard gunshots and thought themselves to be under
fire from snipers. On the suspicion of one of the guardsmen that
the fire was from an apartment building, the buliding was sprayed
with machinegun fire. A 4-year-old girl was killed and her 21-yearold aunt was critically injured.6"
Some officials, such as Mayor Daley of Chicago, have expressed
the view that all looters, arsonists, and snipers must be shot.69
Mayor Daley's feeling was that police must use firepower because
restriction of such a practice would tie the hands of police attempting
to control rioters. Such comment indicates a lack of knowledge on
the part of the officials. Use of tear gas and the more potent gas
CS has proven to be a very effective riot control measure. 70 A few
cannisters of gas have dispersed large angry crowds. Additionally,
gas can temporarily discourage would-be looters and disable escaping
looters.
Elimination of excessive use of deadly force might have a tremendous favorable psychological impact on the rioting minority
community. Ghetto residents would see that "believe it or not,
'whitey' would sooner save colored lives than white-owned buildings. "' 71 Hopefully, future riots would be lessened because minority
communities would have reason to accept the proposition that not
all whites are merely interested in exploiting minorities.
H. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
suspend the privilege of bail for all persons arrested for inciting
to riot and crimes of violence. However, reasonable bail shall
be set for all other rioters.
This provision is suggested as a sensible alternative to the bail
procedures instituted by most cities during past riots. In many cases,
astronomical bail was set even for such minor infractions as curfew
violation.7" Such unrealistic bail practices, based on the theory that
everyone even remotely connected with the riot should be kept out
of the area for the duration of the riot, led to unhealthy overcrowding of established jail facilities and use of emergency facilities
67 KERNER REPORT 36.
8

6

Id. at

57.

69 'Shoot to Kill!' -Daley,
206 THE NATION 554 (1968); To Shoot or Not to Shoot,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968, at 36.
70 G. WILLS, supra note 11, at 41.
71 Insurrection: Outlook in U.S., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968, at 41.
72 KERNER REPORT 185.

1969

RIOT CONTROL LEGISLATION

wholely unsuited for use as detention centers 78 Consequently, there
is a desperate need for a realistic bail system during riots.
This section retains the necessary controls of past systems by
permitting authorities to detain without bail those rioters who,
for lack of a better expression, may be called the hardened criminal
participants. These are the persons who have been arrested for
serious crimes such as inciting to riot, arson, and assault. There are
two reasons for detaining such persons during a riot, both of which
facilitate riot control. First, it must be assumed that any rioter
brazen enough to commit one of the serious crimes anticipated by
this section would be likely to return to participation in the riot
upon his release. Second, such rioters, by their bold defiance of
the law, may provide moral support and encouragement for the
more timid rioters. In either instance, the release of the hardened
criminal rioter would increase the burden of riot control.
While providing a necessary and sensible method for detaining
dangerous rioters, this section also attempts to avoid the creation of
the problems of the past by requiring that reasonable bail be set
for persons arrested for minor violations. The persons so treated
would be largely petty looters, curfew violators, and members of
crowds who failed to disperse when ordered to do so. These people
would be caught up in and carried along by the holiday spirit of
the riot rather than actually fomenting the riot. They are, therefore,
unlikely to rejoin the riot after their release.14 Much would be accomplished by taking these people off the streets for a short time
to make them aware of their wrongdoing until they can be released
on bail. Such a practice would have the advantage of providing a
cooling-off period without the disadvantage of forcing minor rioters
experience which
to remain indefinitely in overcrowded jails -an
could only increase hostility toward the police. This practice would
have the added advantage of reducing the number of rioters detained
75
to a workable volume.
Unfortunately, this procedure cannot eliminate the problems
of temporary overcrowding and delays in bail hearings caused by
76
the great increase in influx of arrestees during riots.
I. Search and seizure:
1. A warrantmay be issued authorizinga reasonablesearch
of an area of the city limited to four blocks upon the
3Id. at 182-85.
1d. at 185.
75
More than 75 percent of the rioters arrested would be entitled to demand reasonable
bail under the system suggested in the text. See CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT; Newark,
supra note 8.
74

7

8 KERNER REPORT 184.
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reasonable suspicion of a policeman that the area holds
a named fugitive or specified weapons, explosives, or
incendiarydevices.
2. Police may stop and search in a reasonablemanner any
person or vehicle without a warrant or probable cause.
This provision is suggested with much hesitation for the
reason that it might be used to justify a search of the type which
was conducted in Plainield, New Jersey, in the summer of 1967.
During the riot which took place in that city, 46 carbines were
stolen from an arms manufacturer and were reportedly distributed
in the riot area. When the carbines were not turned over to authorities pursuant to an agreement between city officials and black
leaders, a house-by-house search of the black ghetto was ordered.
A massive convoy of Plainfield police, New Jersey State Police
and National Guardsmen carried out the search which uncovered
none of the missing carbines. Instead, ghetto homes were left in
shambles which added to the bitterness in the black community.7 7
Another inflamatory and completely unnecessary practice for
which this section might be used would be to justify the harassment
of ghetto residents. During the riot in Newark, two black residents
of the riot area were returning from a grocery store with bags of
food which they had purchased. An unmarked car stopped beside
the two men, and five policemen got out. Accusing the two of being
looters, the policemen threw the bags of groceries onto the ground
and kicked their contents into the street. The police then drove
78
away.
Such practices as mentioned above serve no useful purpose in
riot control and can only further enrage rioters and nonrioters alike.
However, during a riot, authorities may need extraordinary search
and seizure power. Section I authorizes much broader search and
seizure powers than are normally permissible. Under nonriot conditions, authorities are required to have probable cause before they
can search a building for contraband or a fugitive, or stop an individual and search him for contraband.79 While the power granted
here is not an absolute power, it does greatly reduce the evidentiary
standard required to justify a search to that required in ordinary
situations to justify a stop and frisk.80 An even greater power is
granted to stop and search individuals and vehicles. Here no justification for the search is required, the search authorized is limited
to that which is reasonable.
7 Newark, supra note 8, at 31.
7

8 KERNER REPORT 38.

79Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v.United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
80

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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J. Censorship.
The possibility of granting local officials either the broad
power to censor all riot news to be released to the public from the
riot area or the more limited power to censor only news concerning
the riot to be released by the news media into the riot area has been
considered and rejected. These measures would provide a means
of preventing the spread of inflamatory stories in the riot area.
These stories could provide the incentive for nonrioters to participate in the civil disorders. Although such authorizations might
occasionally be useful, they would at best accomplish little. At their
worst, such authorizations would provide the basis for the wholesale extinguishment of the freedom of the press.
The grant of censorship power to local officials was considered because the conclusion has been reached that many reports
of past riots were untrue, exaggerated, or inflammatory. Examples
may be cited to support this conclusion.
One newspaper editor admitted that he wished his paper had
not printed some of the stories which it carried during the riots.
These were reports of "sniper kings" and "nests of snipers."'"
In Tampa, Florida, a deputy sheriff died during the riot. It
was immediately reported that he was killed by rioters. Not until
later did the true story emerge that he had been stricken by a heart
attack.8 2
A major newspaper reported a story of Michigan National
Guardsmen storming a house in Detroit under heavy sniper fire to
capture three shaggy-haired white youths. The report stated that
large stores of arms and ammunition found in the house had been
used to supply snipers over the entire West Side. In fact, guardsmen
had attacked the house in response to the malicious accusations of
the evicted tenants that snipers were in the house. The three persons
captured were the owner of the house, his brother, and a friend who
had taken over the house to prevent the evicted tenants from returing and to protect it from rioters. The only weapon which the
three had was a small rifle to protect themselves.8 3
During the Watts riot, a public meeting between members of
the black community and city officials was held after the initial
outbreak of the riot but before the worst violence erupted. Many very
responsible remarks were made by leaders on both sides including
a plea for calm by the mother of the youth whose arrest had triggered
the riot. However, the greatest news coverage was given to a black
81
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youth who unexpectedly seized the microphone and told everyone
that he and his friends intended to raid white neighborhoods that
evening.84
At the time of the riot in Cincinnati, several sources reported
the arrest of white youths for possession of a bazooka. Few mentioned that the weapon was inoperable.85
Although stories such as those mentioned above can only serve
to increase racial tensions by enraging whites as well as blacks,
it is unlikely that the grant of a censorship power to local officials
would provide the means for truly solving the problem. The reason
is that many of the inflammatory rumors reported during past riots
were given to reporters by local officials who had inadequate communication with their riot control personnel."8
Even if censorship would assure that only true and uninflammatory news of the riot would be reported, the mere news that
censorship had been imposed would create another problem. The
black community is generally hostile toward and places little faith
in the news media. The feeling is that the news media are simply
tools of the white establishment." This feeling is -more pronounced
during riots when blacks believe that the news media fail to adequately report incidents of police brutality or of ghetto residents
helping firemen.88 News of the imposition of censorship could only
increase these beliefs.
The more sensible solution to the problem would appear to
be to encourage the news media to improve the quality of their
reporting. The results of a meeting of representatives in all fields
of reporting indicate that news reporters are making this effort.8 9
K. Local police, state police, National Guardsmen, and federal
soldiers and law enforcement officers deployed in the city may
be deputized, so that they shall have the same powers as the
police of this city.
This provision is an attempt to alleviate a serious problem
which has developed when a number of jurisdictions have provided
law enforcement personnel in a single city. These officers have been
without authority to arrest except for violations of laws of their
own jurisdictions.9 This has meant that National Guardsmen have
84
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85 KERNER REPORT 206.
88

Id. at 202.

87 Id. at 203.
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89 Id. at 205-06.
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generally been without authority to arrest unless martial law has
been declared. Also, police from cities surrounding the riot area
have authority to arrest only for crimes proscribed by state law.
Consequently, much effort to control riots has been rendered ineffective by the inability of National Gaurdsmen and non-local
police to make arrests unless accompanied by a state policeman or
policemen from the riot city. By giving all law enforcement personnel
authority to arrest, the number of active riot controllers would be
greatly increased.
L. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
appoint members of the local bar to serve as municipal judges,
public defenders, and prosecutors.
This proposal is an effort to relieve the logjams which have
plagued courts during previous riots. This overcrowding has increased the difficulty of successful prosecution"' and has eliminated
92
If
the possibility of fair and expeditious treatment of arrestees.

rioters are not to lose all respect for the law, justice must be properly meted out. Guilty persons must be convicted, and innocent
people must be quickly released. Only a great increase in the
number of judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors can assure
that the ends of justice will be served by the courts during riots.
This section, like Section A, requires a determination by local
authorities of whether the mayor has the requisite power under
state and local law. If he does not, changes in state and local law
will be necessary before this section will be effective.
M. Sanctions for abuse of emergency powers:
1. Upon a finding by the Mayor that a police officer or
public official has abused any emergency power granted
by this ordinance, such police officer, or public official
shall be relieved of his duties permanently or for a
93
lesser period as the Mayor may determine.
2. This section shall in no way limit criminal sanctions or
civil remedies against police officers who abuse the
powers granted in this ordinance.
Because very broad extraordinary powers are granted in this
proposed ordinance, this section is necessary to discourage overzealous police conduct and to punish it when it occurs. Undoubtedly,
91 Id. at 184.
2

9 Id. at 185-86.

03 This provision gives the mayor the power to determine when an abuse has occurred
and what sanction to impose. Local officials may feel these should be internal police
determinations to be made by the chief of police.
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some (notably policemen) will argue that this section will hamper
police riot control activities because the threat of suspension will be
foremost in the minds of all riot controllers. However, police conduct
must conform to statutory standards, especially when police possess
powers to violate individuals' rights. Furthermore, the sanction
provided in this section would not be applied in cases where a policeman would be culpable only under a very strict interpretation of
the power which he abused. This limitation is consistent with [he
4
judicial interpretation of §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1.
Subsection 2 is proposed in order to make it clear that all
criminal sanctions and civil remedies are also available when emergency powers are abused. For killing a bystander while shooting at
a sniper or an arsonist, a policeman might be guilty of manslaughter.
For killing an escaping looter, a police officer might be guilty of
murder. For making an unreasonable search of the type reputed to
have been made in Plainfield,9 5 a policeman might be liable for
damages under §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.6 These are only
a few of the criminal and civil remedies available against police
abuse of emergency powers.
No penalties or punishments are suggested here because they
are not properly within the scope of this article. By the time a rioter
can be tried, convicted, and punished, the riot in which he participated is history. The only riot control purpose which punishment of
rioters can serve is as a deterrent to prospective rioters. The likelihood that punishment would have such an effect is small. In the
holiday spirit of a riot most participants are generally law-abiding,97
but are caught up in the excitement of the event and do not consider
the illegality or the consequences of their activities. The other rioters,
who have previous criminal records, have demonstrated that they
are undeterred by the prospect of being punished for their crimes.
Consequently, it is doubtful that punishment for violation of any
of the proposed sections would have a significant effect on riot
control.
REFLECTIONS

This proposal is written in light of the riots which have occurred
in black ghettos in the past 5 years, and the factual references are
drawn from those riots. This is not to say that the applicability of
this proposal is limited to riots by blacks. There are many other
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), construed in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) ; Bowens
v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
96 Newark, supra note 8, at 31.
9642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
9442

97 CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT 24; Newark, supra note 8, at 31.
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minorities which face the same problems which have so enraged
blacks. Consequently, these groups are likely to display their discontent in the same manner. Furthermore, some provisions of this
proposal may be useful in controlling student demonstrations. Although student riots develop in a different manner from riots by
minority groups, and the violence wrought by students is of a
different nature, the students are motivated by the same disenchantment with the society in which they live.
As valuable as legislation as this may be in riot control, its
effect will be severely limited if there is no cooperation among
neighboring municipalities. If adjacent cities do not have and invoke
provisions similar to those in force in the riot city, rioters and nonrioters alike need only cross a city line to avoid such provisions as
restrictions on the sale of gasoline, firearms, and alcoholic beverages.
Furthermore, the sanctions against police abuse of power can only
apply to the policemen of the city which has invoked the ordinance.
Since police from surrounding cities often aid in riot control, such
police would not face the sanctions provided unless the cities from
which they come have similar provisions.
The passage of legislation similar to that proposed here would
go a long way toward providing a city with a comprehensive plan
for riot control. Such legislation would provide cities with authority
to carry out activities essential to effective riot control. In addition,
it would provide some standards for police conduct. These standards
are vitally necessary to assure that riot control measures are not so
suppressive that they incite, rather than control rioters.
Unfortunately, however, riot control legislation is not the
answer to riot control in itself. No amount of legislation can positively control the actions of individual riot control personnel on the
streets. Furthermore, if steps are not taken to eradicate the prejudice
and discriminatory practices which breed riots, no amount of legislation or preparation for riots will be successful in controlling them.
Daniel Schoedinger

BOOK REVIEW
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
By THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
Washington, D.C.: Government PrintingOffice, 1968. Pp. 425. $2.00
The format of a book review is, admittedly, a somewhat awkward way to discuss a commission-style report. Yet the Kerner Report,'
almost unique among its government-sponsored fellows, does function relatively well as a book.
Its hallmarks are the clarity of its rather dense prose, the thorough indexing and citation of its supporting data, and the undeniable
honesty of its reporting. The amount of fact gathering and staff
work represented by the resulting 8-month task (the Commission
published its report some 5 months early) is staggering. The very
bulk of information is one of the few aspects of the Report which
might be considered a fault. But to err on the side of knowledge and
comprehensiveness should be no real detriment; although it does lead
to picking and choosing by the press, political leaders, and, alas, by
book reviewers.
The news media took particular issue with two of the many
topics of headline interest: the costs, and the "two nations divided"
warning. This reviewer feels the most valuable section was Chapter
One, "Profiles of Disorders," which is a cogent and well-organized
description of the events during the summer of 1967 in 10 of the
23 affected cities under investigation. Throughout the reporting and
analysis of causes, events, and participants which are contained in the
first three chapters, what strikes the reader is what did not happen.
There are critically important findings here which have to some
extent been overlooked, or at least have not been as widely understood as they should be.
For example, nearly all reports of the feared sniper fire were
convincingly disproven.' Damages to property, especially in Detroit,
were shown to have been widely overstated.' Suspicions of organized
1NATIONAL
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backing or a conspiracy are dispelled by the Report.' Finally, and
most important to this reviewer, the Report states that the "1967
series" of disorders were by and large not black - white confrontations, not "race riots." 5
On this last point especially, there has been a distressing but
almost predictable failure of understanding. The shouts of Black
Panthers and others, along with the socio-geographic prospects of
divided cities, a divided country and other factors couldn't help but
prompt the retrospective and fearful view among the public that
black and white civil war occurred. Other developments since then
may have reinforced this belief. The 1968 or "King series" of disorders may have in fact dealt a serious blow to the Report's hopeful
observation.
Nevertheless, the reporting contained in the "Profiles of Disorders" is in all respects a superior informative basis for understanding and further investigation.'
It is as a where-to-go-from-here blueprint for action that the
Report faces its biggest disappointment. By and large this is not the
fault of the Commission nor of its published Report, although the
document is so fact-filled and presents so many recommendations,
subrecommendations, and alternative recommendations that it is truly
difficult to sort them out by priority or feasibility. To keep the
approaches straight on the questions of public versus private action,
which level of government is responsible, and what grant programs
need retailoring, would have taken a battery of political analysts
much longer than the Commission's 8-month study period. To a certain extent this results from important differences which characterized the disorders in different cities. Compounding the overwhelming
nature of the information explosion on the subject of disorder and
remedy, at least in the public mind, has been the release of other
4 ld. at 89.
[T]he Commission has found no evidence that all or any of the disorders or
the incidents that led to them were planned or directed by any organization
or group - international, national, or local.
Militant organizations . . . and individual agitators, who repeatedly

forecast and called for violence, were active in the spring and summer of
1967. We believe that they deliberately sought to encourage violence, and
5

that they did have an effect in creating an atmosphere that contributed to
the outbreak of disorder.
Id. at 64.
In his introduction to the Bantam Books edition of the KERNEa
REPORT, New York
Times writer Tom Wicker says:
It is, at the least, an extraordinary document. We are not likely to get
a better view of socially directed violence-

what underlies it, what sets it

off, how it runs its course, what follows. There are novels here, hidden in
the Commission's understated prose; there are a thousand doctoral theses

germinating in its statistics, its interviews, its anecdotes and "profiles."
Wicker, Introduction to the KERNER REPORT at ix (Bantam Books ed. 1968).
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official reports, such as the Walker Report' on the Chicago riots, and
the Douglas Commission Study' on city problems.
The citizen's inability to make sense of all this, no matter how
clearly and convincingly it were to be presented, is excusable. The
failure of his political leaders to rationalize it for him is surely not.9
The cold shoulder given the Report by our statesmen, right up to the
White House, might have been expected. In an otherwise violent and
strange election year, there was no productive way after the death
of Senator Kennedy for the voter to speak for or against the Report,
other than through the rejectionism of a George Wallace.
Yet this political vacuum reflects the core difficulty which stands
in the way of seeing anything substantial done along the lines of the
Report's call for action. That difficulty is in many ways connected to
a sense of frustration and alienation felt by the white middle class.
One commentator has pictured with particular insight the painful,
ironic position of the middle-class city dweller:
[H]is discontent is fed both by envy of the more prosperous

and by anger at the blacks - not just because he fears the blacks
but also because their problems, and not his, seem to be the focus
of national concem ....
The unexciting and envy-producing tone of the non-poor citizen's private life is heightened by the growing remoteness of public
life. The air around him is poisoned, parkland disappears under
relentless bulldozers, traffic stalls and jams, airplanes cannot land,
and even his own streets are unsafe and, increasingly, streaked with
terror. Yet he cannot remember having decided that these things
should happen, or even having wished them. He has no sense that
there is anything he can do to arrest the tide. He does not know
whom to blame. Somehow, the crucial aspects of his environment
seem in the grip of forces that are too huge and impersonal to attack.
You cannot vote them out of office or shout them down.o

Indeed there are, as the quote above would indicate, any number of
these impersonal and unseen enemies of a quality life which impinge
on both ghetto and suburb.
Education, jobs, and equality may remain big issues in the Negro
ghetto. But it is well worth nothing that a surprising number of basic
everyday concerns, such as places for recreation, good transportation,
refuse removal, consumer protection, and reasonably accessable health
care are themselves, and in the aggregate, serious problems to the
slum dweller.
7
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Apparently our political leadership, at least on the national level,
feels there is more to be gained by avoiding the middle-class voter's
resentment, than in pointing out the commonality of city problems
among black and white and then leading the hard way toward some
solutions. Perhaps, too, if the authors of the Report had been in a
position to analyze and emphasize like problems, drawn from some
of the intricate programming required for better urban life in America, a base might have been presented for meaningful political decision-making. 11
So, where are those who seek action on the insights and pleas
of the Kerner Report to turn? More important, where do we turn for
a unifying treatment of common problems whose solutions would
benefit us all?
Some would be hopeful of the lawyer in society fulfilling this
role, providing the time-honored, "generalist's" leadership in all
manner of public affairs for which the profession has been known.
Robert Kennedy wrote, in a slightly different connection:
[I]n the long quest for solutions, lawyers have a good deal to offer.
We are part of an intricate system that has developed over the cen-

turies as man's best hope for resolving disputes and appraising policies, for working out solutions to problems.
If this system of law ... can be kept viable, and if people of
all backgrounds and of all races and creeds can begin fully to under-

stand and to take advantage of it, then, and only then, will we stand

to realize the promise of democracy, both for ourselves and for the
world.' 2

And that:
No generation of lawyers has yet failed its responsibility to the law
or to our society. The role of the lawyer in de Tocqueville's time

prompted him to say that "I cannot believe that a republic could
hope to exist at the present time if the influence of lawyers in public
business did not increase in proportion to the power of the people.'8

It seems certain that there will be no easy approach to the lawyer's responsibility, as there will be no easy answers to any of the
Report's findings. Understanding and attention to the plight of our
cities, humanism and heart, these are the needed skills. Hardly any
job for advocates, the legally-trained may be discomforted by the
11As Richard Goodwin points out:
[These questions can be seen most acutely among those who are neither
poor nor black - the American middle class, or the American majority.
Their psychological plight is both worse and more dangerous than that of
the black militant leading a slum riot. For he at least has a cause and a
purpose, an enemy, and comrades in the struggle. No such outlets and no
human connections so satisfying are available to the man who lives in a
middle-class suburb or a lower-income city apartment. And his discontents,
unlike those of the poor, have real political weight. (emphasis added).
Id.
12R. KENNEDY, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 80 (1964).

13 Id. at 87.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

complex messiness of it all. But the lawyer who hasn't been discomforted by the events is at best insensitive - at worst, a derelict of
our profession.
For the bar to look at the Report and conclude that their major
obligation was, for example, to produce lawyers for either side of
the mass prosecutions which follow civil disorder would be the shallowest kind of ignorance. The job is infinitely bigger than that. Yet
this may be a frequent response by the organized bar. Worse still,
the inclinations of many who have dedicated their lives to the rule
of law is inevitably to look for means of control.
In line with its charge, a major portion of the Commission's
work has been analysis and recommendation of control methods. And
the Report admirably and emphatically distinguishes control from
repression. Its findings are for the most part encouraging in respect
to devices and techniques of policework (including the Army and
National Guard),14 yet these findings are overshadowed by the very
dim prospects for getting at root causes with significant social action.
The superficial view - and, it is feared, a likely one by some authority-conscious attorneys - is that control will seem cheaper than
cure. Time and again the Report speaks of the disastrous consequences of this philosophy.
Deeper than any of these, the penultimate challenge to the profession and its members, and to our society, is in the words of the
Commission, simply this:
What white Americans have never fully understood - but what

the Negro can never forget - is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions
maintain it, and white society condones it.

It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command
to the major unfinished business of this Nation. It is time to adopt
strategies for action that will produce quick and visible progress.
It is time to make good the promises of American democracy to all
citizens ....
Our recommendations embrace three basic principles:
To mount programs on a scale equal to the dimension of
the problems;
To aim these programs for high impact in the immediate
future in order to close the gap between promise and performance;
To undertake new initiatives and experiments that can
change the system of failure and frustration that now dominates the
ghetto and weakens our socety.15
The Report, this review of it, our profession's responsibility,
and the condition in which we find ourselves as a nation can be summarized in no better way than the words just set out. The challenge
14
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is there. It calls more for leadership than lawyering. It commands,
in a word, citizenship - of the highest and most noble sort. And in
the agonizing search for the awaited answers, the Kerner Report will
stand as a very fine touchstone indeed.
Robert T. Page
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